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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis was to expand the existing knowledge base concerning the profile of 
emotional processing that is associated with major depression, particularly in terms of socially 
important non-verbal stimuli (e.g. emotional facial expressions). Experiment one utilised a 
face-word variant of the emotional Stroop task and demonstrated that depressed patients (DP) 
did not exhibit a selective attention bias for sad faces. Conversely, the healthy controls (HC) 
were shown to selectively attend to happy faces. At recognition memory testing, DP did not 
exhibit a memory bias for depression-relevant words, but did demonstrate a tendency to 
falsely recognise depression-relevant words that had not been presented at encoding. 
Experiment two examined the pattern of autobiographical memory (ABM) retrieval 
exhibited by DP and HC in response to verbal (words) and non-verbal (images & faces) 
affective cues. DP were slower than HC to retrieve positive ABMs, but did not differ from 
HC in their retrieval times for negative ABMs. Overall, DP retrieved fewer specific ABMs 
than did the HC. Participants retrieved more specific ABMs to image cues than to words or 
faces, but this pattern was only demonstrated by the HC. Reduced retrieval of specific ABMs 
by DP was a consequence of increased retrieval of categorical ABMs; this tendency was 
particularly marked when the participants were cued with faces. During experiment three, 
DP and HC were presented with a series of faces and were asked to identify the gender of the 
person featured in each photograph. Overall, gender identification times were not affected by 
the emotion portrayed by the faces. Furthermore at subsequent recognition memory testing, 
DP did not exhibit MCM bias for sad faces. During experiment four, DP and HC were 
presented with videotaped depictions of ‘realistic’ social interactions and were asked to 
identify the emotion portrayed by the characters and to make inferences about the thoughts, 
intentions and beliefs of these individuals. Overall, DP were impaired in their recognition of 
happiness and in understanding social interactions involving sarcasm and deception. Correct 
social inference was significantly related to both executive function and depression severity. 
Experiment five involved assessing a group of eight patients that had undergone
I
neurosurgery for chronic, treatment-refractory depression on the identical emotion 
recognition and social perception tasks that were utilised in experiment four. Relative to HC, 
surgery patients (SP) exhibited general deficits on all emotion recognition and social 
processing tasks. Notably, depression status did not appear to interact with surgery status to 
worsen these observed deficits. These findings suggest that the anterior cingulate region of 
the prefrontal cortex may play a role in correct social inference. Summary: Taken together 
the findings of the five experimental studies of the thesis demonstrate that, in general, biases 
that have been observed in DP processing of affective verbal material generalise to non-verbal 
emotional material (e.g. emotional faces). However, there are a number of marked differences 
that have been highlighted throughout the thesis. There is also evidence that biased emotional 
processing in DP requires explicit processing of the emotional content of the stimuli. 
Furthermore, a central theme of the thesis is that deficits in executive function in DP appear to 
be implicated in the impairments of emotional processing that are exhibited by these patients.
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OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENTAL 
CHAPTERS OF THIS THESIS
CHAPTER THREE
Previous studies utilising emotional versions of the Stroop colour-naming task (e.g. 
Gotlib & Cane, 1987) have reported that clinically depressed individuals exhibit a 
selective attention bias towards depression-relevant words, evidenced by slower 
colour naming times for these words compared to positive or neutral words. The 
experiment reported in chapter three extended this work by utilising a face-word 
variant of the emotional Stroop task in order to establish if automatic processing of 
emotional faces would influence concurrent processing of, and subsequent memory 
for, a series of affective words. Of particular interest was whether clinically depressed 
patients would exhibit an attention bias for sad faces. In this study, participants were 
presented with affective words superimposed across photographs of emotional facial 
expressions and were required to ignore the faces and to identify the valence of the 
words. Participants were subsequently given a recognition memory test for the words 
they had viewed during the valence identification task. Contrary to predictions, 
depressed individuals did not selectively attend towards distracting sad faces. 
However, healthy controls demonstrated biased attention towards happy faces. 
Overall, depressed patients demonstrated a deficit in their ability to ignore the 
distracting faces, evidenced by slower valence identification times for incongruent 
face/word pairs relative to congruent pairs. Analysis of the accuracy of word-valence 
identification revealed that depressed individuals exhibited more accurate 
identification of depression-relevant words compared to other word types. During
XXII
recognition memory testing for the words, the depressed individuals did not 
demonstrate the predicted mood-congruent memory bias for depression-relevant 
words. However, they did demonstrate a significant tendency to falsely recognise 
depression-relevant words that had not been presented during the encoding phase. In 
contrast, there was some evidence to suggest that the controls demonstrated superior 
recognition memory for positive words. However, this may have been a consequence 
of a positive word response bias on the part of the controls, as this pattern was no 
longer evident when signal detection analysis was conducted to assess the participants 
‘pure’ memory for the words.
CHAPTER FOUR
Previous studies have consistently reported that major depression is associated with 
marked changes in the retrieval of autobiographical memories. For example, many 
studies have demonstrated that depression is related to greater accessibility of 
negative memories relative to positive, usually as a result of impaired retrieval of 
positive memories (see Williams, 1996). Furthermore, numerous studies (e.g. Kuyken 
& Brewin, 1995; Moore, Watts & Williams, 1988; Williams & Dritschel, 1988; 
Williams & Scott, 1988) have reported that, when requested to retrieve specific 
memories of autobiographical events, depressed individuals tend to retrieve 
overgeneral, categorical memories. The experiment reported in chapter four extended 
this work by comparing the pattern of ABM retrieval associated with the traditional 
verbal cueing task and two novel non-verbal cueing tasks, where participants were 
cued with emotional faces and affective images. Participants were presented with 
thi ee blocks of memory cues (words, images & faces) in a counterbalanced order and 
were required to retrieve a specific memory of an event from their past in response to
XXIII
each cue. The participants were also asked to rate the pleasantness of each memory 
they retrieved. As expected, depressed patients were significantly slower than healthy 
controls to retrieve specific positive memories, but did not differ from the controls in 
terms of the time taken to produce negative memories. Also as expected, depressed 
individuals retrieved significantly fewer specific ABMs than did the controls. 
Inspection of the participants’ retrieval errors revealed that the reduction in ABM 
specificity exhibited by the depressed patients was a consequence of a marked 
increase in the retrieval of generic categorical memories. As expected, participants 
retrieved significantly more specific memories to image cues than to faces or words. 
This finding is consistent with Williams et al (1999) who reported that highly 
imageable word cues produced greater ABM specificity than did less imageable 
words. However, in the current study, the specificity advantage for images was only 
observed in the healthy controls. This finding is consistent with Williams and 
Dritschel (1988), who reported that clinically depressed individuals were unahle to 
make use of additional contextual information to enhance their access to specific 
ABMs. Interestingly, in the current study, the tendency on the part of the depressed 
patients to retrieve generic memories was particularly marked when they were 
required to retrieve memories to face cues, compared to words or images. One 
plausible explanation of this finding is that the faces were inducing rumination in the 
depressed patients. Content analysis of the retrieved memories provided some support 
for this proposition. It is also possible that this finding was a consequence of 
differences in the relative cognitive demands of ABM retrieval to the faces compared 
to the other cue types. Inspection of the participants’ retrieval times revealed that, 
relative to words and images, faces required longer processing to produce specific 
ABMs, suggesting that retrieval to faces required greater cognitive capacity. It is
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generally accepted that depressed individuals have reduced cognitive capacity relative 
to healthy individuals, thus it would be expected that any increase in cognitive 
demand would have exerted a greater impact on the ABM retrieval of depressed 
patients, than that of the controls.
CHAPTER FIVE
Previous research has consistently demonstrated that depressed individuals exhibit a 
marked mood-congruent memory (MCM) bias for depression-relevant words. A 
recent study (Ridout, Astell, Reid, Glen & O’ Carroll, 2003) extended this work by 
demonstrating that this MCM bias generalises to depressed individuals’ memory for 
emotional facial expressions. The aim of the experiment reported in chapter five of 
this thesis was to establish if the observed MCM bias for sad faces in major 
depression was dependent upon explicit processing of face valence during encoding. 
In the previous study (Ridout et al, 2003) the task completed by the participants 
during encoding phase was a valence identification task, which clearly required 
explicit processing of face valence. In contrast, a gender identification task was 
utilised during the initial phase of the cuiTent study, which would not have required 
explicit processing of face valence. Participants were presented with a series of 
photographs of different people (who were posed in different emotional expressions) 
and were asked to identify the gender of the people featured in the photographs. 
Inspection of the gender identification times revealed that the emotional expression 
featured in the photographs did not influence the speed of gender identification. 
Furthermore, inspection of the recognition memory data revealed that depressed 
individuals did not demonstrate the expected MCM bias for the sad faces, suggesting 
that such memory biases are dependent upon explicit processing of emotional valence
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at encoding. This notion is consistent with Teasdale and Barnard’s Interacting 
Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) model (1993).
CHAPTER SIX
Previous research has demonstrated that clinical depression is associated with changes 
in emotion recognition from faces (e.g. Persad & Polivy, 1993). Furthermore, a 
number of studies (e.g. Ambady & Gray, 2002) have reported that depression is 
associated with impairments to social perception. The experiment reported in chapter 
six extended this work by utilising a novel test of emotion recognition and social 
perception (The Awareness of Social Inference Test; TASIT). In the Emotion 
Evaluation (EE) phase of TASIT, participants are presented with videotaped 
depictions of realistic social interactions and are required to identify the emotion 
portrayed by the individuals featured in the video clips. In the Social Inference (SI) 
phase, participants are presented with further video clips and are required to make 
inferences about the thoughts, feelings, beliefs and intentions of the featured 
protagonists. In the EE phase of the current study, clinically depressed individuals did 
not exhibit a general deficit in emotion recognition, relative to healthy controls. 
However, subsequent analysis of the paiticipants’ recognition of the individual 
emotional expressions revealed that they did exhibit a specific impairment in their 
recognition of happiness. In the SI phase of the current study, patients with major 
depression demonstrated impaired interpretation of social interactions involving 
sarcasm and deception, but were unimpaired in their interpretation of sincere social 
interactions, relative to healthy controls. Correct interpretation of social interactions 
involving sarcasm and deception was significantly related to both depression severity 
(indexed by the BDI scores) and central executive function (indexed by performance
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on the Stroop and Hayling’s tasks). A plausible explanation of these findings is that 
depression reduced the capacity of available cognitive resources that could be applied 
to perform the executive tasks and to interpret the social interactions. However, as the 
relationship between executive function and social inference persisted even after 
controlling for depression severity, it would seem likely that successful social 
inference relies, at least in part, upon intact executive function.
CHAPTER SEVEN
The aim of the experiment reported in chapter seven was to establish if neurosurgical 
interventions for chronic, treatment-refractory depression were associated with 
subsequent impairments in emotion recognition and social perception. The current 
study involved assessing a group of patients, around one year after they had 
undergone a neurosurgical intervention for chronic, treatment-resistant depression, on 
the same test of emotion recognition and social perception (TASIT) that was utilised 
in the study reported in chapter six. The depressed patients and healthy controls from 
the previous study were included in the current study as clinical and healthy control 
groups for the surgery patients. The findings reported in chapter six suggested a role 
for the central executive in successful social inference, evidenced by strong 
relationships between successful social interpretation and performance on the Stroop 
and Hayling’s tasks. Previous studies have implicated the anterior cingulate (AC) 
region of the preffontal cortex in the performance of these executive tasks. 
Furthermore, Homack et al (2003) reported that lesions to the AC were associated 
with impaired emotion recognition fi-om faces and voices. As it has been 
demonstrated that major depression is associated with dysfunction of the AC it is 
plausible that the deficits in social inference and executive performance exhibited by
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the depressed patients in the previous chapter might relate to the changes in function 
of the AC in these patients. Based on this assumption it was expected that the surgery 
patients in the current study would demonstrate similar impairment of emotion 
recognition and social processing, as the majority (seven out of eight) of the surgery 
patients in the current study had undergone an anterior cingulotomy (involving 
bilateral lesions to the anterior cingulate). The remaining surgery patient had 
undergone an anterior capsulotomy, which involves the disconnection of the 
orbitofrontal cortex from important regions of the limhic system (e.g. the thalamus). 
As Homack et al (2003) reported that dismption to the function of the OFC was also 
associated with impaired emotion recognition from faces and voices, it was expected 
that this patient would also demonstrate deficits on TASIT. In the emotion evaluation 
phase of the current study surgery patients demonstrated a general impairment of 
emotion recognition, in contrast to the depressed patients’ specific deficit in the 
recognition of happiness. In the social inference phases, surgery patients exhibited a 
general impairment in their social perception. Importantly, although both depression 
and surgery were associated with deficits in emotion recognition and social perception 
there was no interaction between these two factors. The findings suggest that the 
observed deficits in emotional processing related to a disruption of the normal 
functioning of the anterior cingulate and/or orbitofrontal cortex, either as a 
consequence of depression or surgical lesion. However, although both depression and 
surgical intervention were associated with impaired emotional processing, and 
presumably AC/ OFC function, they resulted in a differential pattern of impairment. 
Moreover, the presence of depressive symptoms in patients that had undergone 
surgery did not appear to further impair the emotional processing of these individuals.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
-CHAPTER ONE-
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Id . Background
Major depression (MD), also referred to as clinical depression, is the most common of 
all of the psychological disorders, with an estimated 5% of US and European 
populations suffering from MD at any one time (Blazer, Kessler, McGonagle & 
Swartz, 1994; Smith & Weissman, 1992), and with approximately one in five of the 
individuals in these populations suffering from MD at some point in their lives (cited 
in Hammen, 1997). Furthermore, according to the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), clinical depression is currently considered the fourth biggest cause of 
disability and premature death around the world, and is predicted to become the 
second biggest cause by the year 2020 (Murray & Lopez, 1996). From these findings 
it is clear that MD represents a common and extremely serious condition that warrants 
considerable research effort.
According to the fourth edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV; 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and the tenth version of the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10; WHO, 1993) the core feature of MD is a striking 
disturbance of mood. This disruption manifests itself most notably as feelings of 
intense sadness (or ‘emptiness’) that are usually coupled with marked anhedonia (loss 
of pleasure in life’s activities). Importantly, in MD these feelings are seen to persist 
over a number of weeks, months or even years (the diagnosis of major depression will 
be considered in more depth in the next chapter, page 46).
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Despite clear evidence that depression is associated with marked changes in brain 
chemistry (see Hammen, 1997), MD can also be usefully conceived of as a disorder of 
thinking. For example, it is common for depressed individuals to report that they 
believe their current depression to be a punishment for something they have done in 
the past. Such guilt-ridden, self-critical thinking has been shown to persist in 
depressed individuals even after these beliefs have been challenged by clinicians or 
the patient’s significant others (e.g. spouse). Many researchers (e.g. Beck, 1967;
Teasdale, 1983) have argued that the changes in thinking that are associated with 
clinical depression could play a central role in maintaining the ongoing depressive 
episode, and furthermore, might even be involved in the initial onset of MD. With 
this in mind, the last three decades have witnessed increasing interest in the cognitive 
aspects of clinical depression (see Murphy, Sahakian and O’ Carroll, 1998). The 
majority of this research has tended to follow one of two approaches. Studies have 
either examined depressed individuals’ performance on standard tests that address 
elements of general cognitive functioning (e.g. learning, memory, attention, problem­
solving etc) or else they have been concerned with changes in the processing of 
emotionally valenced material that are associated with major depression. Although 
these approaches have been conducted relatively independently of one another, it 
would seem clear that an understanding of the pattern of general cognitive impairment
in MD could contribute to explanations of the observed changes in the processing of
!
emotionally valenced material. Similarly, awareness of how MD influences the j
processing of affective material might also facilitate greater understanding of how |
depression impairs normal cognitive function. |
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The experimental studies that will form the core of this thesis will primarily take the 
latter approach of those outlined above (i.e. they will examine the processing of 
emotional material), however, in explaining the pattern of findings observed in each 
study, reference will be made to previous work concerning general cognitive 
impairment that is associated with MD. Furthermore, evidence concerning the 
possible neural underpinnings of the observed cognitive changes will also be 
considered. The next two sections of this chapter will provide an outline of the profile 
of general cognitive impairment that is associated with major depression and consider 
possible factors underlying this pattern of impairment. The subsequent two sections 
will then provide an overview of the central findings concerning the processing of 
affective material in MD and provide an overview of the principal cognitive theories 
of clinical depression, with particular focus on how these theories account for the 
observed changes in emotional processing. The subsequent section will consider 
possible neural underpinnings of major depression, including the associated pattern of 
cognitive impairment and the observed profile of emotional processing. Finally an 
outline of the principal aims of the thesis will be presented, including an overview of 
the central research questions.
L2. General cognitive impairment in MD
Despite the fact that both the DSM-IV and ICD-10 include reference to problems with 
concentration, thinking and decision-making in their diagnostic criteria for major 
depression, initial investigations into this area (e.g. Friedman, 1964) suggested that 
depression was only associated with mild impairment of cognitive function. However, 
this position was challenged by Miller (1975) who concluded, based on a review of 
the available evidence, that depression was associated with deficits in a variety of
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cognitive domains. Despite this work, the full extent of cognitive impairment 
associated with major depression has only been established fairly recently. For 
example, it has been reported on a number of occasions that the impairment of 
cognitive function associated with clinical depression could be so marked that 
depressed individuals were indistinguishable from patients with organic dementias 
(e.g. O’ Carroll, Conway, Ryman & Prentice, 1997). The evidence that individuals 
suffering from major depression exhibit impaired functioning of a variety of cognitive 
processes, most notably speed of processing, memory, attention and ‘executive’ 
function will be considered in the subsequent sub-sections (1.2.1 to 1.2.4.).
1.2.1. Cognitive and psvchomotor retardation in MD
A primary deficit that has been consistently demonstrated in the performance of 
depressed individuals on a myriad of cognitive tasks has been a marked slowing of 
cognitive and psychomotor speed (see Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 1997). 
For example, it has been reported on numerous occasions that depressed individuals 
exhibit impaired performance on simple reaction time (SRT) tasks (e.g. Austin et al, 
1999; Moffoot et al, 1994). Similar deficits have been reported on choice reaction 
time performance (e.g. Tarbuck & Paykel, 1995). Further evidence of marked 
psychomotor slowing in depressed patients comes from numerous studies (e.g. Austin 
et al, 1999; Ilsley, Moffoot & O’ Carroll, 1995; Ridout, Astell, Glen, Reid & O’ 
Carroll, 2003) reporting that major depression is associated with impaired 
performance on the digit symbol substitution task (DSST) from the revised Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1981). However, as noted by Mialet, 
Pope and Yurgelun-Todd (1996), although these tasks are, to some extent, measures 
of cognitive speed they also involve a motor component. Psychomotor retardation is
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highly characteristic of depressive states, thus it would seem likely that at least some 
of the deficit in performance on these tasks relates to this psychomotor retardation. 
Despite this likelihood, Tsourtos, Thompson and Stough (2002) reported that, relative 
to non-depressed matched controls, un-medicated depressed individuals were slowed 
on a measure of speed of information processing (inspection time; IT) that did not 
require a speeded motor response. Thus there is some evidence, at least for un­
medicated patients, to suggest that information processing is slowed, as a 
consequence of depression. However, it is important to note that psychomotor 
retardation is not specific to depression, as it has been reported in previous studies 
(e.g. Miller, 1975) that it was not possible to distinguish between depressed and 
schizophrenic patients on standard cognitive tests that involve motor and/or cognitive 
speed. However, it is clear that when assessing depressed individuals’ cognitive 
function there is a need to control for the deficits in performance that could be 
explained simply in terms of this cognitive/motor slowing.
1.2.2. Memory function in MD
There have been a vast number of studies reporting deficits in mnemonic function in 
depressed patients. Tarbuck and Paykel (1995) for example, reported that depressed 
individuals were significantly impaired, relative to matched controls, on all elements 
of the Rivennead Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT, Wilson et al, 1985), which is a 
standardised method of assessing everyday memory function. Furthermore, numerous 
studies have reported that depression is associated with impaired memory for 
previously learned words. This finding has been particularly robust in studies that 
have utilised recall tasks (e.g. Brown, Scott, Bench & Dolan, 1994; Golinkoff & 
Sweeney, 1989; Ilsley, Moffoot & O’Carroll, 1995) but has also been demonstrated in
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studies incorporating tests of recognition memory (e.g. Austin et al, 1999; Brown et 
al, 1994; Golinkoff & Sweeney, 1989) and also cued recall tasks, such as paired- 
associate learning (e.g. Brown et al, 1994; Golinkoff & Sweeney, 1989). In addition 
to the memory deficits that have been reported using verbal stimuli, recognition 
memory deficits have been also been reported in studies using visual stimuli. For 
example, a number of researchers have demonstrated impaired memory for abstract 
patterns (e.g. Abas, Sahakian & Levy, 1990; Elliott et al, 1996). In particular, it has 
been reported consistently (e.g. Elliot, Sahakian, Herrod, Robbins & Paykel, 1997; 
Elliot et al, 1996; Moffoot et al, 1994; Shah, O’ Carroll, Rogers, Moffoot & Ebmeier, 
1999) that depressed individuals are impaired on the delayed matching to sample task 
(DMTS), which is a controlled test of pattern recognition that is part of the Cambridge 
Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB; Morris et al, 1987). In 
addition, depressed individuals have been shown to exhibit deficits in recognition 
memory for previously viewed faces (e.g. Brown et al, 1994; Palmer et al, 1996). 
Despite the consistency of these findings, it should be noted that a number of studies 
have failed to demonstrate impaired recognition memory in depressed patients (e.g. 
Ilsley et al, 1995; Purcell, Maruff, Kyrios & Pantelis, 1997).
Another area of memory that has been the focus of considerable study has been short 
term/working memory function. There have been numerous studies (e.g. Abas, 
Sahakian & Levy, 1990; McAllister, 1981) reporting significant deficits in depressed 
individuals’ performance on tests assessing this area of memory function. Further 
supportive evidence of a working memory deficit in depressed individuals comes 
from several studies that have reported impaired performance on the digit span task 
(e.g. Austin et al, 1999; Moffoot et al, 1994; Ridout et al, 2003). Similarly, research
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(e.g. Abas et al, 1990; Elliott et al, 1996) reporting impaired performance on the 
spatial span task also provides support for the notion that major depression is 
associated with a dismption of working memory function. However, it should be 
noted, there have been a number of studies that have failed to demonstrate impaired 
working memory function in depressed patients (e.g. Ilsley et al, 1995; Purcell et al,
1997). Nevertheless, despite these findings, the weight of evidence supports a wide- 
ranging impairment of mnemonic function in major depression. This phenomenon 
will be considered further when the possible factors influencing these cognitive 
impairments are discussed (section 1.3, page 11).
1.2.3. Attention and concentration in MD
As noted by Mialet, Pope and Yurgelun-Todd (1996), in comparison to the vast 
number of studies addressing mnemonic function in major depression, there has been 
a relatively limited investigation of the changes in attentional processing that are 
related to clinical depression. This is surprising considering that depressed individuals 
often report considerable problems in their ability to concentrate (e.g. to read a 
newspaper). Studies that have been conducted have provided consistent evidence that 
major depression is associated with marked dysfunction of various aspects of 
attentional processing. For example, Mialet et al (1996) reported that, in terms of the 
initial ‘alerting’ stage of attention, depressed individuals exhibit a reduction in 
receptivity to incoming stimuli (e.g. indexed by longer initial processing time). 
Furthermore, a number of studies (e.g. Elliott et al, 1997; Shah et al, 1999) have 
reported that depressed individuals were less accurate in identifying targets on the 
simultaneous matching to sample element (SMTS) of CANTAB, a task that is best 
conceptualised as a measure of concentration and attention. There is also some
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evidence to suggest that clinical depression is associated with impaired vigilance and 
sustained attention (see Christensen, Griffiths, MacKinnon & Jacomb, 1997). There is 
also good evidence that deficits in focused attention contribute to the impairment in 
verbal recall that is associated with major depression. For example, Hertel and Rude 
(1991) demonstrated that when encoding conditions did not encourage focused 
attention depressed individuals’ recall of words was significantly poorer than matched 
controls. However, if the encoding instructions constrained participants to focus their 
attention on the words then the recall performance of the depressed patients was 
indistinguishable from that of the controls. From the above it is clear that depression 
is associated with deficits in many areas of normal attentional function. However, 
considering the character of everyday attentional problems that are reported by 
depressed individuals (e.g. an inability to concentrate sufficiently to read a book or to 
watch a television programme) it would seem that studies addressing selective 
attention might provide a clearer understanding of how clinical depression affects 
attention.
There have been a number of studies addressing elements of selective attention in 
depression. For example, there is considerable evidence that, relative to healthy 
controls, depressed individuals are impaired on the Stroop colour-naming task (e.g. 
Lamelin, Baruch, Vincent, Everett & Vincent, 1997; Trichard et al, 1995). In the 
traditional Stroop task participants are required to name the colour of ink in which a 
series of stimuli are presented. The most common finding is that participants are 
markedly slower to name the colour of ink when the stimuli are incongruent colour 
words (e.g. the word RED printed in green ink) than when they are nouns (e.g. the 
word TABLE printed in green ink) or letter strings (e.g. a row of X’s printed in green
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
ink). This finding is commonly referred to as the Stroop effect (Macleod, 1991). The 
Stroop task is usually considered to be measure of selective attention. However, there 
have been a number of theories proposed to account for the observed slowing in 
colour naming. The most common account is that automatic processing of word 
meaning interferes with colour naming. The Stroop task is also considered to be an 
executive task, as it requires controlled allocation of attention. A number of studies 
have reported increased interference from incongruent colour names in participants 
with frontal lobe damage (Swick & Jovanovic, 2002). Furthermore, there have been a 
number of functional imaging studies that have demonstrated increased activation in 
brain regions considered to be involved in executive processing (e.g. anterior 
cingulate; AC) during the performance of the traditional Stroop task (e.g. Pardo, 
Pardo, Janer & Raichle, 1990). However, it should be noted that, there have been a 
number of theories concerning the role of the AC in Stroop performance; including 
resource allocation, response selection and conflict monitoring. The common finding 
is that, relative to healthy controls, major depression is associated with increased 
interference from incongruent colour words on this task. However, Lamelin et al
(1997) concluded that impaired performance on the Stroop task in depression might 
be a consequence of two different attentional deficits; some patients may exhibit 
impaired distracter inhibition and others may have deficient processing resources 
available. The notion of differences in available cognitive resources will be discussed 
further in section 1.3 (page 11) when the possible factors underlying cognitive 
impairment in MD are considered. Further evidence that major depression is 
associated with impaired distracter inhibition comes from MacQueen, Tipper, Young, 
Joffee & Levitt (2000), who reported that depressed individuals failed to inhibit
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distracting “off task” stimuli when they were asked to respond to the target “on task” 
stimuli.
1.2.4. ‘Executive’ function in MD
A further domain of cognitive function that has been the subject of considerable 
research interest, in terms of the influence of major depression on cognitive function, 
is that of the so-called ‘executive’ function. ‘Executive’ function refers to the higher- 
level cognitive processes (e.g. planning, reasoning & problem-solving) that require 
organisation, control and allocation of cognitive resources (Channon, 1996). This 
important system has been postulated in a number of influential models of cognitive 
function. For example, the ‘central executive’ element of working memory proposed 
by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) or the ‘attentional supervisor’ proposed by Norman and 
Shallice (1986) in their model of attention. There is considerable evidence to suggest 
that clinical depression is associated with impaired ‘executive’ function. For example, 
numerous studies have demonstrated impaired verbal fluency in depressed patients 
(e.g. Brown et al, 1994; Elliott et al, 1998; Porterfield, Cook, Deary & Ebmeier, 1997; 
Trichai'd et al, 1995). However, it should be noted that this impairment could be due 
to the presence of psychomotor/cognitive slowing in the depressed patients (outlined 
above in 1.2.1, page 4).
Further evidence of ‘executive’ dysfunction in major depression comes from a 
number of studies reporting that depressed individuals are impaired on tasks that 
assess planning, such as the Towers of London task from CANTAB (e.g. Elliot et al, 
1996; Elliott et al, 1997; Purcell et al, 1997) or multiple scheduling tasks (e.g. 
Channon & Green, 1999). A widely utilised neuropsychological test that is considered
10
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to tap ‘executive function’ is the Wisconsin card-sorting task (WCST; Heaton, 1981). 
A vast number of studies have demonstrated impaired WCST performance in 
clinically depressed individuals (e.g. Austin et al, 1999; Channon, 1996; 
DegTInnocenti, Agren & Backman, 1998; Palmer et al, 1996). Inspection of the 
findings of these studies suggests that, relative to healthy individuals, depressed 
patients tend to take longer to learn the sorting rules, to complete fewer sorting 
categories, take more trials to complete each sorting category, and most notably to 
make more perseverative errors (i.e. continue to apply a sorting rule when it is no 
longer appropriate to do so). Other tasks that have been utilised in studies 
demonstrating impaired ‘executive’ function in depressed individuals include the 
Hayling’s sentence completion task (Channon & Green, 1999), the symbol 
cancellation task (Tarbuck & Paykel, 1995; Trichard et al, 1995), frequency 
judgement task (Golinkoff & Sweeney, 1989) and the silly sentences task (Tarbuck & 
Paykel, 1995). Taken together these findings indicate that clinical depression is 
associated with extensive impairment o f ‘executive’ function.
1.3. Possible factors influencing cognitive impairment in MD
1.3.1. Depression severitv
There have been numerous studies that have assessed the extent to which any 
observed cognitive impairment was associated with the severity of depressive 
symptoms. For example, Elliott et al (1996) reported that degree of cognitive 
impairment was significantly associated with clinical ratings of depression severity; 
these findings were particularly apparent for memory function. Similarly, a number of 
reviews of cognitive function in depressed patients have reported relationships 
between depression severity and cognitive impairment (e.g. Chiistensen et al, 1997;
11
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Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez & Dykman, 1993; Johnson & Magaro, 1987; and 
McAllister, 1981). However, it should be noted that a considerable number of studies 
have failed to report significant relationships between cognitive performance and 
depression severity (e.g. Brown et al, 1994; Channon & Green, 1999; DegTInnocenti 
et al, 1998; Golinkoff & Sweeney, 1989; Ilsley et al., 1995).
Taken together these findings suggest that there is some evidence to support a 
relationship between the severity of participants’ depression and their performance on 
a variety of cognitive tasks but it is far from a universal finding. As noted by Elliott
(1998), this discrepancy might relate, in part, to the measures of depression severity 
utilised in the different studies. Some measures (e.g. the Montgomery and Asberg 
Depression Rating Scale; MADRS, Montgomery & Asberg, 1979) have elements of 
the scale that refer explicitly to cognitive function and so would be likely to be related 
to any observed impairment, whereas other measures (e.g. the Hamilton Rating Scale 
for Depression; HRSD, Hamilton, 1960) do not include such items and so might be 
less likely to be associated with cognitive deficits.
1.3.2. Task demands
It has been proposed that depressed patients demonstrate greater cognitive impairment 
on tasks that require the application of cognitive effort than on tasks that require little 
or no cognitive effort, i.e. automatic processing (Hartlage et al, 1993; Hasher & 
Zacks, 1979). Evidence for this position comes from studies (e.g. Ilsley et al, 1995) 
that have demonstrated impaired recall but intact recognition memory performance in 
depressed individuals, as it has been suggested that recall tasks require greater 
cognitive effort than do tests of recognition memory (e.g. Weingartner & Silberman,
12
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1982). Further evidence cornes from studies reporting deficits in explicit memory but 
normal implicit memory performance (e.g. Denny & Hunt, 1992). Perhaps the 
strongest evidence is that depressed individuals have been consistently shown (e.g. 
Austin et al, 1999; Channon & Green, 1999) to exhibit impaired performance on 
‘executive’ tasks, which are clearly extremely cognitively demanding. It should be 
noted, that there have been some studies that do fit with the notion that depression 
selectively impairs effortful processing. For example, Christensen et al (1997) 
reported, in their review of cognitive function in depression, that patients did not 
differ in terms of the deficits they exhibited on recall or recognition tasks. However, 
in general there would appear to be strong support for the notion that depression 
selectively affects effortful as opposed to automatic processing.
1.3.3. Processing resources
Hasher and Zacks (1979) were the first theorists to suggest that depression might 
reduce the capacity of available cognitive resources. This notion was supported by 
Roy-Byme et al (1986) who proposed that this effect is mediated by the way 
depression interferes with the function of the neural systems utilising dopamine. 
However, other researchers (e.g. Ingram & Wisnicki, 1991) have argued that 
cognitive capacity is not altered in depression, but rather observed deficits are related 
to the patients narrowing the focus of their attention towards task irrelevant thoughts 
in general, or depression-relevant thoughts in particular. Finally, hoth of these 
propositions have been combined in the model of attention outlined by Ellis and 
Ashbrook (1988) that asserts that depression is associated with both reduced cognitive 
capacity and a narrowing of attentional focus towards primarily depression-relevant 
thoughts. The debate concerning the effect of depression on cognitive capacity is still
13
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ongoing, however the strongest evidence would seem to support the combined model 
proposed by Ellis and Ashbrook (1988). For more detailed coverage of the evidence 
concerning these different positions see the review conducted by Hartlage et al 
(1993). However, the notion that depressed individuals are preoccupied with 
depression-relevant thoughts will be returned to in the sub-section (1.3.5, page 15) 
discussing the influence of rumination on cognitive performance.
1.3.4. Motivation
Considering that “loss o f interest” is one of the diagnostic criteria for major 
depression on both the DSM-IV and ICD-10 it would seem likely that a lack of 
motivation on the part of depressed individuals would at least contribute to well- 
reported cognitive deficits associated with this condition. There is some support for 
this notion (e.g. Schmand et al, 1994). However, a study conducted by Richards and 
Ruff (1989) reported that direct manipulation of the levels of motivation had little or 
no effect on the level of observed cognitive performance. Elliot et al (1997) argued 
that it was important to distinguish between different aspects of motivation. 
According to these researchers, an important element of motivation in terms of major 
depression is the response to reinforcement. They demonstrated that the probability of 
a depressed individual making an error was significantly increased on a trial that 
followed a previous error. This finding corresponded with the results of Beats et al 
(1996) who also demonstrated a rapid deterioration of perfonnance on an ‘executive’ 
task (towers of London) once the depressed patients had committed an error. These 
results have been interpreted as evidence that depression is associated with a 
“catastrophic response to perceived failure”. However, it should be noted that Shah et 
al (1999) attempted to replicate these findings in two samples of depressed patients
14
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and failed to observe such a devastating deterioration of performance following 
negative feedback in either sample. They proposed that the abnormal response to 
failure feedback might be a characteristic a subgroup of depressed patients.
1.3.5. Rumination
Rumination can be defined as “the focusing o f one s thoughts on one’s current mood, 
the causes o f one’s depressive symptoms and worrying about the implications o f one’s 
depressive symptoms” (Watkins & Brown, 2002). This type of analytical thinking 
style is characteristic of many depressed individuals, and is particularly common 
amongst females (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Rumination has been shown to intensify 
patients’ depression and to interfere with their ability to actively solve problems they 
encounter in their day-to-day life. With this in mind, it would seem likely that 
ruminative thinking style would interfere with the patients’ ability to perform the type 
of cognitive tasks that were outlined in the previous sections. In line with this notion, 
a number of studies have reported that the ruminative response style is associated with 
impaired cognitive performance. For example, Watkins and Brown (2002) assessed 
clinically depressed patients and healthy controls on a measure of ‘executive’ function 
(random number generation task) following both a rumination and distraction 
manipulation. Following the rumination manipulation depressed individuals’ 
performance was significantly impaired relative to the controls. However, following 
distraction (which acts to prevent rumination) the performance of the two groups was 
indistinguishable. It is clear from these findings that mmination interferes with the 
performance of cognitive tasks, possibly by reducing the availability of cognitive 
resources that can be applied to the task in hand.
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1.3.6. Other potential influences on cognitive impairment in MD 
There are a number of other factors that have been shown to exert an influence on 
cognitive performance and, hence, need to be controlled for in studies addressing the 
effect of depression on tasks that involve cognitive functions such as memory. The 
first of these is age, as a number of studies have reported that it can have a negative 
impact on cognitive functioning, and has even been shown in some studies to interact 
with the effects of depression. The second factor is general intellectual ability; it 
would seem obvious that the basic cognitive functions involved in the types of tasks 
utilised to investigate emotional processing would be influenced by the participants’ 
general intelligence. Finally, there are a great many studies indicating that anxiety is 
also associated with changes in cognitive function (see Williams et al, 1997; Wells & 
Matthews, 1994). In particular there is good evidence that anxiety impairs attentional 
function. For example, Broadbent, Broadbent and Jones (1986) reported deficits in the 
performance of anxious patients on tasks assessing focused attention. Similarly, 
Mathews et al (1990) reported problems with attentional control in anxious 
participants. Major depression is commonly accompanied by marked anxiety with 
some studies reporting a co-morbidity rate of around 56% (Mineka, Watson & Clark,
1998). With this in mind, it is important when assessing the processing of emotional 
material in depression individuals to distinguish effects on processing that are related 
to depression from those that are a consequence of co-morbid anxiety.
1,4. Processing o f emotional material in MD
1.4.1. Memorv for emotional material in MD
In line with the investigation of general cognitive impairment (outlined in section 1.2, 
page 3) the bulk of studies addiessing processing of emotional material in major
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depression have tended to focus on memory function. These studies have been 
inclined to take one of two approaches. Studies have either looked at changes in 
depressed individuals ability to retrieve memories of events from their own lives (i.e. 
autobiographical memories) or else they have assessed depressed patients’ memory 
for emotionally valenced experimental material (e.g. affective words). The next two 
sub-sections will consider the wealth of evidence that has resulted from these two 
approaches.
1.4.1.1. Autobio graphical memorv (ABMl in MD
There is a wealth of evidence suggesting that major depression is associated with 
changes to autobiographical memory function. For example, many studies have 
demonstrated that depression is related to greater accessibility of negative memories 
relative to positive, usually as a result of impaired retrieval of positive memories (see 
Williams, 1996). This tendency has been demonstrated in both the speed of retrieval 
(e.g. Lloyd & Lishman, 1975) and in terms of the proportion of positive and negative 
memories retrieved (e.g. Clark & Teasdale, 1982). In addition to changes in the 
relative accessibility of different memories, numerous studies (e.g. Kuyken & Brewin, 
1995; Moore, Watts & Williams, 1988; Williams & Dritschel, 1988; Williams & 
Scott, 1988) have reported that, when requested to retrieve specific memories of 
autobiographical events, depressed individuals are more likely than non-depressed 
controls to retrieve overgeneral memories. Williams and Dritschel (1992) conducted a 
detailed analysis of the types of ABMs produced by depressed patients and identified 
two forms of general ABM; extended memories (that last longer than one day, e.g. 
being on holiday in Spain two years ago) and categorical memories (summaries of 
repeated events, e.g. taking the dog for a walk, getting in trouble at worE). Following
17
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
their analysis they reported that, relative to healthy controls, depressed individuals 
exhibited a greater tendency to produce the categorical form of general ABMs, 
whereas the two groups did not differ in terms of the number of extended memories 
they produced.
Another factor that has been shown to influence the specificity of depressed 
individuals’ ABM retrieval is the valence of the retrieved memory. For example, 
Williams & Broadbent (1986) reported that depressed suicidal patients retrieved 
significantly more positive than negative overgeneral ABMs. This finding has been 
replicated in many subsequent studies (e.g. Brittlebank, Scott, Williams & Ferrier, 
1993; Puffet et al, 1991; Williams & Dritschel, 1988). With this in mind, two recent 
studies (Park, Goodyer & Teasdale, 2002; Swales & Williams, 2001) are of note, as 
they reported no valence effects upon the specificity of retrieved ABMs. However, 
both of these studies addressed ABM retrieval in adolescents suffering from 
emotional disorders rather than adult patients, which might account for the different 
pattern of retrieval. It is clear, however, that in adult populations valence effects on 
specificity of ABM retrieval are relatively robust.
It should be noted that overgeneral ABM retrieval is not specific to MD and suicidal 
individuals, as it has also been observed in patients suffering from post-traumatic 
stress disorder (e.g. McNally, Litz, Prassas, Shin & Weathers, 1994; McNally, Lasko, 
Macklin & Pitman, 1995). There is also some evidence of overgeneral ABM retrieval 
in patients suffering from obsessive-compulsive disorder (e.g. Wilhelm, McNally, 
Baer & Florin, 1997). However, as noted by the authors themselves, it is possible that 
this finding related to co-morbid depression rather than their obsessive-compulsive
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symptoms. It is also important to note that overgeneral ABM retrieval is not common 
to all psychological disorders, as there is little support for such a bias in anxious 
individuals (see Burke & Mathews, 1992; Richards & Whittaker, 1990) or patients 
with social phobia (Rapee, McCallum, Melville, Ravenscroft & Rodney, 1994). 
Subsequent research has demonstrated that overgeneral ABM retrieval has important 
clinical and social consequences for individuals with depression. For example, 
Brittlebank et al (1993) reported that higher levels of overgeneral ABM retrieval, 
particularly of positive memories, were associated with poorer long-term outcome for 
clinically depressed patients. Furthermore, other studies (e.g. Evans, Williams, 
O’Loughlin & Howells, 1992; Goddard, Dritschel & Burton, 1996) have 
demonstrated that the generic retrieval style is associated with poorer interpersonal 
problem solving. Therefore, it is clear that the study of overgeneral autobiographical 
memory in individuals suffering from clinical depression represents an increasingly 
important avenue of research.
An account of overgeneral ABM retrieval in depression requires an understanding of 
the organisation of autobiographical knowledge in memory. There is considerable 
evidence (e.g. Conway & Rubin, 1993, Conway, Pleydell-Pearce & Whitecross, 2001) 
to suggest that autobiographical information is organised in some form of hierarchy, 
with information of increasing specificity at different levels of the hierarchy. Access 
to information at the higher (less specific) levels of the structure provides access to 
knowledge that is stored at lower (more specific) levels and vice - versa. It is 
proposed (e.g. Conway & Rubin, 1993) that the ABM knowledge base is accessed via 
a cyclical retrieval system, mediated by the central executive, that creates a general 
memory description based upon the available cues, searches memory using this 
description and then evaluates the output in terms of the task in hand. If the required
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memory has been retrieved then the search is teiminated with the current output. 
However, if the search does not produce the required specificity of knowledge then 
the cycle begins again and the memory description will be elaborated with 
information from related knowledge schema in order to predict further details of the 
target memory leading to its retrieval. Healthy individuals are able to move fluently 
through the hierarchy in order to access the specificity of information required by a 
given context. In contrast, as highlighted above, depressed individuals exhibit marked 
difficulties in moving from general descriptions to specific event memories.
Williams (1996) suggested that successful retrieval of specific autobiographical 
memories requires the inhibition of the intermediate categorical descriptions in order 
to allow contextual information (e.g. time and place etc) to be added to the memory 
search. In line with Conway & Rubin (1993), Williams also argued that this inhibition 
is a function of the central executive. Thus low central executive capacity would 
result in less specific memories. Evidence supporting this notion comes from a 
number of studies addressing retrieval of personal memories in patients that have 
reduced working memory capacity (e.g. brain injured patients; Baddeley & Wilson, 
1986 or elderly adults; Winthorpe & Rabbitt, 1988), as they have reported that these 
individuals tend to produce overgeneral ABMs. However, in contrast to the pattern 
reported for depressed patients (Williams & Dritschel, 1992), these individuals tend to 
demonstrate increased retrieval of extended ABMs rather than categorical memories 
(Williams, 1996).
Williams and Dritschel (1988) suggested that individuals who are prone to emotional 
problems might use the overgeneral retrieval style in order to avoid the painful 
consequences of accessing specific negative memories. Williams (1996) suggested
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that whenever a memory cue begins to access elements of an emotional event the 
search is strategically terminated by the individual in order to avoid the possibility of 
accessing a memory of a painfrd event. Williams argued that failure to access the 
required memory output would result in the cyclical retrieval mechanism initiating a 
second memory search. The result of the second search is another intermediate 
description that will again lead to a termination of the memory search once the 
process begins to access elements of previous emotional episodes. The consequence 
of subsequent iterations of the retrieval mechanism is, according to Williams, a 
chronically activated network of mainly negative general descriptions. Williams 
proposed that over time associations form between these general descriptions and also 
with novel event information. The consequence of this process is that, in future 
attempts to retrieve an ABM, the intermediate description that is accessed in response 
to the initial memory cue leads to the access of further general categorical 
descriptions, due to the strength of the associative links between the categorical 
memories. Williams (1996) termed this process ‘Mnemonic Interlock’, which he 
suggested was encouraged by, and encouraging of ruminative self-focus.
Evidence in support of the notion that overgeneral ABM retrieval might be a 
consequence of an attempt on the part of the depressed individual to avoid accessing 
negative event memories comes from a study conducted by Kuyken and Brewin 
(1995), who reported that depressed patients who had been subjected to childhood 
sexual abuse produced more overgeneral memories than did patients who reported no 
such abuse. Furthermore, patients who reported recent attempts to avoid thinking 
about memories concerning this abuse were also shown to retrieve a greater number 
of generic memories, relative to participants who did not report this tendency. 
However, as noted by Williams, Teasdale, Segal and Soulsby (2000), it is also
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possible that the cognitive efïbrt required to suppress these unpleasant memories 
reduces the amount of available cognitive resources, which would also contribute to 
the difficulty in moving from general to specific memories. In line with this notion, a 
number of studies have reported that a ruminative thinking style is associated with 
differences in ABM retrieval (e.g. Lyubomirsky, Caldwell & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; 
Watkins, Teasdale & Williams, 2000; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). For example, 
Wakins et al (2000) reported that preventing rumination in depressed participants, 
using a distraction manipulation, reduced overgeneral ABM retrieval. A similar 
reduction in overgeneral ABM retrieval was observed in Watkins and Teasdale (2001) 
in conditions that led to reductions in analytical self-focus. They suggested that 
overgeneral ABM retrieval might be a consequence of rumination upon current or 
past problems, in an attempt to make sense of them.
Initially it was thought that overgeneral retrieval style was a trait phenomenon, i.e. 
was part of the make up of individuals who are prone to emotional problems. 
However, both of the studies conducted by Watkins and colleagues suggest that the 
categorical retrieval style is modifiable, as it was influenced by short-term cognitive 
manipulations. In line with this notion, a recent study (Williams, Teasdale, Segal & 
Soulsby, 2000) reported that a relatively new form of cognitive therapy ‘Mindfulness’ 
therapy was also successful in reducing the rate of overgeneral ABM retrieval. The 
key point here is that it appears to be possible to manipulate the specificity of ABM 
retrieval experimentally, which should provide greater understanding of the processes 
underlying overgeneral ABM retrieval.
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1.4.1.2. Mood-congruent memory IMCMI bias for experimental materials in MD 
Mood congruent memory has been defined as the tendency to recall information that 
is consistent with one’s current mood (Watkins, Mathews, Williamson & Fuller, 
1992). Using the verbal learning paradigm, a vast number of studies have 
demonstrated MCM bias for emotional stimuli in depressed individuals. For example, 
Derry and Kuiper (1981) presented depressed patients and healthy controls with a list 
of positive and negative self-referent words. At memory testing, they demonstrated 
that the depressed individuals exhibited superior recall of the negative words (e.g. 
useless), whereas the non-depressed participants demonstrated superior recall of the 
positive words (e.g. excited). This finding has been replicated on numerous occasions 
(e.g. Bradley & Mathews, 1983; Bradley et a l 1995; Denny & Hunt, 1992; Watkins 
et al. 1992; see also review by Blaney, 1986). It should be noted, however, that the 
MCM bias in MD appears to be confined to memory for self-referent, depression­
relevant words (e.g. failure) and not all negative words (e.g. cancer).
MCM bias has also been demonstrated consistently in studies utilising recognition 
memory tasks. For example, Dunbar and Lishman (1984) conducted a study assessing 
the recognition memory of depressed individuals and healthy controls for previously 
viewed (positive, neutral & negative) affective words. They conducted a signal 
detection analysis and reported that although the depressed patients and controls did 
not differ in their memory for the neutral words the depressed individuals 
demonstrated superior memory for negative words. Conversely, the controls 
demonstrated enhanced memory for the positive words. Analysis of response biases 
indicated that depressed individuals exhibited preferential processing of the 
depression relevant words.
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Superior recognition memory for depression-relevant words has been replicated on a 
number of subsequent occasions (e.g. Watkins et al, 1992). It should also be noted 
that despite the apparent robustness of the phenomenon there have been a small 
number of studies that have reported no recognition memory bias in depressed 
patients for depression-relevant, self-referent words (e.g. Banos, 2001). With this in 
mind, it is generally accepted that MCM bias in MD is stronger in recall than 
recognition tasks (see Dalgleish & Watts, 1990). Of particular note is an important 
meta-analysis of studies investigating mood congruent recall of positive and negative 
verbal material (e.g. words, sentences, whole texts) carried out by Matt, Vacquez and 
Campbell (1992). They revealed that clinically depressed individuals on average 
recalled 10% more negative than positive material. Conversely, healthy, non­
depressed individuals were shown to demonstrate a bias towards superior recall of 
positive material (recalling an average of 8% more positive than negative).
Previous research addressing MCM bias in depressed individuals has focused almost 
exclusively on differences in memory for verbal material (words, stories etc). 
However, it is clear that biased memory for important social stimuli (e.g. emotional 
facial expressions) could have important consequences in terms of how depressed 
individuals view their social interactions. With this in mind, Ridout, Astell, Reid, 
Glen and O’ Carroll (2003) conducted a study to establish if the MCM bias 
generalised to the processing of emotional facial expressions. In their study, 16 
clinically depressed patients and 16 matched controls were presented with a series of 
photographic images of different individuals portraying happy, sad or neutral facial 
expressions. At encoding, participants were required to identify the valence of the 
emotion portrayed by the faces (i.e. positive, neutral or negative) and then were
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subsequently given a recognition memory test for these faces. In line with studies 
addressing memory for affective verbal stimuli, depressed patients correctly 
recognised significantly more of the sad faces than either happy or neutral faces. In 
contrast, the healthy controls demonstrated superior memory for happy expressions 
relative to sad or neutral faces (these data are illustrated in figure 1.1). The findings 
of Ridout et al (2003) suggest that MCM bias is not confined to the processing of 
affectively valenced words, but notably is also present in depressed individuals’ 
processing of socially relevant emotional stimuli. These findings will be discussed 
further in the section (1.5, page 36) concerning cognitive theories of major 
depression.
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Figure 1.1. Percentage of each type of emotional faces correctly recognised by the 
participants during recognition memory testing (error bars show ± one standard 
error of the mean) - reproduced from Ridout et al (2003).
25
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The memory tasks that were utilised in the studies outlined above (e.g. recall & 
recognition) all assessed explicit memory function, i.e. these tasks require participants 
to actively search their memory for the previously leamt material. It should be noted 
that there have also been a number of studies that have addressed implicit memory 
function in depressed individuals (e.g. Wakins et al., 1996). Implicit memory refers to 
occasions where previously leamt material influences ongoing processing, but where 
the individual has not consciously searched for this information and may not even be 
aware that learning has taken place. The evidence that major depression is associated 
with a mood-congment implicit memory bias has received considerably less support 
than the explicit MCM bias. The majority of studies have reported that depression is 
not associated with an implicit memory bias (e.g. Bazin et al., 1994; Denny & Hunt, 
1992; Watkins et al., 1992). However, in a recent review, Watkins (2002) suggested 
that the failure to demonstrate mood-congment implicit memory biases in MD might 
relate to the types of implicit memory tasks that have been utilised by the majority of 
previous studies. In general, previous studies have utilised tasks such as word 
fragment and word-stem completion. Such tasks rely on the priming of physical 
characteristics. However, Watkins (2002) successfully demonstrated the presence of 
an implicit memory bias in depressed individuals under circumstances that involved 
conceptual priming but not in tasks involving the priming of physical characteristics. 
Watkins (2002) suggested that implicit memory bias in depression might be confined 
to conditions that encourage conceptual priming. However, in a recent review of the 
literature concerning implicit memory function in major depression, Bairy, Naus and 
Rehm (2004) reported that it is not the type of processing per se that is important for 
implicit memoiy bias in depression but rather whether there is a match between the 
type of processing required during the encoding task and the type of processing
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required during the retrieval stage. This notion is referred to as Transfer Appropriate 
Processing (TAP). Originally proposed by Roediger and Blaxton (1987), the basic 
premise of TAP is that performance on a given task is dependent less on the type of 
memory system that is activated and more upon the match in processing requirements 
between the training and assessment phases. Thus participants’ perfonnance on a 
word-fragment completion task (a perceptual task) would be enhanced following a 
perceptual encoding task (e.g. categorise these words according to number of letters) 
relative to a conceptual encoding task (e.g. categorise these words according to their 
meaning), whereas participants would demonstrate superior performance on a 
conceptual retrieval task (e.g. sentence completion) when they had undergone 
conceptual training relative to perceptual encoding.
Barry et al (2004) proposed that the equivocal findings of implicit memory bias in 
depression could be accounted for within the TAP framework. In their review, they 
grouped the available evidence into two categories, the case for and against an 
implicit memory bias in depression. They demonstrated that studies providing 
evidence for such a bias in depression (e.g. Bradley et al, 1994, Ruiz-Caballero & 
Gonzalez, 1994, Watkins et al, 1996) had used a design that involved a match 
between the processing requirements of the encoding task and the retrieval task. 
Usually, these studies involved perceptual processing at both encoding and test 
phases. However, as reported above, implicit memory bias has also been 
demonstrated in tasks involving conceptual processing, but only in cases that have 
involved conceptual processing at both encoding and retrieval. In contrast, Barry et al 
(2004) demonstrated that studies that had failed to demonstrate an implicit bias in 
depression (e.g. Denny & Hunt, 1992, Ilsley et al, 1995; Watkins et al, 1992) had
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designs that involved one type of processing during encoding (e.g. conceptual) and a 
different form of processing (e.g. perceptual) at retrieval. In conclusion, taking into 
consideration the recent evidence, it would appear that depression is associated with 
an implicit memory bias but only in situations where the learning and retrieval of the 
material involve the same form of processing. These findings will be discussed in 
more detail in section 1.5 (page 31), when the cognitive theories of depression are 
considered.
1.4.2. Selective attention for affective material in MD
In line with the studies addressing general attentional impairment (outlined in section
1.2.3, page 7) there have been relatively few studies investigating selective attention 
for affective stimuli in major depression, particularly in comparison to the vast 
number of studies that have been conducted into depressed individuals’ memory for 
different types of emotional material. The evidence supporting the presence of biased 
attention for negative material has been equivocal. The remainder of this section will 
consider the evidence for and against the presence of a selective attention bias in 
major depression.
Selective attention for negative emotional material in MD has been demonstrated 
most consistently in studies that have utilised emotional analogues of the Stroop 
colour-naming task (see section 1.2.3. page 7 for a description of the traditional 
Stroop task and what is thought to measure). For example, Gotlib and Cane (1987) 
demonstrated that, relative to positive and neutral words, clinically depressed patients 
were significantly slower to colour-name depression-relevant words. This effect has 
subsequently been replicated on numerous occasions (e.g. Nunn, Mathews & Trower,
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1997; Segal & Vella, 1990, Segal et al, 1995, and Williams & Nulty, 1986). It should 
be noted that a study conducted by Hill and Knowles (1991) failed to replicate this 
finding. Possible explanations for their findings could be the relatively small sample 
(n=12), the severity of depression in their sample (their patients were only mildly 
depressed) and finally the type of stimuli they utilised in their study (general negative 
words not strictly depression-relevant).
Despite the evidence of a MCM selective attention bias in depressed individuals 
provided by the studies using emotional Stroop tasks, the vast majority of studies 
utilising alternative measures of selective attention performance (e.g. the dot-probe 
task) have failed to provide further support for this phenomenon. For example, 
MacLeod, Mathews and Tata (1986) utilised the dot-probe task to investigate if 
depressed and anxious participants exhibited selective biases for negative stimuli. 
They reported that anxious individuals selectively attended to the threat words but the 
depressed individuals did not show this bias. A possible criticism of this study is that 
the words were threat-relevant and not depression-relevant and as noted above 
cognitive biases associated with emotional disorders usually require the stimuli to be 
condition relevant (see Williams et al, 1997). Therefore, in a related study, Gotlib, 
McLachlan and Katz (1988) incorporated depression-relevant words into the dot- 
probe task to address this criticism. However, they also failed to demonstrate evidence 
of a selective attention bias in the depressed individuals. Their results demonstrated 
that the depressed participants were even-handed in their attention to the different 
types of words, whereas the non-depressed individuals exhibited biased attention 
towards the manic words. A potential criticism of their study is that it was conducted 
using a student sample categorised as depressed or non-depressed according to their
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scores on the Beck Depression Inventory and there is good evidence that clinical and 
‘analogue’ samples differ in the type and strength of cognitive biases they exhibit (see 
Williams et al, 1997). Furthermore, it should be noted that Power & Dalgleish (1997) 
argued that the failure to demonstrate the positive attention bias that is associated with 
healthy mood, should also be interpreted as evidence of a negative bias on the part of 
the depressed patients.
Despite these findings it is important to note that there have been a number of studies 
that have utilised tasks other than the emotional Stroop and demonstrated evidence of 
privileged processing of depression-relevant stimuli in depressed patients. Bradley, 
Mogg and Lee (1997), for example, utilised the modified dot-probe task, to address 
selective attention to depression-relevant words in participants with induced and 
naturally occurring depressed mood. Importantly, they reported that both types of 
depressed mood were associated with an attention bias towards depression related 
words. However, these effects were only observed in conditions that allowed 
relatively prolonged processing of the words (around 1000 milliseconds). They 
reported that depressed mood was not associated with an early (pre-conscious) bias 
for negative words, as there was no bias present when the words were presented for 
short durations (14ms) and then masked.
The findings reported above for affective words have largely been replicated in 
subsequent studies using emotional facial expressions. Bradley et al (1997b) utilised 
the dot probe task to investigate dysphoric and non-dysphoric students attention to 
different facial expressions (angiy, happy or neutral). They reported that dysphoric 
students demonstrated no attention biases in processing the facial stimuli, whereas the
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non-dysphoric students attended away from the threatening (angry) faces. In a related 
study (Bradley et al, 1998), anxious individuals were shown to exhibit an attention 
bias towards angry faces, whereas participants who were high in dysphoria (indicated 
by high BDI scores) demonstrated a bias away from happy expressions. Similarly, 
Suslow, Junghanns and Arolt (2001) utilised an alternative measure of spatial 
attention (the face-in-the-crowd task) and reported that, relative to non-depressed 
participants, depressed individuals were significantly impaired at detecting happy 
expressions in an array of neutral expressions. However, these patients did not exhibit 
the increased sensitivity to detecting sad faces. Recently, Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue 
and Joormann (2004) utilised the dot-probe paradigm to investigate depressed 
individuals processing of emotional faces and replicated the findings of Bradley et al 
(1997a). Depressed individuals demonstrated biased selective attention towards the 
sad faces, but only in conditions that allowed prolonged processing of the stimuli 
(around 1000 milliseconds).
Taken together, these findings provide some evidence that depressed individuals 
selectively attend to depression-relevant material in their environment. However, it 
would appear that this bias does not operate in all areas of processing; most notably it 
does not appear that depressed individuals demonstrate biased pre-conscious attention 
to depression-related stimuli. The clearest interpretation of these findings, including 
the studies utilising the emotional Stroop task, is that depression is associated with 
problems in disengaging from depression-relevant material that has become the focus 
of attention, rather than enhanced spatial awareness of salient negative material in 
their environment. For example, if  a depressed individual were giving a public speech 
they would not, relative to a healthy individual, be more sensitive to detecting a
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person in the room that was yawning. However, if the depressed individual happened 
to notice the person yawning then they would tend to focus their attention on that 
person, whereas a person in a healthy mood would be more likely to focus their 
attention away from that yawning person towards someone who was paying attention, 
smiling and nodding for instance. In line with this notion, it would also seem that 
depression is associated with a loss of the positive bias that is characteristic of normal 
mood, a tendency that can also be interpreted as a negative attention bias (see Power 
& Dalgleish, 1997). These findings will be considered in more detail in the section 
(1.5, page 36) concerning cognitive theories of major depression. One thing that is 
clear is that further investigation of selective attention in depression, particularly in 
terms of the processing of socially relevant stimuli (e.g. emotional faces), represents 
an important and potentially fruitful avenue of study.
1.4.3. Emotion recognition and social perception in MD i
iMurphy et al (1999) presented depressed individuals and matched controls with a i
series of emotional words as part of an affective set-shifting task. They reported that 
the depressed patients were significantly faster to identify the emotional valence of 
depression-relevant words than positive words. This finding suggests that depressed 
individuals exhibit biased detection of depression-relevant material. In line with this 
notion there is some evidence that depressed patients demonstrate superior 
recognition of sadness from facial expressions (e.g. Mandai & Bhattacharya, 1985)
Similarly, Murray & Ferret (2000) reported that depressed individuals were more 
sensitive to the presence of sad mood in ambiguous facial expressions. Conversely, 
other studies have reported that depressed patients exhibit impaired recognition of 
emotion from faces (e.g. Feinberg, Rifkin, Schaffer & Walker, 1986). In line with this
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notion, Persad & Polivy (1993) presented clinically depressed individuals with a 
booklet containing a series of emotional faces (half portrayed by a male, half by a 
female) and asked the participants to identify the emotion portrayed by choosing a 
one descriptor from seven possible responses (happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, 
surprise, anxious & indifferent). Persad and Polivy (1993) reported that depressed 
patients exhibited a general deficit in their ability to recognise emotion from 
photographic images of emotional facial expressions. Similarly, Bouhuys, Bloem & 
Groothuis (1995) reported a depression-related bias in the perception of emotional 
facial expressions, such that depressed individuals perceived more sadness in 
ambiguous expressions and less happiness in explicit facial expressions. These 
findings are consistent with the proposal that major depression is associated with 
deficits in social functioning (Cooley & Nowicki, 1989). However, it should be noted 
that other studies that have reported no differences between depressed participants 
and healthy controls in terms of emotion recognition from facial cues (e.g. Loeb, 
Feshbach, Beck & Wolfe, 1964). Furthermore, Ridout et al (2003) presented clinically 
depressed patients and healthy controls with photographic images of emotional faces 
via a computer screen and asked the participants to identify the emotion portrayed 
(happiness, sadness or neural expression) by pressing one of three marked keys on the 
computer keyboard. The authors reported that depressed and non-depressed 
participants did not differ on the number of expressions they correctly recognised or 
on the types of recognition errors they made. The variability of these findings could 
relate to differences in the emotional stimuli utilised in the different studies or the 
type of task used to address emotion recognition during these studies. It is clear, 
however, that there is a need for further investigation of emotional processing from 
faces in major depression.
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In addition to differences in emotion recognition (discussed above) there is evidence 
that depressed individuals are impaired on tasks that involve social perception. Social 
perception has been defined as the ability to read social cues and use them to make 
judgements about the behaviour, attitudes and emotions of others (McFall, 1982). For 
example, depressed individuals tend to provide negative interpretations when asked to 
judge stories concerning social situations that have an ambiguous meaning (e.g. 
Rrantz & Hammen, 1979; Butler & Mathews, 1983). Furthermore, Bollenbach & 
Madigan (1982) presented undergraduate students that undergone a mood induction 
procedure (to induce either an elated or depressed mood) with drawings of social 
situations and reported that mood significantly influenced the participants’ 
interpretations of the pictures, with depressed mood being associated with more 
negative perceptions. Similarly, Hoehn-Hyde, Schlottman & Rush (1982) presented 
clinically depressed individuals and healthy controls with videotapes of social 
interactions (either positive, neutral or negative in content). They reported that 
depressed individuals perceived the negative interactions as more negative than did 
the controls (but only when they were asked to imagine themselves involved in the 
social interactions). Hollander and Hokanson (1988) presented dysphoric and non- 
dysphoric students with videotaped scenarios involving a counselling session. Half of 
the clips portrayed the counsellor being genuine and in the other half the counsellor’s 
behaviour was non-genuine. The dysphoric participants were unable to differentiate 
between the two types of behaviour. Overall the dysphoric students perceived less 
genuineness that did the controls. Further evidence that depression influences 
individuals’ perception of social behaviour was provided in a recent study conducted 
by Ambady and Gray (2002). They presented dysphoric and non-dysphoric 
individuals (categorised according to their BDI scores) with ‘thin slices’ of non-verbal
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behaviour (silent video clips of a teacher in a classroom lasting between 6 & 15 
seconds) and asked them to make judgements of the competence of the individuals 
portrayed. Ambady and Gray (2002) reported that the dysphoric individuals provided 
less accurate judgements than did non-dysphoric participants. In a second study (also 
reported in Ambady and Gray, 2002) dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants were 
asked to make judgements about the type of relationships that existed between two 
individuals featured in another series of ‘thin slices’. Again, the authors reported that 
dysphoria significantly impaired the accuracy of the participants’ social judgements. 
Interestingly, participants’ perfonnance significantly improved when they were 
required to complete the social judgement task, whilst simultaneously performing a 
distracting task (that required cognitive resources).
It should be noted, however, that depressed individuals have also been shown to make 
more accurate social judgements than non-depressed individuals. For example, Edison 
and Adams (1992) asked dysphoric and non-dysphoric students to take part in dyadic 
social interactions. The participants subsequently rated their own and others social 
behaviour (the social interactions were also judged by independent raters). Dysphoric 
participants were more accurate in their perceptions of the quality of their own social 
performance than were non-dysphoric participants. Interestingly dysphoric individuals 
were also more accurate in judging other peoples social behaviour than were the non- 
dysphoric participants. Other studies have reported that depressed individuals do not 
differ from non-depressed individuals in terms of their social perception. For 
example. Price (1995) presented dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants with 
videotaped scenes of non-verbal behaviour (positive & negative in nature). She 
reported that there was no difference between the two groups in terms of their ability
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to identify the valence of the behaviour. Despite these findings the weight of evidence 
suggests that depressed mood is associated with impaired social perception.
7.5. Cognitive theories ofMD
During the last three decades there have been a number of theories proposed to 
account for the growing literature on the cognitive aspects of major depression. The 
next subsection of this chapter will provide an overview of two of the most influential 
of the early cognitive theories of depression, those of Beck’s Schema theory (Beck, 
1967) and Bower’s network theory (Bower, 1981). The subsequent two subsections 
will outline two contemporary models of depression proposed by Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod and Mathews (1988; cited in Williams et al, 1997) and Teasdale and 
Barnard (1993).
1.5.1. Beck’s Schema theorv and Bower’s network theory
According to the theory proposed by Beck (1967), depression relates to activity of 
dysfunctional schema. In terms of Beck’s model (1967), schemas are stable 
representations of knowledge that have been acquired by an individual during their 
development. The knowledge stored in these schemas represents a person’s beliefs, 
attitudes and assumptions, which are used to perceive, interpret and think about the 
events that an individual encounters day-to-day. Beck (1967) suggested that early life 
experience, particularly relating to loss in the case of depression, leads to the 
development of dysfunctional schemas. Activity of these dysfunctional schema leads 
to negative biases that colour the individuals’ interpretation of the self, the world and 
the future, which in turn leads to, and maintains, the depressive episode. Bower 
(1981), in agreement with Beck, also argued that negative thinking and depressed
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mood reinforce one another reciprocally. He developed an explanation of emotional 
disorders, including depression, based on his network theory (Bower, 1981). In his 
model, he proposed that emotions could be regarded as nodes in a semantic network 
with numerous connections to related ideas, physiological systems and events etc. He 
suggested that emotional material is stored in the network in the form of propositions 
or assertions. A thought occurs via activation of certain nodes by internal or external 
stimuli. Activation of a node, or set of nodes, leads to spreading activation throughout 
the network e.g. if the sadness node is activated then this can lead to the activation of 
depression-related nodes in the semantic network, such as hopelessness or despair 
(Eysenck & Keane, 1998). These two theories account well for the MCM bias 
demonstrated by depressed individuals for depression-relevant material (outlined in 
section 1.4.1.2, page 22). However, there are a number of findings that they cannot 
explain. For example, both would predict an implicit MCM bias in depression, which 
is not evident in the majority of studies addressing this phenomenon. Furthermore, 
both of these theories would predict a mood congruent attention bias in depression. 
Again, the available evidence does not support the presence of the type of wide- 
ranging mood-congruent attention bias that would be expected based on these models.
1.5.2. Williams. Watts. MacLeod & Mathews
Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews (1988; 97) adapted Graf and Mandler’s 
(1980) theory of cognitive processing in order to develop an alternative cognitive 
theory of depression. In line with Graf and Mandler (1980), Williams et al (1988; 97) 
proposed that there ai*e two stages to cognitive processing: a “pre-attentive” 
integration (priming) stage and a subsequent elaboration phase. Priming is an 
automatic process that occurs rapidly without cognitive effort and involves the
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activation of multiple elements associated with the representation of a particular 
stimulus. The result is a strengthening of the internal representation of this stimulus. 
This reinforcement of the representation makes the stimulus more ‘accessible’, i.e. it 
will be more likely to come to mind when only some of its components are present 
(e.g. initial letters in terms of words). By contrast, elaboration refers to a strategic 
process that involves associating new information with related material that is already 
represented in memory. This process involves the generation of new associative 
pathways, but also strengthens old pathways as a result of spreading activation 
between these related concepts. The result of this process is that elaborated material is 
more ‘retrievable’, than non-elaborated material, as it has a greater number of 
associative links with related in memory. Williams et al (1988; 97) argued that 
depressed individuals give priority to depression-relevant information during the 
strategic (under conscious control) elaboration phase, but that the pre-attentive 
(automatic) processes are largely unaffected in depression. Conversely, they argued 
that anxiety is associated with increased sensitivity to threatening information at the 
pre-attentive stage of processing, but that is not associated with changes in elaborative 
processing.
Williams et al’s model (1988; 97) accounts well for the majority of experimental 
findings in the literature. For example, the model provides a good explanation of the 
robust explicit mood-congruent memory bias in depressed individuals (outlined above 
in section 1.4.1.2 (page 22). According to the Williams model (1988; 97), at encoding 
depressed individuals strategically allocate more cognitive resources to the 
elaboration of depression-relevant material. As a result, more associative links are
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formed between this material and other related material represented in memory, 
making this material more retrievable during subsequent memory testing.
As it is proposed in the Williams’ model (1988; 97) that pre-attentive processing is 
relatively unaffected in depression then it would be expected that depressed 
individuals would not demonstrate changes in early attentional processing. Inspection 
of the review of selective attention in MD (section 1.4.2, page 28) reveals that the 
majority of the evidence is consistent with this proposal. Similarly, as implicit 
memory function involves priming (i.e. early, automatic, pre-attentive processing), 
according to the Williams’ model, it would not be expected that depressed patients 
would demonstrate a bias in this memory function. In line with this proposal, the 
majority of available evidence has failed to demonstrate an implicit memory bias in 
depressed patients (see section 1.4.1.2, page 22).
Although, the model proposed by Williams et al. (1988; 97) clearly provides a good 
account of the majority of available evidence in the literature, there are a number of 
findings that represent problems for their model. For example, the findings of Watkins 
et al (1996) and Watkins (2002) demonstrating that depression-related implicit 
memory biases in circumstances that involve semantic priming. Furthermore, the 
findings of Power, Cameron and Dalgleish (1996) reporting emotional priming in 
depressed patients are also not consistent with the model proposed by Williams et al 
(1988; 97). A further problem encountered by the Williams et al (1988; 97) model is 
how to account for the difference between ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ cognitions. For example 
the fact that it is possible to retrieve an autobiographical memory and talk about it 
without experiencing the emotion that was associated with the event (termed ‘cold’
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cognition). However, it is also possible to retrieve the same ABM and to reinstate the 
emotion associated with the remembered event. Williams et al (1988; 97) suggested 
that multiple levels of representation are required to account for these two forms of 
processing. Teasdale and Barnard (1993) proposed an influential multi 
representational model that accounts well for the complex interaction between 
cognition and emotion, including the difference between ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ cognitions.
1.5.3. Teasdale and Barnard’s Interacting Cognitive Subsystems HCSI model 
Teasdale and Barnard (1993) proposed that the cognitive architecture is divided into 
nine sub-systems. They suggested that each subsystem processes its own unique 
‘code’ and has its own recording (memory) system. Therefore, the different elements 
of a given event are processed and represented in different subsystems. Three of these 
subsystems (visual, acoustic & body state) concern sensory and proprioceptive 
representations. Two subsystems (morphonolexical & object) represent intermediate 
structural descriptions and two systems (prepositional & implicational) represent 
higher order meaning. Finally, two subsystems (articulatory <Sc limb) relate to output 
systems. In terms of this model, emotion results only from processing in the 
implicational subsystem. The literal meaning of the statement “ I failed my maths 
exam” can be represented in the prepositional subsystem and such representation will 
not be accompanied by an emotional reaction, i.e. cold cognition. However, 
representation of the implicational meaning of this proposition, i.e. in terms of the 
schematic model of “me as a failure” will result in emotional reactions, i.e. hot 
cognition. Teasdale and Barnard’s model can also provide an explanation of 
depressive cognition. According to Teasdale and Barnard (1993) depression is a 
consequence of generation of depressogenic schematic models in the implicational
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subsystem and is maintained via a feedback loop with the prepositional subsystem. In 
effect, the active schematic model generates propositions such as “I am useless” that 
feed back to the implicational subsystem reinforcing the active schematic model. The 
account given by Teasdale and Barnard for MCM bias is very similar to that proposed 
by Williams et al (1988; 97), i.e. depression-relevant material is more highly 
elaborated during encoding and at retrieval ongoing processing of depression-relevant 
schematic models will increase the likelihood that these representations are accessed. 
However, they propose that MCM bias will only be observed in conditions that enable 
representation of the material in the implicational subsystem, as the prepositional 
subsystem may encode if a stimulus was considered good or bad but is only the 
implicational subsystem that can capture the affective properties of the stimulus.
1.6. Neural changes underlying mood and cognitive deficits in MD
There has been considerable discussion in the literature concerning whether major 
depression is associated with structural changes to the brain. There is some evidence, 
in elderly patients at least, that depression is related to changes in brain structure that 
are related to observed cognitive deficits (e.g. Abas et al, 1990). However, the 
majority of studies addressing the neural substrates of depressed mood and associated 
cognitive deficits have focused on changes in brain function rather than structure. 
One of the most consistent findings in studies using imaging techniques (e.g. PET, 
SPECT and fMRI) has been of abnormal blood flow in the pre-ffontal cortex, in 
particular the dorsal and ventral anterior cingulate (e.g. Bench et al, 1992; Drevets et 
al, 1992; Drevets et al, 1997; Goodwin et al, 1993). Other studies have reported 
reduced blood flow in the orbitoffontal cortex in depressed individuals (e.g. Elliot et 
al, 1998). Furthennore similar changes in blood flow have been reported in the
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striatum (e.g. Bench et al, 1992). These findings strongly suggest that functional 
changes, particularly in the region of the preffontal cortex, are a feature of major 
depression. The perfusion of studies reporting prefrontal abnormalities supports the 
numerous findings of impaired executive ‘function’ in neuropsychological studies of 
depression (outlined in section 1.3, page 11). Of particular note are studies reporting 
abnormalities of function of the anterior cingulate (AC).
The AC is an area of the preffontal cortex (PFC) implicated in a number of attentional 
processes that are central to normal performance on tasks such as the Stroop colour- 
naming task. For example, it has been suggested (e.g. Swick & Jovanovic, 2002) that 
the AC plays a role in the inhibition of pre-potent/pre-leamt responses (e.g. word 
reading). Furthermore, there is evidence (e.g. van Veen & Carter, 2002; Pardo, Pardo, 
Janer & Raichle, 1990) to support a role for the AC in the detection and resolution of 
conflict in cognitive processing. In line with this notion, impaired performance on the 
Stroop task has been related to preffontal changes, particularly of the anterior 
cingulate (e.g. George et al, 1997). Furthermore, impaired AC function has also been 
related to impaired performance of depressed individuals on other ‘executive’ tasks. 
For example, Elliot et al (1997) reported that reduction in blood flow in the AC was 
related to impaired performance on the Towers of London task ffom CANTAB. These 
functional changes in the preffontal cortex have also been implicated in the wide- 
ranging impairment of mnemonic function (outlined in section 1.2, page 3). For 
example, it has been suggested that the anterior cingulate probably plays a role in the 
control processes relating to memory (e.g. Fletcher et al, 1995). Furthermore, the AC 
region of the PFC has been implicated in recognition memory tasks (e.g. Elliot & 
Dolan, 1998). Drevets et al (1997) argued that the structural and functional changes in
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the medial prefrontal cortex (including the dorsal and lateral anterior cingulate-and 
medial orbitofrontal cortex) that have been observed in depressed individuals may be 
fundamental to this disorder, as these regions have been related to the relationship 
between cognition and emotion. Furthermore, these regions are modulated by the 
neurotransmitters implicated in depression (i.e. dopamine and serotonin). Also of 
relevance to the proposed course of study are the findings of reduced activation in the 
orbitofrontal cortex (Elliot et al, 1998) as disruption of this region has been implicated 
in impairment of recognition of emotion from faces and vocalisations (Homak, Rolls 
& Wade, 1996).
1.7. Summary and Research Overview
From the preceding review it is clear that, in terms of processing neutral stimuli, 
major depression is associated with marked cognitive impairment, particularly in 
terms of mnemonic and ‘executive’ functions. Furthermore, there is considerable 
evidence that depression is associated with significant changes in the processing of 
emotional material. The most notable of these changes are associated with explicit 
retrieval of previously learnt depression-relevant material. Furthermore, it is clear that 
there are marked changes in ABM retrieval associated with MD. There is also some 
evidence that depression is associated with changes in selective attention, emotion 
recognition and social perception. However, these findings have not received the 
same degree of support as those relating to memory bias. As noted previously there 
have been a number of problems with these studies, most notably ensuring that the 
stimuli incorporated were depression-relevant.
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Inspection of the relevant literature (outlined in section 1.4, page 16) reveals that the 
vast majority of studies addressing the processing of emotional material in major 
depression have focused on the processing of affective verbal material (e.g. words, 
stories etc). One exception to this trend was a study conducted by Ridout, Astell, 
Reid, Glen and O’ Carroll (2003) that assessed depressed individuals memory for 
emotional facial expressions. The findings of this study demonstrated that the robust 
MCM bias that has consistently been demonstrated in patients with MD generalised to 
the processing of important, ecologically valid, social stimuli. The aim of this thesis is 
to continue the theme initiated in this study, i.e. to investigate the processing of non­
verbal socially relevant stimuli (e.g. affective images or emotional facial expressions). 
Williams et al (1997) proposed that non-verbal emotional stimuli (e.g. pictorial 
images) might be more emotive than affective verbal material. If this assumption is 
correct then, in line with Teasdale and Barnard’s ICS model (1993), it would be 
expected that a different pattern of processing would be observed for these stimuli, 
relative to verbal material. For example, Teasdale and Barnard (1993) argued that 
mood congruent biases would be stronger in conditions that encourage ‘hot’ 
processing, i.e. that encourages, representation of, and access to, the affective 
elements of the stimuli. Furthermore, it would seem clear that biased processing of 
important social stimuli could have serious consequences for the depressed 
individuals, particularly in terms of their social interactions with significant others.
This section of the chapter will take the form of an overview of the experimental 
studies that make up this thesis. In Chapter three a face-word variant of the 
emotional Stroop task was utilised in order to extend the literature concerning 
selective attention for emotional faces in major depression. Furthermore, this study
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aimed to address if the to-be-ignored element of the stimuli (i.e. the faces) influenced 
subsequent memory of the to-be-responded-to element (i.e. the words). Chapter four 
investigated the influence of different cue modalities (pictorial or verbal) on retrieval 
of specific ABMs in MD. This aim of this study was to develop the work 
demonstrating that manipulating characteristics of the memory cue can modify 
specificity of ABM. Chapter five represents a replication of Ridout et al (2003) with 
one critical modification. The encoding task was changed (identify gender instead of 
identify emotion) in order to assess if the observed mood-congruent memory bias is 
dependent on explicit processing of the emotional valence of the faces. Chapter six 
involved presenting depressed individuals and matched controls with videotaped 
depictions of realistic social interactions in order to establish if, using dynamic 
ecologically valid stimuli, there is evidence to suggest that major depression is 
associated with deficits in emotion recognition and social perception. Finally, 
Chapter seven reports a related study that was conducted to establish if neurosurgical 
intervention for chronic, treatment refractory depression is associated with a deficit in 
emotion recognition and social perception.
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- CHAPTER TW O -
COMMON MEASURES AND METHODOLOGIES 
2.1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the procedures and assessments that 
were commonly used during the studies reported in the five experimental chapters. 
The subsequent sections of this chapter will cover how the depressed patients were 
diagnosed and how the severity of their depressive symptoms was established. 
Similarly, the procedures for assessing self-reported depression and anxiety in the 
patients and healthy controls will be outlined. Furthermore, a brief description of the 
method used to establish the level of the participants’ general intellectual ability will 
be provided. Finally, the general assessment protocol for the participants that took 
part in the five experimental studies will be outlined, including an overview of the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria that were used during the recruitment of the patients 
and suitably matched controls.
2.2. Diagnosis of Major Depression
Previous research has demonstrated that many psychiatric conditions (e.g. anxiety, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder) in addition to major 
depression are associated with changes to normal cognitive function (see Williams et 
al, 1997). Likewise, it has also been demonstrated in previous research that different 
forms of depression may result in different patterns of cognitive impairment. In 
particular, differences between the depressive phase of bipolar disorder and major 
depressive episodes have been reported (Murphy et al, 1999). With this in mind, it 
was considered important in terms of the proposed studies to establish, using a
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recognised method of classification/diagnosis, that the patients who took part in these 
studies were suffering from major, unipolar depression and not some other form of 
depressive disorder (e.g. bipolar) or different mental disorder (e.g. general anxiety 
disorder). This aim was achieved as part of the patients’ initial assessment upon 
referral to the Affective Disorders Clinic at Ninewells Hospital in Dundee. On the 
first occasion that the patients attend the clinic they are interviewed (for around an 
hour) by a psychiatrist, using a semi-structured clinical interview schedule, and are 
subsequently assigned a diagnostic category, according to criteria laid out in the 
International Classification of Diseases (Version 10) Manual (ICD-10; World Health 
Organisation, 1993). The ICD-10 classification system has much in common with the 
American categorisation/diagnostic system the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual - 
version four (DSM-IV; APA, 1994). Both systems involve classifying disorders based 
on the profile of signs and symptoms that are established during the clinical interview 
(either reported by the patients during the interview, observed by the clinician or 
reported by significant others). The ICD-10 has been shown to have good inter-rater 
reliability in terms of consistent diagnosis of patients (WHO, 1993), which suggests 
that, although there is still some controversy concerning the validity of diagnostic 
systems such as DSM-IV and ICD-10, there can be a degree of confidence that the 
patients that took part in the five experimental studies were suffering from the same or 
highly related condition, namely unipolar depression.
2.3. Clinical Assessment of Depression Severity
2.3.1, The Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD)
As previous research had demonstrated that the severity of a patients’ depressive 
symptoms can exert a strong influence on their performance on a variety of cognitive
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tasks, most notably some memory tasks (see review in section 1.3, page, 11), then it 
was considered important in the all of the experimental studies included in this thesis 
to quantify the severity of depression being experienced by the patients that took part. 
The Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD; Hamilton, 1960) was chosen as 
the most suitable method of achieving this aim, as it is the most commonly used 
interviewer-rated measure of depression severity (Hammen, 1997) and would 
therefore allow comparison between the current studies and other previous 
investigations. The HRSD consists of 21 items concerning various aspects (biological, 
cognitive, psychological) of the participants’ mood (by convention only 17 of these 
items are actually scored). The scale is completed during/following a clinical 
interview, which according to Hamilton (1960) should last around a minimum of 30 
minutes. A recent development to the HRSD is the addition of descriptive anchor 
points to elicit greater objectivity in the scoring of the scale. Scores on the 17-item 
version of the HRSD range from 0 to 52. In terms of interpreting the HRSD scores, 
Katz, Shaw, Vallis and Kaiser (1995) reported that scores below six are generally 
considered to indicate healthy, non-depressed, mood. Furthermore, they suggested 
that scores between 7 and 17 on the HRSD are considered indicative of mild 
depression, ratings between 18 and 24 are generally considered to indicate moderate 
depression and scores of over 25 on the HRSD are taken to reflect severe depression. 
It should be noted that the HRSD was not designed as diagnostic tool, but rather was 
intended to provide an index of depression severity in patients that had already been 
diagnosed as suffering from clinical depression. Nevertheless, in terms of recruiting 
depressed patients for research studies a minimum severity rating is often stipulated. 
For example, a common cut-off that has been employed is a score of 14 or above on
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the 17-item version of the HRSD (Katz et al, 1995). Although, it should he noted that 
other studies have reported the use of 17 as the cut-off point (see Katz et al, 1995).
A serious problem that has been identified in terms of the accurate scoring of the 
HRSD is the possible variation in the amount, and quality, of information collected by 
the different raters during the clinical interview. With this in mind, Williams (1988) 
developed the Structured Interview Guide for the HRSD (SIGH-D) in an attempt to 
minimise these potential differences by standardising the administration of the HRSD. 
Although previous research (e.g. Hedlund & Vieweg, 1979) had demonstrated good 
inter-rater reliability on the HRSD (around 0.84), Williams reported that use of the 
SIGH-D greatly improved the inter-rater reliability of the HRSD compared to the 
standard administration procedure.
Although, in most circumstances, trained clinicians (e.g. psychiatrist or clinical 
psychologist) are required to administer the HRSD, various studies (e.g. O’ Hara & 
Relnn, 1983) have reported reasonable inter-rater reliability (0.76) between clinician 
ratings and those of lay individuals that have undergone training (around five hours) 
in the administration and scoring of the HRSD. The author (NR) underwent a short 
training course (10 hours) that initially involved observation of clinical interviews, 
where the clinician would ‘talk-through’ with NR the Hamilton rating they had given 
for each patient. In later training sessions NR also provided HRSD ratings for the 
patients and these were discussed and compared with those provided by the clinician. 
As part of this training, NR rated the severity of depressive symptoms exhibited by a 
group of six psychiatric outpatients. NR interviewed the patients using Williams 
(1988) structured intemew schedule for the HRSD. These patients had also been
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assessed (within a week of NR’s rating) on the HRSD by one of the psychiatrists at 
the ADC. The ratings provided by the author were compared statistically with those 
provided by the clinicians using a Pearson’s correlation test and an independent t-test. 
There was a significant, positive conelation between the ratings produced by the 
author and the clinicians; r(6)=0.99, p<0.001. Furthermore, there was no significant 
difference between the HRSD ratings provided by the author (p=14.7, SE=5.1) and 
the clinicians (p=15.8, SE=5.5); t(10)=0.2, p>0.05. These findings strongly suggest 
that the HRSD ratings provided by the author can be considered reliable in 
comparison to those provided by the clinicians at the ADC.
2.4. Self-report Measures of Mood
2.4,1. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
In line with the aim of quantifying the severity of depression experienced by the 
patients in the current studies, it was also considered important to obtain a measure of 
self-reported depression severity. Furthennore, it was considered important to screen 
for the presence of depressive symptoms in the participants making up the control 
groups, as the presence of depression in the controls could mask group differences. 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al, 1961) was considered the most 
suitable measure to achieve these aims, as it is the most frequently utilised self-report 
measure of depression (Hammen, 1997). In addition to its wide use amongst 
clinicians, the BDI has been commonly employed to establish self-reported 
depression severity in experimental studies investigating the affect of depressive 
symptoms on cognitive performance, and to screen for depression in controls. 
Furthermore, a review of a number of studies reported in Katz et al (1995) 
demonstrated that the BDI correlates strongly with most other self-report measures of
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depression. More importantly, previous studies have demonstrated that the BDI 
correlates particularly strongly (0.96) with clinicians’ ratings of depression severity 
(Beck, Rial & Rickels, 1974).
The BDI is presented to the participants in questionnaire format, and consists of 21 
items that are designed to assess the emotional, cognitive, behavioural and biological 
aspects of the patients’ depressive symptoms. Each item on the BDI consists of four 
statements that are graded in terms of the severity of depression they represent, with 
the least depression-relevant response (e.g. I  do not feel sad) being scored zero and 
the most depression-relevant statement (e.g. I  am so sad and unhappy that I  can 7 
stand it) being scored with a three. For each of the 21 items the participants are 
required to circle the number associated with the statement that best represents their 
mood during the week prior to assessment. The sum of the scores represents the 
severity of the participants’ depression, with a range of 0 to 63. In terms of 
interpreting participants’ BDI scores. Beck, Steer and Garbin (1988) reported that it is 
generally accepted that a score of less than 10 is indicative of normal, non-depressed, 
mood; a score of 10 to 18 suggests that the individual is experiencing mild depressive 
symptoms; scores ranging between 19 and 29 reflect moderate depression and scores 
of 30 plus are taken to indicate the presence of severe depressive symptoms. 
However, it is important to note that the BDI was not designed as a diagnostic tool but 
rather was intended to represent a continuous dimension of depressive symptoms that 
cuts across a variety of diagnostic categories. With this in mind, Katz et al (1995) 
proposed that the BDI could be better conceived of as a measure of general 
psychological distress. Despite this proposition, the BDI was considered to be the 
most suitable self-report measure of depression severity for the proposed studies,
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mainly due to the strong correlations between BDI scores and other self-report 
measures of depression, and most notably clinicians’ ratings of depression severity.
2.4.2. The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS)
There is strong evidence (see Williams et al, 1997) that anxiety is also associated with 
marked changes in cognitive function. It is clear that the presence of co-morbid 
anxiety could confound any observed effects of depression on the various tasks 
employed during the course of the experimental studies. It was therefore considered 
extremely important to ascertain the level of co-morbid anxiety in the patients, and 
also to screen for anxiety symptoms in the healthy participants, in order to control for 
the effects of anxiety on task performance. The Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) is a short self-report measure of anxiety and 
depression severity, which consists of fourteen items (7 referring to depressive 
symptoms & 7 referring to anxiety symptoms). Each item features a single statement 
presented in bold (e.g. I feel tense or ‘wound up’) followed by four possible 
responses (e.g. ‘most of the time’, ‘a lot of the time’, ‘from time to time’, 
‘occasionally’ & ‘not at all’) and the participants are required to indicate which of the 
responses best represents their mood during the week prior to the test session. 
Previous research (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) has demonstrated a high correlation 
between the participants’ scores on the anxiety sub-scale of HADS and clinicians’ 
ratings of anxiety severity (0.74). Likewise, a strong relationship between 
participants’ scores on the depression subscale and clinicians’ ratings of depression 
severity has also been reported (0.7). These findings, coupled with the brevity of its 
administration, suggested that the HADS was highly suitable for use in the proposed 
studies. A further advantage of the HADS over other self-report measures of anxiety
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(e.g. the Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventoiy) was that it provided a further self- 
report measure of depression severity.
2.5. Estimation of Pre-morbid Intellectual Ability
When conducting investigations into the performance of clinically depressed patients 
on tasks that involve cognitive processes it is important to quantify, and control for, 
the participants’ general intellectual ability, as differences between the groups in pre- 
morbid intelligence could potentially confound findings of group differences on the 
various tasks. As it was not feasible (or desirable) to assess the participants 
intelligence using a full IQ test, a relatively quick method was required that would 
provide an accurate estimate of general intellectual ability. Furthermore, as clinical 
depression has been shown to impair performance on many cognitive tasks (see 
Murphy, Sahakian & O’Carroll, 1998) it was important that the method used was 
resistant to the effects of depression on cognition. It has been reported in previous 
studies (e.g. Crawford et al, 1987) that the National Adult Reading Test (NART, 
Nelson, 1982) provides an accurate estimate of depressed individuals’ general 
intellectual ability that is unaffected by their depressive symptoms. The NART 
involves presenting participants with a series of 50, relatively short, English words 
(increasing in difficulty from the beginning of the list to the end). The participants are 
required to read aloud how they think each word should be pronounced. The words 
used on the NART were chosen specifically because they have an irregular 
pronunciation; that is the correct pronunciation cannot be established by phonemic 
decoding but rather relies on word recognition. As, in the normal population, the 
number of reading errors on the NART is highly correlated with WAIS IQ score it is
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possible to predict participants’ full-scale IQ score just from the number of enors they 
make on the NART (Nelson & Williamson, 1991).
2,6. General Assessment of Patients and Controls
2.6.1. General Assessment o f Patients
All of the patients that took part in the five studies reported in the experimental 
chapters were recruited from the Affective Disorders Clinic (ADC) at Ninewells 
Hospital in Dundee. Prior to taking part, a psychiatrist at the ADC assessed the 
patients’ clinical status according to ICD-10 diagnostic criteria (following a semi­
structured clinical interview). Within a week prior to the test session, the severity of 
the patients’ depression was assessed using the 17-item HRSD. This assessment was 
conducted either by one of the psychiatrists at the ADC or in later studies by the 
author (using Williams SIGH-D). On the day of testing, the patients’ self-rated 
depression and anxiety was assessed using the 21-item BDI and the HADS. Finally, 
an estimate of the patients’ general intellectual ability was obtained using the NART.
2.6.2. General Assessment o f Healthy Participants
The healthy participants were recruited from a variety of sources using recruitment 
posters and word of mouth. The backgrounds of the participants making up the 
control groups were varied, including non-academic staff at the universities of St 
Andrews, Dundee, and Abertay, undergraduate students at the Open University and 
the evening degree course at St. Andrews, shop workers, clerical staff, cleaners, goods 
drivers, postgraduate students at Dundee university, and chefs. A number of the 
controls were unemployed and a number were retired. Prior to inclusion in the five 
experimental studies, potentially suitable controls were screened using a simple
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questionnaire (see Appendix I) to ensure that they met the inclusion criteria and did 
not meet any of the exclusion criteria (see below). On the day of testing, the controls 
were asked to rate their recent mood (over the week prior to the test session) using the 
21-item BDI and the HADS. On the day of testing, they were also required to 
complete the NART in order to allow an estimate of their general intellectual ability 
to be obtained.
2,63. Inclusion and exclusion criteria for the clinical studies 
The participants who were included in the “depressed” groups of the five 
experimental studies were required to meet the following criteria. An ICD-10 
diagnosis of major depression without bipolar or psychotic symptoms, plus a 
depression severity score of 14 or above on the 17-item Hamilton Rating Scale for 
Depression (Hamilton, 1960). Furthermore, the patients were required to be aged 
between 18 and 65 years of age. Exclusion criteria for the depressed sample included 
failure to meet the inclusion criteria, recent ECT treatment (within six months of the 
test session), suspected chronic alcohol and/or substance abuse, suspected 
neurological disorder (e.g. Korsakoff s), history of head injury that resulted in 
prolonged loss of consciousness and that required hospital treatment, and/or the 
presence of a physical disorder or pharmacological treatment, that might be 
considered likely to impair cognitive function (e.g. Multiple Sclerosis). Inclusion 
criteria for the healthy controls in the clinical studies of this thesis included meeting 
the required matching characteristics to the depressed participants; i.e. age (±3 years), 
sex and educational background (± 2 years), no cunent or prior diagnosis of major 
depression, aged between 18 and 65 years of age and a BDI score of less than 10 on 
the day of testing. The exclusion criteria for the controls were identical to those for 
the patient sample.
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2.7. Data Analysis
Parametric test assumptions were established for each study using the following 
protocol. To confirm that the data was normally distributed, the mean and median of 
each cell was compared to confirm that they were similar. The mean and standard 
deviation of each cell were compared to confirm that the standard deviations were not 
bigger than the mean. The histograms of the distribution of scores in each cell were 
examined to see if they approximated a bell shaped curve. The normality plots were 
examined to establish if the observed data points lay close to the predicted 
distribution. Finally, Kolomogorov & Smirnov and Shapiro & Wilks normality tests 
were conducted to establish if the observed data differed significantly from the 
predicted distribution. The evidence from all of these sources was weighed in order to 
confirm if the data was or approximated a normal distribution. The data from each 
study was examined to confirm homogeneity of variance by comparing the standard 
deviations of the different cells to confirm that the larger was not vastly different from 
the smaller (it is generally excepted that homogeneity is met provided the larger SD is 
not vastly greater than double the smaller). As all studies made use of repeated 
measures ANOVA sphericity assumptions were also tested. Where these assumptions 
were not met the results from more conservative tests were used (e.g. Greenhouse- 
Geisser).
2.8. Summary and Conclusions
The recruitment and assessment procedures outlined in this chapter ensured that 
although the different participant groups (depressed & controls) of the five 
experimental studies represented distinct groups in terms of their clinical status and
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mood, they were well matched on important variables (age, sex, educational 
background, & general intellectual ability).
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- CHAPTER THREE -
SELECTIVE ATTENTION AND RECOGNITION MEMORY FOR 
AFFECTIVE WORDS IN MAJOR DEPRESSION: THE INFLUENCE 
OF DISTRACTING EMOTIONAL FACIAL EXPRESSIONS
3.1. Introduction
Evidence for a selective attention bias for depression-relevant material in major 
depression has been equivocal. However, as reported in chapter one (section 1.4.2, 
page 28) there is at least some evidence, particularly from studies utilising emotional 
versions of the Stroop colour-naming task, that depressed individuals selectively 
attend to salient emotional material in their enviromnent. Nevertheless, it would 
appear that this bias does not operate in all areas of processing; most notably it would 
appear that depressed individuals do not demonstrate biased pre-conscious attention to 
depression-related stimuli. The clearest interpretation of the available findings is that 
depression is associated with problems in disengaging from depression-relevant 
material that has become the focus of attention, rather than enhanced spatial 
awareness of salient negative material in their environment. It should also be noted 
that a number of studies (see section 1.4.2, page 28) have reported that depressed 
individuals fail to demonstrate the positive attention bias that is associated with 
healthy mood, and some researchers (e.g. Power & Dalgleish, 1997) have argued that 
this should also be interpreted as evidence of a negative attention bias.
One criticism that can be levelled at a number of the studies that have failed to 
demonstrate biased attention in depressed patients (e.g. MacLeod, Mathews & Tata,
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1986) is that they have utilised stimuli that are not strictly depression-relevant. This is 
important; as there is good evidence that the biased processing associated with 
emotional disorders is restricted to material that is condition-relevant (see Williams et 
al., 1997). Power and Dalgleish (1997) also noted this point and suggested that there 
was a need for studies addressing depressed individuals’ attention for emotional 
stimuli with high personal relevance, such as emotional facial expressions.
Emotional facial expressions are an extremely important class of social stimuli that 
enable human beings to ascertain extremely quickly the mood, and possible intentions 
of other individuals. Biased processing of these stimuli could have serious 
consequences for depressed individuals, particularly in terms of social interactions 
with significant others. In line with this notion, Persad and Polivy (1993) proposed 
that changes in the processing of facial expressions by depressed individuals might 
underlie the difficulties that they experience in conducting social interactions. Some 
support for this notion comes from a study conducted by Ridout, Astell, Reid, Glen & 
O’ Carroll (2003), who demonstrated that clinical depression is associated with 
superior memory for sad faces relative to happy and neutral expressions (see figure
1.1, page 25). The authors considered that such a bias was likely to colour the 
patients’ interpretations of social interactions they were involved in. From the above, 
it is clear that investigation of possible attention biases for emotional facial 
expressions in major depression is an important avenue of research that could have 
significant implications for the current understanding of depression. The next section 
of this chapter will consider briefly the evidence concerning selective attention bias 
for emotional faces in major depression.
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3,1,1, Selective attention for emotional faces in major depression
Whilst there is considerable evidence (e.g. Fox, Russo & Dutton, 2002; Bradley et al., 
1998; Bradley et al., 1997) demonstrating the tendency of anxious individuals to 
selectively attend to threatening (angry) facial expressions, even when they are 
presented subliminally, the existence of such a bias for sad faces in depression has not 
received the same degree of support (see section 1.4.2, page 28). However, the studies 
that have been conducted to assess depressed individuals’ attention for faces can be 
criticised on a number of grounds. First, they have tended to use threat-relevant 
(angry) expressions rather than depression-relevant (sad) faces. Furthermore, studies 
that have used sad faces have tended to use schematic drawings of emotional 
expressions rather than photographic images, which may have reduced the impact of 
these stimuli. From the literature utilising verbal stimuli (e.g. words) it would be 
expected that depressed individuals might exhibit problems in disengaging their 
attention from sad faces under conditions that allowed relatively long (around 1000 
milliseconds) processing of the stimuli.
As noted above, a tendency to focus attention on sad facial expressions could 
influence the patients’ interpretation of social interactions they are involved in. 
However, it is clear that successful comprehension of social interactions actually 
requires processing of multiple “channels” of information simultaneously (e.g. the 
words that are spoken by the conversational partner, their facial expression, body 
posture, tone of voice etc.) rather than individual sources of stimuli. It is also clear 
that these different “channels” might on occasion be sending conflicting information, 
thus individuals have to interpret all available social information in order to establish 
the meaning of the interaction. The question that arises is, “under circumstances that
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involve the presence o f a number o f types o f stimuli, do depressed individuals focus 
their attention on depression-relevant stimuli?” Previous research (e.g. Gotlib & 
Cane, 1987) using the emotional Stroop task would seem to suggest that they would. 
However, this question has not been addressed using emotional faces. This is 
important, as it could be argued that a study utilising emotional faces would have 
greater ecologically validity in terms of understanding the possible impact of biased 
attention on patients’ social functioning. With this in mind, one aim of the current 
study was to address this question using photographic images of emotional facial 
expressions.
A potentially useful paradigm in terms of the proposed study was utilised in a series 
of studies conducted by Stenberg, Wiking and Dahl (1998). The authors were 
interested in establishing the extent to which certain characteristics of facial 
expressions (most notably the emotional valence) were processed automatically, and 
furthermore, the influence that this automatic processing exerted on other concurrent 
processing. They presented healthy participants with a series of compound stimuli 
consisting of affective words, half positively valenced {Q.g Joyful) and half negatively 
valenced (e.g. useless), superimposed across photographs of happy, sad and neutral 
emotional facial expressions. The participants were instructed to disregard the faces 
and to identify the emotional valence of the words. Stenberg and colleagues (1998) 
reported that the valence of the faces interfered with the identification of incongment 
words but enhanced the identification of congruent words.
The current investigation employed this face-word variant of the Stroop task in order 
to address the question reported above. Stenberg et al (1998) did not assess the effect 
of depressed mood on this task, but, based on the findings of previous studies
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demonstrating impaired inhibition of distracting “off-task” stimuli (e.g. MacQueen et 
al., 2000), it would be expected that the depressed patients would be more likely, than 
healthy individuals, to process the to-be-ignored element of the stimuli (i.e. the faces). 
Furthermore, from research reported above, it would be expected that the depressed 
patients would exhibit problems in disengaging their attention from sad faces that 
entered the focus of their attention, which in turn would dismpt concurrent processing 
of the superimposed words. However, m a previous study, Muiphy et al (1999) 
demonstrated that depressed individuals were significantly faster to identify the 
valence of negative words relative to positive, suggesting an identification advantage 
for depression-relevant material With this in mind, it might be expected that 
conditions involving depression-relevant words superimposed on sad faces would 
enliance tliis identification advantage in the depressed patients.
Another important question that arises from this work is “how does processing o f the 
to-be-ignored element o f the stimuli (i.e. the faces) influence subsequent memory for  
the to-be-responded-to component o f the stimuli (i.e. the words)?” The following 
section of this chapter will briefly consider the evidence concerning MCM bias in 
depression and how the presence of other affective material is likely to affect 
depressed individuals’ memory for the different words.
3.1.2. Récognition memory for affective material in major depression
As reported in chapter one (section 1.4.1.1, page 17), mood-congruent memory 
(MCM) bias for self-referent depression-relevant words is an extremely robust finding 
in depressed patients. Furthermore, depressed patients have also been shown to 
exhibit similar preferential memoiy for sad faces (Ridout et a l, 2003). However,
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previous studies investigating MCM bias in depression have presented the “to-be- 
remembered” stimuli (e.g. emotional words, sentences, & emotional facial 
expressions) in isolation i.e. the participants were required to attend to only one set of 
stimuli during the experiment. However, it can be argued that in an individuals’ 
everyday life any number of emotional and non-emotional stimuli may appear 
simultaneously in the individuals’ environment. It would seem feasible that these 
combinations of stimuli might influence which elements of an individual’s 
environment are remembered. In line with this notion, Stenberg and colleagues (1998) 
reported that their participants demonstrated enhanced memory for words that were 
presented at encoding with incongment faces (particularly positive words paired with 
sad faces). They explained these findings in terms of elaboration, suggesting that due 
to the unusual nature of the incongment pairings the participants allocated more 
resources to processing of these combinations. In terms of depressed patients, from 
Williams et al. (1997) it would be expected that negative word/sad face pairs would 
receive greater elaboration by the patients than would all other face/word pairs, 
leading to enhanced recognition memory of negative words that were paired with sad 
faces at encoding.
A further area of interest that the current study hopes to address is the extent to which 
depressed individuals might be susceptible to the creation of false memories, 
particularly in terms of negative memories. The subsequent section will consider how 
this can be addressed in the current study.
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3.1.3. Investigating false memories in major depression
False memories can be conceived of as either remembering events that never 
occurred, or remembering events as markedly different from how they actually were 
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Due to the nature of depressed individuals’ 
processing (e.g. the tendency to interpret ambiguous situations in a negative light) it 
would seem plausible that these individuals might be predisposed towards the second 
kind of false memory, i.e. remembering events as more negative than they actually 
were. The list-leaming paradigm utilised by Roediger and McDermott (1995) was 
incorporated into the current study in order to address this notion. Roediger and 
McDermott (1995) presented participants with multiple lists of words to learn. Each 
list consisted of associates of a non-presented word, referred to as the critical “lure”. 
In their study they demonstrated high levels of false recognition of these non­
presented “lure” words. As it has been suggested (e.g. Segal et al., 1995) that 
depression-relevant concepts are highly interconnected in the cognitive systems of 
depressed individuals it would be expected that activation of some of these 
depression-relevant concepts (at encoding) would lead to the activation of other 
related concepts. Having been activated during encoding these units would be more 
likely to be reactivated during retrieval. This notion suggests that depressed patients 
would be more susceptible to the false recognition of non-presented depression­
relevant words, than would the controls.
3.1.4. Overview and Predictions
Clinically depressed patients and healthy matched controls were presented with a 
series of compound stimuli (each consisting of an affective word superimposed across 
a photograph of an emotional facial expression). The participants were required to
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ignore the faces and to identify the emotional valence of the words, as quickly and 
accurately as they could. After a filled delay, they were given a recognition memory 
test for the words they had viewed during the selective attention task. Within the sets 
of non-presented distracters (positive & negative words only) there were a number of 
critical lures (words that are strongly related to the previously viewed material). The 
following predictions were made:
3.1.4.1. Hvpotheses tested during the selective attention phase:
1. Based on the findings of Stenberg et al (1998) it was expected that, overall, 
participants would be significantly slower to identify the valence of the words 
paired with incongment faces than those paired with congment or non- 
congment (neutral) expressions.
2. In line with the findings of Stenberg et al (1998) it was expected that the 
controls would demonstrate a positive word identification advantage 
(evidenced by faster identification times) that would be enhanced when the 
words were paired with happy faces and abolished when the words were 
presented with sad facial expressions. Conversely, based on Murphy et al 
(1999) it was expected that depressed patients would demonstrate a negative 
word identification advantage that would be enhanced when the words were 
presented with sad faces and abolished when the words were paired with 
happy expressions.
3. In line with Stenberg et al (1998) it was predicted that, overall, participants 
would make significantly more valence identification errors when the words 
were paired with incongment facial expressions than when they were 
presented with congment or non-congment faces.
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4. In line with Stenberg et al (1998) it was predicted that controls would be more 
accurate when responding to positive words than neutral or negative. 
Conversely, it was expected that depressed individuals would be more 
accurate when responding to negative words than neutral or positive.
5. In line with previous studies (e.g. Gotlib & Cane, 1987) it was predicted that 
depressed individuals would be significantly slower to identify the valence of 
the neutral words when they were paired with sad faces than when they were 
presented with happy or neutral expressions. However, it was not expected 
that the neutral word identification times for the controls would differ as a 
function of the type of facial expressions these words were presented with.
3.1.4.2. Hvpotheses tested during the recognition memorv phase:
6. Based on previous studies (e.g. Bradley et al, 1995, Watkins et al, 1992) it was 
expected that depressed individuals would correctly recognise significantly 
more negative than neutral or positive words. However, it was also predicted 
that the depressed patients would recognise significantly more of the negative 
words that were paired with sad faces than those that were paired with happy 
or neutral expressions.
7. Finally, it was predicted that the depression-relevant lures would be falsely 
recognised by significantly more of the depressed patients than the controls.
3.2. Method
3.2.L Design
This study made use of a 2 between (group) x 3 within (face valence) x 3 within
(word valence) mixed factorial design. The independent variables for both the
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selective attention and recognition memory phases of the study were the valence of 
the emotional facial expression on which the words were superimposed {happy, sad 
or neutral) and the valence of the words (positive, negative or neutral). The 
dependent variables during the selective attention phase were the time taken (in 
milliseconds) to identify the emotional valence of the words, and the percentage of 
valence identification errors. The dependent variable during the recognition memory 
phase was the percentage of words correctly recognised from the selective attention 
task. The independent variable for the false memory analysis was the valence of the 
non-presented “lures” (positive or negative). The dependent variable was the number 
of participants from each group (depressed & controls) that falsely recognised the 
critical Tures’.
3,2.2. Participants
Thirty-two clinically depressed patients (19 females, 13 males) and thirty-two healthy 
controls (19 females, 13 males) took part in the current study. According to Cohen 
(1992) this sample size is suitable to detect the medium to large effect sizes that were 
predicted from previous studies (e.g. Gotlib & Cane, 1987; Stenberg et al, 1997) 
addressing selective attention (see appendix II for full details of the power analysis). 
The two groups in the current study were matched in terms of age, sex, educational 
background and general intellectual ability (see table 3.1, page 76). The participants 
(depressed <Sc controls) were recruited according to the inclusion and exclusion 
criteria cited in chapter two (section 2.6.3, page 55). Furthennore, upon admission to 
the study they were assessed according to the standard protocol outlined in chapter 
two (section 2.6.2, page 54). The characteristics of the individuals making up the two 
participant groups are reported in table 3.1 (page 76). As outlined in chapter two
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(section 2.3.1, page 48), the severity of the patients’ depressive symptoms was 
assessed using the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD). The mean HRSD 
score for the patients in the current study was 20 (with a range of 14-28), indicating 
moderate to severe depression.
3.2.3, Materials and Apparatus
3.2.3.1. Emotional Facial Expressions Idistracters^
Two sets of twelve grey-scale photographic images of different individuals portraying 
emotional facial expressions were used to provide the distracting element of the 
compound stimuli that were presented to the participants during the selective attention 
task. In each set of twelve, four images featured individuals portraying happiness, 
four showed a sad expression and in the remaining four images the individuals 
portrayed a neutral expression. The individuals that portrayed happiness in set A were 
posed in a sad expression in set B and vice versa. Different individuals (matched for 
their sex and approximate age) portrayed the neutral expressions in the two sets. The 
age and sex of the individuals portraying the facial expressions were matched across 
the different emotional expressions, as it was considered that these variables might 
influence the distractibility of an image. The rationale for creating two sets of images 
also concerns factors other than emotional expression that might influence the 
distractibility of the images and is outlined fully in section 3.2.3.3 (page 70). The 
photographic images used in this experiment were drawn from a set used in a study 
looking at emotion perception in healthy adults (Le Gal & Bruce, 1999). In creating 
their set of images Le Gal and Bruce presented the faces to seventy undergraduate 
students (35 male, 35 female) one at a time in a random order and asked the students 
to make a forced choice decision concerning the emotion portrayed {happiness,
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sadness, surprise, anger, disgust, fear and neutral expression). The faces included in 
the current study all received over 75% subjective agreement concerning the emotion 
portrayed. A further six neutral faces were used to make up practice and buffer stimuli 
(outlined below).
3.2.3.2. Affective Words
72 affective words (24 positively valenced; e.g. successful, 24 negatively 
valenced/depression-relevant; e.g. guilty and 24 of neutral valence; e.g. medium) were 
drawn from a larger set of words compiled by the author during a pilot study. In that 
study, one hundred and sixty words (40 negatively valenced, 40 positively valenced 
and 80 considered to be neutral in valence) were presented to one hundred 
undergraduate students (50 males & 50 females) who were asked to rate the words in 
terms of their emotional meaning {positive, neutral or negative) and emotional 
strength (emotionality) on a 7-point scale {where 7= not emotional and 7— extremely 
emotional). The 24 words in each category {positive, negative <Sc neutral) that 
achieved the highest rate of subjective agreement in terms of their emotional meaning 
were chosen as the stimuli for the current study. All of the words included in the 
current study achieved over 95% subjective agreement concerning their emotional 
meaning. The subsets of words {positive, neutral & negative) were matched for length 
{number o f letters) and frequency {rate per million words) according to Francis and 
Kuçera, 1982. The positive and negative words were also matched for their 
emotionality, but as expected both sets were rated as significantly more emotional 
than the neutral words. Two sets of thirty-six words (each consisting of 12 positively 
valenced, 12 negatively valenced and 12 neutral valence words) were created from the 
set of 72 words that were chosen from the corpus rated by the students. The two sets
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of words were matched on all relevant variables {word length, frequency, percentage 
agreement over their emotional meaning, and their emotional strength). One set of 
the words (see appendix III) was combined with the emotional faces (outlined in 
section 3.2.3.1, page 61) to form the compound stimuli that were presented to the 
participants during the selective attention task. The other 36 words (see appendix IV) 
were used as distracters (i.e. the novel words) during recognition memory testing. Full 
details of the analysis conducted to ensure the two word sets did not differ 
significantly on important characteristics (e.g. frequency, emotionality etc.) can be 
found in appendix IV. Within each set of distracters {positive & negative words only) 
were two words considered (by the author) to be most indicative of the nature of the 
particular class of words. The negative lures were “depressed” and “sad” and the 
positive lures were “excited” and “charming”. A further ten words (3 positive, 3 
negative & 4 neutral) were included to make up the practice and buffer items 
(outlined below).
3.2.3.3. Compound Stimuli
The two sets of twelve emotional facial expressions were each combined with the 
thirty-six affective words. Each image was paired with three different affective words 
{one positive, one negative and one neutral). The words were printed across the 
photographs in bold 24-point text. The words had to be positioned in such a way that 
the eyes and mouth were not obscured, but also such that it ensured the word would 
be central to the face. Stenberg et al (1998) located the words across the bridge of the 
nose, therefore that location was considered the most suitable for the current study. 
An example of the compound stimuli can be seen in figure 3.1 (below). The full sets 
of face-word pairs are presented in appendices VI and VII.
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Figure 3.1. An exemplar of the compound stimuli presented to the participants 
during the selective attention task
This procedure resulted in two sets of compound stimuli consisting of the two sets of 
facial expressions but with the same set of emotional words (see appendices VI & 
VII). The rationale for creating two sets of stimuli was to control for the 
distinctiveness of the individuals portraying the facial expressions, as this was 
considered likely to influence the extent to which an image would be distracting. 
Thus, any differences in valence identification times might be a consequence of 
attention capture by distinctive faces rather than the emotional content of the faces. 
Likewise, any advantage for particular words at recognition memory testing might 
also be ascribed to the distinctiveness of the faces that they were superimposed upon 
rather than the emotional content of these faces. The participants were randomly 
assigned to receive only one of the sets during the selective attention task. Four extra 
face-word pairs (four neutral faces paired with 1 positive, and 1 negative word and 2 
neutral words) were created to act as buffer stimuli (see appendix VIII). Two of these 
stimuli appeared at the beginning and two at the end of the selective attention task in 
order to minimise primacy and recency effects on the recognition memory task 
(responses to these stimuli were not included in any analysis). Six more face/word
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pairs were produced and were presented during the practice phase of the selective 
attention task (see appendix VIII). All of these pairs consisted of a neutral face paired 
with a different emotional word (2 positive, 2 neutral & 2 negative).
3.2.3.4. Assessment of Psvchomotor Speed
The Digit Symbol Substitution Task (DSST) was drawn from the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale -  revised version (WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1981) in order to provide a 
measure of general psychomotor speed and also to act as a distracter task during the 
five-minute delay period between encoding (selective attention) and memory phases.
3.2.3.5. Stimulus Presentation
An AppleMac PowerBook 3004 laptop computer loaded with the SuperLab® program 
version 1.5.7. (Cedrus Corporation, 1992; Phoenix, Arizona) was used to present the 
stimuli (in a random order) and to measure and record the participants’ responses to 
the stimuli. The size of the computer screen was 260mm by 175mm and the face/word 
stimuli were 125mm (height) by 75mm (width). The words were printed in 24-point 
font size, with the letters appearing seven millimetres in height on the screen. The 
rationale for the attention task was that the participants would have to inhibit their 
responses to the faces in order to correctly respond to the words. However, if the 
face/word pairs always appeared in the same location (e.g. the centre of the screen) 
the participants could apply a strategy of narrowing their focus of attention to the 
point where the word appears, thus lessening the impact of the faces. It has been 
reported (e.g. Hertel, 1997) that depressed patients are less likely to adopt strategies 
than healthy individuals, thus any apparent differences between the groups could have 
been ascribed to differences in strategy use and not differences in controlled attention.
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Therefore, in order to prevent use of such strategies the position of the face/word pairs 
on the screen was manipulated such that the stimuli appeared randomly in one of nine 
different positions on the screen (top left, top centre, top right, centre left, centre of 
screen, centre right, bottom left, bottom centre and bottom right). During the 
recognition memory test the {novel & familiar) words (in bold 24-point text) were 
presented in a random order in the centre of the screen. The words remained on screen 
until the participant pressed a key.
3.2.4. Procedure
3.2.4.1. Selective attention task
The participants were presented with one of the sets of face/word pairs (A or B) and 
were informed that they should focus on the words and disregard the faces (as in 
Stenberg et al, 1998). The participants were informed that their task was to indicate, 
by pressing one of three marked keys, whether they considered the emotional 
meaning of the words to be positive, neutral or negative. The participants were 
informed that they should try to do this as quickly and accurately as possible. A 
reminder of the position of the positive, neutral and negative keys was provided in the 
form of a card that lay across the keyboard adjacent to the response keys, so that the 
participants could see which key related to which emotion even when their fingers 
were covering the response keys. Prior to the actual test session there was a short 
practice phase of six face/word pairs to ensure that the participants understood the 
task. The participants were then required to progress to the main set of stimuli (once 
they had been given an opportunity to ask any questions they might have concerning 
the task). Upon completion of the selective attention task they were asked to complete 
the Digit Symbol Substitution task (DSST). Following the standard procedure, the
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participants were given 90 seconds to complete as many symbol substitutions as they 
could. Participants were then asked to complete the BDI and HADS mood 
questionnaires. Once a five-minute delay period had elapsed the participants were 
given a recognition memory test for the words they had seen during the selective 
attention task.
3.2.4.2. Recognition memorv task
The participants were presented with a set of 72 words {36 familiar & 36 novel), in a 
random order, one at a time in the centre of the screen. They were asked to indicate 
for each word whether or not they recognised it from the initial phase of the 
experiment. They were asked to do this by pressing one of two marked keys {'yes ” or 
"no”). As in the selective attention task, a card reminding the participants of which 
key related to which response was positioned on the keyboard above the response 
keys. Once all of the words had been viewed and judged the participants were asked 
to complete the National Adult Reading Test.
3.2.4.3. Data Analvsis
The participant characteristics (e.g. age, years of full-time education completed etc) 
and scores on the mood measures were analysed using a MANOVA with group as the 
independent factor. The participants’ data from the selective attention phase {response 
times & the percentage o f errors) and the recognition memory phase {percentage o f 
words correctly recognised) were analysed using a 3 {face valence; happy, sad & 
neutral) x 3 {word valence; positive, neutral & negative) repeated measures ANOVA 
with group {depressed & control) as the between subjects factor. Pair-wise analyses 
of significant main effects were analysed using least significant difference (LSD)
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tests, when a-priori predictions had been made and Bonfenoni tests where no such 
predictions had been made. Subsequent investigations of significant interactions were 
carried out using one-way and two-way ANOVA and paired t-tests (for within subject 
comparisons) or independent t-tests (for between group comparisons). The alpha level 
of subsequent t-tests was adjusted where appropriate using Holms Sequential 
Bonferroni Correction Method (Green & Salkind, 2003). The association between 
participant group and false recognition of the different Ture’ words was analysed 
using chi-squared tests.
3.3. Results and Discussion (Selective Attention Task)
3.3.1, Participant characteristics
Analysis of the participants’ characteristics (table 3.1) revealed that the two groups 
were well matched in terms of age; F<1, educational level (years o f full-time 
education completed)', F(l, 62)=2.5, p>0.05 and pre-morbid intelligence {estimated 
from the number o f reading errors committed by the participants ' on the NART)’, F(l, 
62)=2.2, p>0.05. It should be noted that although the two groups did not differ 
significantly in terms of their general intellectual ability, the estimated full-scale IQ 
scores of both groups are relatively high. This finding might represent a sampling 
bias, as perhaps patients with a higher IQ were more likely to agree to participate, or 
perhaps the psychiatrists were more likely to consider these patients as suitable for the 
study.
Analysis of the participants self-rated mood revealed that, as expected, the patients 
rated themselves as significantly more depressed than did the controls, on both the 
BDI; F(l, 62)=198, p<0.0001 and HADS depression scale; F(l, 62)=304, p<0.0001.
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Furthermore, the patients rated themselves as significantly more anxious than did the 
controls on the HADS anxiety scale; F(l, 62)=151, p<0.0001. As it has been 
consistently been reported that anxiety is also associated with marked changes in 
cognitive fimction, particularly of selective attention (see section 1.3.6, page 15), it 
was considered appropriate to control for the influence of anxiety when analysing the 
data of the current study. Details of the analyses conducted to control for the influence 
of anxiety on task performance can be found in appendix IX.
Table 3.1. Characteristics of the individuals making up the two participant 
groups
Depressed
(N=32)
Controls
(N=32)
P-value
Age 40.7(10.1) 42.1 (9.6) NS
Sex 19 Females, 13 Males 19 Females, 13 Males -
Years of FTE 12.1 (2.5) 13.0 (2.4) NS
Predicted IQ 113(5.8) 115(4.6) NS
DSST 42.8 (9.7) 55.8 (9.2) < 0.0001
BDI 29.0 (10.2) 2.8 (2.6) < 0.0001
HADS (A) 14.2 (4.3) 3.3 (2.6) < 0.0001
HADS (D) 13.6 (3.9) 1.1 (0.9) < 0.0001
HRSD 20.0 (4.4) N/A -
FTE -  Full-time Education, BDI = Beck Depression Inventory (21-item), HADS (A) = Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale (Anxiety Score), HADS (D) = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Depression Score), 
HRSD= Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (17-item) and DSST= Digit Symbol Substitution Task score.
In line with previous studies (e.g. Ilsley et al., 1995) the patients demonstrated 
impaired perfonnance on the Digit Symbol Substitution Task relative to the controls;
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F(l,62)=30.2, p<0.0001. This finding suggests that, relative to the healthy controls, 
the patients exhibited significant psychomotor slowing.
3.3.2. Valence Identification Times
Based on the findings of Stenberg et al (1998) it was expected that, participants would 
be significantly slower to identify the valence of the words paired with incongruent 
faces than those paired with congruent or non-congruent (neutral) expressions. In line 
with this prediction, analysis of the participants valence identification times 
(presented in table 3.2) revealed a significant face valence x word valence interaction 
(illustrated in figure 3.2); f(2, 124)=9.1, p<0.001.
Table 3.2. Mean valence identification time (in milliseconds), as a function of the 
type of facial expression upon which the words were superimposed during the 
selective attention task (one standard error presented in parentheses)
Face
Valence
Word
Valence
Depressed
(N=32)
Controls
(N=32)
Happy Positive 1641 (84) 1221 (33)
Negative 1837(105) 1339(42)
Neutral Positive 1664 (78) 1207 (31)
Negative 1761 (97) 1269 (41)
Sad Positive 1837(85) 1196(31)
Negative 1674 (74) 1231 (45)
TOTAL 1736(76) 1244 (31)
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Inspection of the data presented in figure 3.2 revealed that overall participants were 
significantly slower to identify the valence of the positive words when they were 
paired with sad expressions (p=1516, SE=60) than when they were presented with 
happy (p=1664, SE=78) or neutral expressions (p=1664, SE=78); t(63)=2.2, p<0.05 
and t(63)=2.7, p<0.05 respectively.
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Figure 3.2 Mean valence identification times for the positive and negative words 
paired with happy, neutral and sad faces (error bars represent ± one standard 
error of the mean)
Positive word identification times for words paired with happy and neutral 
expressions did not differ significantly, p>0.05. Furthermore, analysis of the 
participants’ valence identification times also revealed that negative words were 
identified significantly slower when they were paired with happy expressions 
(p=1588, SE=64) than when they were presented with sad (p=1453, SE=51) or
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neutral (p=1515, SE=61) faces. Negative word identification times did not differ 
significantly when the words were paired with sad or neutral faces, p>0.05. It should 
also be noted that the participants in both groups demonstrated a positive word 
identification advantage as positive words were identified significantly faster 
(p=1461, SE=50) than were negative words (p=1519, SE=54), f(l, 62)=6.3, p<0.05.
In line with the findings of Stenberg et al (1998) it was also expected that the controls 
would demonstrate a positive word identification advantage (evidenced by faster 
identification times) that would be enhanced when the words were paired with happy 
faces and abolished when the words were presented with sad facial expressions. 
Conversely, based on Murphy et al (1999) it was expected that depressed patients 
would demonstrate a negative word identification advantage that would be enhanced 
when the words were presented with sad faces and abolished when the words were 
paired with happy expressions. In line with these predictions, analysis of the valence 
identification times revealed a significant group x face valence x word valence 
interaction, f(2, 124)=4.0, p<0.05. In order to elucidate the nature of this three-way 
interaction the identification times for positive and negative words were analysed 
separately using 2 (group) x 3 (face valence) repeated measures ANOVA.
Analysis of the valence identification times for positive words revealed a significant 
group X face valence interaction (illustrated in figure 3.3); f(2, 124)=6.1, p<0.01. 
Subsequent analysis revealed that, contraiy to the predictions, controls’ valence 
identification times for positive words did not differ significantly as a function of face 
valence. However, depressed individuals were significantly slower to identify positive 
words when they were paired with sad faces (p=1836, SE=85) than when they were
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presented with neutral (p=1664, SE=78) or happy expressions (p=1641, SE=84); 
t(31)=3.3, p<0.01 andt(31)=2.8, p<0.01 respectively.
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Figure 3.3. Mean valence identification times for the positive words paired with 
happy, neutral and sad faces, as a function of participant group (error bars 
represent ± one standard error of the mean)
Analysis of the negative word identification times revealed a significant main effect 
of face valence (illustrated in figure 3.4); f(2, 124)=5.5, p<0.01. Subsequent analysis 
revealed that the participants’ negative word identification times were significantly 
slower when the words were paired with happy faces (p=1588, SE=64) than when 
they were presented with neutral (p=1664, SE=78) or sad faces (p=1664, SE=78); 
p<0.05 and p<0.01 respectively. Negative word identification times were also slower 
when the words were paired with neutral faces than when they appeared with sad
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faces, but this difference was not significant, p==0.13. There was no significant group 
X face valence interaction; F<1.
IsII;
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Figure 3.4. Mean valence identification times for the negative words paired with 
happy, neutral and sad faces, as a function of participant group (error bars 
represent ± one standard error of the mean)
In line with previous studies (e.g. Gotlib & Cane, 1987) it was predicted that 
depressed individuals would be significantly slower to identify the valence of the 
neutral words when they were paired with sad faces than when they were presented 
with happy or neutral expressions. However, it was not expected that the neutral word 
identification times for the controls would differ as a function of the type of facial 
expressions these words were presented with.
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Figure 3.5. Mean valence identification times for the neutral words paired with
happy, neutral and sad faces, as a function of participant group (error bars 
represent ± one standard error of the mean)
Analysis of the data presented in figure 3.5 revealed a significant group x face valence 
interaction; f(2, 124)= 3.8, p<0.05. Further analysis revealed that contrary to the 
prediction (outlined above) depressed individuals’ valence identification times for 
neutral words were not significantly influenced by the type of facial expression the 
words were presented with; happy (p=1755, SE=84); neutral (p=1834, SE=105) and 
sad (p=1834, SE=109) respectively; all tests p>0.0.5. However, controls were 
significantly slower to identify the valence of the neutral words presented with happy 
faces (p=1314, SE=33) than those paired with neutral (p=1235, SE=43) or sad faces 
(|l i =1222, SE=33); t(31)=2.7, p<0.05 and t(31)=4.1, p<0.001 respectively.
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The finding that participants were slower to identify positive words paired with sad 
faces than those presented with happy or neutral expressions provides support for the 
first hypothesis. Likewise, the finding that the participants were slower to identify 
negative words paired with happy faces than those paired with neutral or sad 
expressions also supports the first hypothesis. These findings correspond with 
Stenberg et al (1998) and suggest that emotional valence of faces is processed 
automatically and that this processing is able to influence other ongoing cognitive 
activity. However, the finding of a three-way group x face valence x word valence 
interaction suggests that the two groups of participants may have been differentially 
affected by the interaction of the faces and words. These findings will now be 
considered.
The finding that the controls’ positive word identification times did not differ as a 
function of face valence does not support the second hypothesis. Likewise, this 
finding is not consistent with the results of Stenberg et al (1998). This result suggests 
that the faces were not influencing the ongoing processing of the participants in the 
control group. By contrast, there was strong evidence that the valence of the face the 
words were paired with exerted a significant influence on the positive word 
identification times of the depressed patients. This finding is consistent with previous 
work that has reported that depression is associated with impaired ability to inhibit 
distracting “off-task” stimuli (e.g. MacQueen et al, 2000). One possible explanation 
of the failure to replicate the positive emotion bias that was reported in Stenberg et al 
(1998) is that there is a marked difference in the ages of the samples in the two 
experiments, as the mean age of the current sample is 41 compared to a mean age of 
22 in Stenberg et al (1998). A second possibility is that there may have cultural
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differences between the two samples, as the original participant sample was from 
Sweden and the current sample is Scottish. However, another possibility concerns 
depressive symptoms in the participant samples. In the current study it was the 
depressed sample that demonstrated changes in identification times as a consequence 
of face valence and it is therefore plausible that a number of the participants in 
Stenberg et al (1998) may have been experiencing dysphoria that was not controlled 
for in their study.
The finding that the negative word identification times of both groups of participants 
were significantly influenced by the valence does not support the second prediction of 
hypothesis two as depressed individuals were not shown to exhibit a negative word 
advantage. Similarly the finding from then main analysis that all participants 
demonstrated a positive word identification advantage was not consistent with the 
second hypothesis. However, there is evidence from negative word identification to 
suggest that the processing of healthy individuals was also subject to interference 
from the distracting stimuli. For both groups the effect seems to be primarily that the 
incongruent faces (happy) were impairing their negative word identification. 
However, there was also a non-significant tendency towards the priming of the 
negative words when they were presented with sad faces. Although both groups of 
participants exhibited marked slowing of negative word identification in the presence 
of happy expressions, it is possible that the processes underlying this slowing are 
different for the two groups. For instance it is likely that the slowing in the depressed 
patients represents a general impaiiment relating to an inability to inhibit distracting 
‘off-task’ stimuli. Conversely, it is possible the slowing in the control group related to 
a selective attention bias towards happy faces.
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The finding that the faces did not influence the depressed individuals’ neutral word 
identification times does not support the presence of the predicted selective attention 
bias for sad faces in depressed individuals. Conversely, the findings that the controls 
were significantly slower to identify neutral words paired with happy faces compared 
to those paired with neutral or sad faces does suggest that healthy mood is associated 
with an attention bias towards happy faces. These findings correspond with those of 
Gotlib et al (1988) who reported that healthy individuals exhibited an attention bias 
towards positive stimuli, whereas depressed patients exhibited no preferential 
processing of the different types of stimuli.
The findings of the current study suggest that depressed individuals had difficulty in 
dealing with cognitive conflict, as they demonstrated slowed identification of word 
valence only when the words were presented with incongruent faces. This finding is 
in line with those of MacQueen et al (2000), who reported that depressed individuals 
failed to inhibit distracting “off-task” stimuli. These findings are also consistent with 
studies that have reported that depressed individuals are impaired on the traditional 
Stroop colour-naming task (e.g. Lamelin et al., 1997; Trichard et al, 1995). Moreover, 
as the selective attention task in the current study is essentially a Stroop task then it 
would seem feasible that the observed interference demonstrated by the patients could 
relate to the same dysfunction in the anterior cingulate that has been reported in 
depressed patients in previous studies (e.g. Bench et al, 1992; Drevets et al, 1992; 
Drevets et al, 1997; Goodwin et al, 1993). This assumption is consistent with the 
findings of George et al. (1997) who reported that impaired perfonnance of depressed 
patients on the Stroop task related to blunted activation in the AC. This could be 
tested in future using functional brain imaging tecliniques (e.g. fMRI) to identify
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which brain regions are recmited by depressed patients and healthy controls to 
perform this emotional Stroop task. It would also be possible to obtain further 
evidence using a more traditional neuropsychological approach of comparing the 
performance of depressed and non-depressed individuals on both the novel face-word 
variant of the emotional Stroop task (utilised in the current study) and the traditional 
Stroop task, in order to establish if the participants’ performance on the two tasks was 
significantly related.
3.3.3. Percentage o f Valence Identification Errors
In line with Stenberg et al (1998) it was predicted that, overall, participants would 
make significantly more valence identification errors when the words were paired 
with incongruent facial expressions than when they were presented with congruent or 
non-congiuent faces. However, preliminary analysis revealed that the percentage of 
identification errors made by the participants in the control group was very low 
(p=1.9%, SE=0.6) compared to the depressed patients (p=17.5%, 3.9); therefore 
analysis was only conducted on the percentage of identification errors made by the 
depressed patients.
Analysis of the percentage of valence identification enors made by the depressed 
individuals (illustrated in figure 3.6) revealed a significant face valence x word 
valence interaction, f(2, 62)=4.6, p<0.01. There was no significant effects of face 
valence or word valence; f(2, 62)=1.1, p>0.05 and f(l, 31)=1.5, p>0.05 respectively. 
In order to elucidate this interaction the percentage of positive and negative 
identification errors made by the depressed individuals was analysed separately using 
one-way repeated measures ANOVA with face valence as the within subjects factor.
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Figure 3.6. Mean percentage of positive and negative word identification errors
made by the depressed patients, as a function of face valence (error bars
represent ± one standard error of the mean)
Analysis of the percentage of positive word identification errors revealed that the 
number of errors did not differ significantly as a function of face valence; for either 
happy (p=16.4%, SE=4.8), neutral (p=22.7%, SE=5.8) or sad faces (p=22.0%, 
SE=05.5); f(2, 62)=1.1, p>0.05. Conversely, the percentage of negative word 
identification errors differed significantly as a function of the valence of the faces the 
words were presented with; f(2, 62)=5.7, p<0.001. Overall, depressed individuals 
made significantly more identification errors when the negative words were paired 
with happy expressions (p=22,7%, SE=6.1) than when they were paired with neutral 
(jj,=l 1.7%, SE=4.3) or sad faces (p=9.4%, SE=3.8); p<0.05 and p<0.01 respectively.
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Further analysis of the percentage of word identification errors revealed that when the 
words were paired with neutral faces the depressed participants made significantly 
more positive than negative identification eiTors; t(31)=2.0, p<0.05 (one-tailed). 
Similarly, when the words were presented with sad faces the depressed individuals 
made significantly more positive than negative errors; t(31)=2.3, p<0.05. However, 
when the words were paired with happy faces this pattern was reversed, the depressed 
individuals made more negative than positive errors, but this difference was not 
significant, p>0.05
From hypothesis four it was expected that depressed individuals would be more 
accurate when responding to negative words than neutral or positive. The evidence 
reported above provides some support for this proposal, as the depressed patients 
appear to demonstrate a negative word identification advantage in the neutral face 
condition that is enhanced slightly in the presence of the sad faces. However, the 
presence of the happy faces appears to have reversed this advantage, again providing 
evidence that the concurrent processing of the ‘off-task’ information significantly 
altered ongoing cognitive activity.
3.3.4. Is the face-word task strictly a test o f selective attention?
Tasks that have been used in previous studies to address selective attention in major 
depression have tended to involve the presentation of a neutral element and an 
emotional item. These stimuli are either presented in the same physical space; as in 
the emotional Stroop task, where the emotional element (an emotional word) is 
combined with the neutral component (an ink colour), or in different locations as in 
the dot probe task, where the emotional stimulus (e.g. an angry face) and neutral item
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(e.g. a neutral face) appear at different locations. In these types of studies it is possible 
to make inferences about differences in the allocation of attention based on patterns of 
colour-naming times or relative differences in response times to the probes. The face- 
word variant of the Stroop task that was utilised in the current study was originally 
designed by Stenberg et al (1998) to investigate the extent to which emotional faces 
were processed automatically and whether this processing influenced other ongoing 
cognitive activity. There are, however, a number of similarities between this paradigm 
and the other tasks that have been used to tap selective attention for emotional 
material in depression. For example, a number of stimuli in the current study involved 
a neutral stimulus paired with an emotional item (e.g. a neutral face paired with a 
positive or negative word, or an emotional face paired with a neutral word). Despite 
these similarities, there are also clear differences between the face-word task and the 
other selective attention tasks. For example, many of the compound stimuli presented 
during the current study consisted of two emotional elements (e.g. a sad face with a 
positive word). It could be argued that where the face-word pairs were incongruent 
(e.g. happy face/negative word or sad face/positive word) the task closely resembled 
the original Stroop task, i.e. in the original Stroop task both elements were colour­
relevant and in the current face-word task both elements were emotion-relevant. It is 
clear, however, that where the face-word pairs were congruent (happy face/positive 
word or sad face/negative word) the task was not addressing selective attention but 
rather emotional priming.
It would seem clear that evidence of slowed valence identification in the incongment 
conditions could be interpreted as the automatic processing of the to be-ignored 
stimulus interfering with the processing of the to-be-attended stimulus, in line with
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explanations of the traditional Stroop task. Slowed identification of neutral words in 
the presence of happy faces, as demonstrated by the controls, could be interpreted as a 
consequence of the participants’ attention being captured by the happy faces, in line 
with the logic applied in explaining the changes in colour-naming times in studies 
using the emotional variant of the Stroop task. More rapid identification of words 
presented in congruent condition would have provided evidence of emotional 
priming, similar to that demonstrated in Stenberg et al (1998). However, there was no 
evidence of this phenomenon in the current study. Overall, it can be argued that the 
face-word task employed in the current study does address elements of selective 
attention in similar ways to other common attentional tasks. However, it also provides 
interesting and important information concerning how individuals (depressed & non­
depressed) allocate attention in conditions where two conflicting emotional cues 
occupy the same spatial location. The data produced by the face-word task is very 
complex and requires careful analysis in order to understand the findings. In future it 
would be advisable to try and simplify the design to look separately at emotional 
priming and selective attention.
3.3,5. Summary and Conclusions (Selective Attention Task)
Taken together, the evidence from the valence identification times and percentage of 
errors revealed that, contrary to the predictions, depressed individuals did not 
demonstrate a selective attention bias for sad facial expressions. Conversely, evidence 
from the identification times revealed that the controls exhibited an attention bias for 
the happy faces. This supports the notion that depressed individuals are even-handed 
in their processing, whereas healthy individuals tend to see the world through “rose- 
tinted” spectacles (e.g. Gotlib et al, 1988). It would seem likely that reduced attention 
to positive stimuli in their environment might have consequences for the severity and
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duration of the patients’ depressive episode. For example, if a depressed person, was 
in conversation with a significant other, and failed to attend to the conversational 
partner’s smiling face this could negatively influence the interpretation of the 
interaction. There was support for the predicted congruence/ incongruence effect on 
valence identification times. However, it appears that it was depressed participants 
and not controls that exhibited changes in positive word identification as a function of 
face valence. Contrary to the findings of Stenberg et al (1998) healthy controls did not 
exhibit an emotional bias for positive words. Explanations for this non-replication 
include differences in participant variables (e.g. age, depression) or possibly cultural 
differences. In line with previous studies (e.g. MacQueen et al, 2000) the patients 
demonstrated impaired inhibition of distracting “off-task” stimuli, indexed by 
significantly slowed identification times in circumstances that involved incongment 
face/word pairs. It is plausible that this relates to a dysfunction of the anterior 
cingulate in the depressed sample. Overall, depressed individuals were more accurate 
in their identification of negative words, possibly due to their expertise in processing 
these words. However, this advantage disappeared when the negative words were 
presented with incongment (happy) faces, possibly due to the increased cognitive 
demands of trying to resolve the conflict in meaning between the incongment faces 
and words.
3.4, Results and Discussion (Recognition Memory Task)
3.4.1. Percentage o f correct recognitions
Preliminary analysis revealed that the percentage of neutral words correctly 
recognised by the participants did not differ significantly across the different face
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conditions; therefore full analysis was conducted on only the percentage of positive 
and negative words that were correctly recognised at memory testing.
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Figure 3.7. Percentage of positive and negative words correctly recognised by the 
participants during recognition memory testing
Hypothesis three predicted that, “depressed individuals would correctly recognise 
significantly more o f the negative words than the neutral or positive ”, In line with this 
prediction, analysis of the percentage of words correctly recognised by the 
participants during memory testing revealed evidence of an interaction between group 
and word valence (illustrated in figure 3.5), which approached conventional 
significance, F(l, 62)=3.1, p=0.08. However, further analysis of this interaction 
revealed that the depressed patients recognised a similar niraiber of positive 
(p=74.2%, SE=3.1) and negative words (p=75.0%, SE=2.8) during memory testing.
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which does not support the prediction (outlined above). Nevertheless, this analysis 
did reveal that the depressed patients correctly recognised significantly fewer positive 
words than did the controls (p=85.1%, SE==2.6), t(62)=2.7, p<0.01. Furthennore, 
depressed individuals did not differ from the controls in terms of the number of 
negative words that they correctly recognised (p depressed=75.0%, SE=2.8; p 
controls=78.4%, SE=2.3), p>0.05. Also of note was the finding that the controls 
correctly recognised significantly more positive than negative words during memory 
testing, t(31)=2.4, p<0.05.
It was also predicted in hypothesis three that, “the mood congruent memory bias in 
depressed patients would be moderated by the valence o f the faces the words were 
paired with at encoding, such that patients would recognise significantly more o f the 
negative words that were paired with sad faces than those that were paired with 
happy or neutral expressions”. However, analysis of the percentage of words 
correctly recognised by the participants during memory testing did not reveal the 
expected group x face valence x word valence interaction, F<1. Therefore this 
prediction was not supported by the results of the current study.
The findings of the current study did not provide evidence of the predicted negative 
memory bias in the patient sample. However, the patients demonstrated impaired 
recognition memory of the positive words relative to the controls, which could be 
interpreted as a negative bias. Participants in the control group demonstrated a 
positive memory bias, as they exhibited superior memory for positive words relative 
to negative words. This positive memoiy bias in the control sample conesponds with 
the pattern of memory observed for non-depressed individuals in previous studies
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addressing mood-congruent memory bias in depressed individuals (see Matt et al, 
1992 for a review). The failure to demonstrate the predicted MCM bias for the 
depressed patients in the current study may be accoimted for in terms of elaborative 
processing. Inspection of the valence identification times from the selective attention 
task (see table 3.2, page 78) revealed that depressed individuals failed to inhibit the 
distracting faces, hence the valence identification task would have been highly 
demanding for the patients in terms of cognitive resources. As a consequence the 
patients may have had fewer cognitive resources to allocate to the elaboration of the 
words. Conversely, the controls’ processing of the positive words was relatively 
unaffected by the presence of the faces, hence they would have been able to 
selectively allocate more resources to the elaboration of the positive words.
3A.2, Signal Detection Analysis
As recognition memory performance is susceptible to distortions due to response 
biases on the part of the participant, signal detection analysis (Swets, 1961) was 
conducted on the recognition memory data in the current study in order to establish if 
the group x valence interaction was still observed when the participants’ response 
style was controlled for. The signal detection parameter d’ (calculated from the 
number of “hits”) indicates the relative sensitivity of the participants to the different 
stimuli, with higher values indicating superior “pure” memory for the stimuli (i.e. 
memory performance that is independent of response style). The parameter p 
(calculated from the number of “false positives”) indicates the participants’ response 
style to the different types of stimuli, with higher values indicating the application of 
more conservative criterion for rejecting words as being previously viewed. However, 
analysis of these data (presented in table 3.3) revealed that, once the response style of
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the participants was controlled for, the group x valence interaction was no longer 
significant, F<1. This finding suggests that the controls’ memorial advantage for 
positive words related to a tendency to falsely recognise positive words. However, 
analysis of the participants’ P scores revealed no significant main effects or 
interaction.
Table 3.3. Mean d’ and p values calculated from the participants responses to the 
positive and negative words during recognition memory testing
Group Word Valence Sensitivity (d’) Response Style (P)
Depressed Positive 0.93 (0.06) 1.4 (0.7)
Negative 0.71 (0.1) 1.3 (0.7)
Controls Positive 1.2 (0.05) 1.6 (0.1)
Negative 0.9 (0.07) 1.5 (0.07)
3.4.3. False recognition o f non~presented “lure*^  words
There was some evidence in support of the prediction that “depression-relevant 
'lures ’ would be falsely recognised by significantly more o f the depressed patients 
than the controls ”, as more of the patients falsely recognised the lure word “sad” than 
would be expected, whereas fewer of the controls recognised it than would be 
expected (see table 3.4, below).
Analysis of this data using a chi-squared test revealed that this observed association 
between participant group and falsely recognising the word “sad” was significant, 
X^(l)=5.3, p<0.05. However, evidence from the analysis of the number of participants 
in each group that falsely recognised the lure word “depressed” provided less
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convincing evidence of the predicted tendency. Although more of the depressed 
individuals (n=16) falsely recognised the lure “depressed” than would be expected 
(n=14), and less of the controls (n=12) falsely recognised this word than would be 
expected (n=14), the test of this association only suggested a non-significant trend in 
the predicted direction, x^(l)=!.!, p=0.15.
Table 3.4. Number of participants in each group that falsely recognised the lure 
word “sad” (expected frequencies are shown in parentheses)
Falsely recognised “sad”?
Yes No
Depressed 17(12.5) 15 (19.5)
Controls 8 (12.5) 24 (19.5)
This tendency towards false recognition of depression-relevant lures cannot be 
explained in terms of a greater tendency of the patients to falsely recognise non­
presented words, as there was no difference in the number of participants in each 
group that falsely recognised the lure words “charming” and “excited”. There was no 
significant association in either case, p>0.05. The tendency of the patients to falsely 
recognise depression-relevant words corresponds with the findings of Segal et al 
(1995), who proposed that depression-relevant material is highly organised and 
interconnected in the cognitive systems of depressed individuals. They suggested that 
presentation of one element of this representation would, due to the highly organised 
interconnections, increase the accessibility of related material.
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3.4.4. Summary and Conclusions (Recognition Memory Phase)
Contraiy to the predictions, the depressed individuals did not demonstrate superior 
recognition memory for the depression-relevant words. Furthermore, they did not 
demonstrate the predicted enhanced memory for negative words paired with sad faces. 
There was some evidence that the controls demonstrated a bias towards superior 
recognition memory of the positive words. However, when the recognition memory 
data were subjected to a signal detection analysis it was apparent that high levels of 
false recognition of positive words may have contributed to the memory bias 
exhibited by the controls. As predicted, there was some evidence to suggest that 
depressed individuals were more likely to falsely recognise the depression-relevant 
“lures” than were the controls, which probably related to the highly interconnected 
nature of depression-relevant material in the cognitive systems of the patients. It 
would seem clear that the observed impairment of memory for positive memories in 
depressed patients, coupled with their tendency towards false memories of negative 
memories could act to bias recollection of events in which they are involved, leading 
the patients to remember events as more negative than they actually are. This 
tendency could, therefore, further contribute to the patient’s low mood.
3.5. General Discussion
3.5.1. The influence o f emotional facial expressions on processing o f concurrently 
presented affective words
Overall it would appear that, relative to the controls, the faces exerted a greater 
influence on the processing of the depressed patients. Primarily depressed patients 
demonstrated impaired inhibition of the faces, evidenced by slower valence 
identification times for incongruent than congruent face-word pairs. However, the
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presence of the faces also exerted specific valence-related effects on the profile of 
cognitive processing exhibited by the patients. For example, the presence of happy 
faces reduced the patients’ apparent identification advantage for depression-relevant 
words, whereas the presence of the sad faces appeared to enhance this bias. In terms 
of recognition memory performance the most striking finding of the current study is 
the failure to demonstrate the robust MCM bias for depression-relevant words in the 
depressed patients. It is proposed that as the patients were processing all elements of 
the compound stimuli (faces & words) they may have had fewer cognitive resources 
to apply to the elaboration of the negative words.
Although the faces clearly exerted greater influence on the processing of the 
depressed patients, there was also evidence that they significantly influenced the 
processing of the healthy controls. The most notable finding was the positive attention 
bias evident for happy faces. Initial inspection of the data would appear to suggest 
that the faces did not influence the memory of the controls, as the evidence supports 
that they exhibited the expected MCM bias for positive words. However, signal 
detection analysis revealed that the observed superior memory performance related to 
a response bias in terms of falsely recognising positive words. It is possible that the 
inhibition of the faces at encoding also reduced resource capacity of the controls, 
preventing them from elaboratively encoding the positive words. It is possible that at 
recognition memory they were relying on a feeling of familiarity as opposed to an 
actual recollection of the different words. This could be tested in future using the 
remember-know paradigm (Gardner & Java, 1993).
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3.5.2, Methodological Considerations
During the recognition memoiy phase of the study conducted by Stenberg et al (1998) 
the words were presented with faces (half the same face and half different). However, 
in order to simplify the procedure in present experiment it was decided to present the 
words alone. This also enabled examination of the influence of distracting stimuli at 
encoding alone (i.e. if the faces were not present at retrieval then any observed effects 
on memory must relate to conditions at encoding). However, Stenberg and colleagues 
suggested that the compound stimuli would be processed as a whole and perhaps 
some of the memory effects were lost as a consequence of separating the words from 
the faces in the current study. A future investigation that involves presenting the faces 
and words during the recognition memory phase would enable this to be established. 
A further element of the current study that requires consideration is the critical “lures” 
used to assess false recognition. In traditional studies addressing false recognition, 
lure words are non-presented associates of the sets of presented words. These lures are 
identified by presenting words to participants and asking them to provide as many 
associated words as they can. This procedure enables those words that are most 
regularly associated with a given lure word to be identified. These words can then be 
presented during the encoding phase. However, it should be noted that it was not 
possible to follow that procedure during the current study. The investigation of false 
recognition was not the primary focus of the current study and the decision to conduct 
this part of the study was taken after the initial tasks (selective attention & recognition 
memory) had been developed. Therefore, the choice of critical “lures” was restricted 
to the non-presented words that were already included as distracters in the recognition 
memoiy study. Whilst the depression-relevant lures were very representative of the 
words presented at encoding (see appendices III & IV) the positive “lures” were less
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closely associated with the previously presented positive words. This is an obvious 
limitation of the cunent study. It would be appropriate to conduct a pilot study prior 
to any future investigations of false recognition in depression in order to obtain 
reliable participant agreement concerning appropriate positive and negative associates 
to be used as critical lures. However, it is still the case that the groups differed on the 
(highly suitable) depression-relevant lures in the current study and not on the (less 
suitable) positive lures.
3.5.3. Summary and Conclusions
Contrary to predictions, the depressed patients did not demonstrate an attentional bias 
for sad facial expressions. Conversely, the controls demonstrated an attention bias for 
happy facial expressions. Depressed individuals exhibited greater difficulty in 
inhibiting the distracting faces, evidenced by slowed valence identification times in 
cases that involved incongruent face/word pairs. It would seem feasible that this 
deficit related to impaired anterior cingulate function in the depressed patients. Also 
contrary to predictions, the patients did not demonstrate superior memory for negative 
words. However, there was some evidence of a memory advantage for positive words 
exhibited by the controls. The predicted effect of face valence on the participants’ 
memory for the words was not observed. The clearest interpretation of the findings is 
that the presence of the faces at encoding reduced the capacity of cognitive resources 
that could be applied by the depressed patients to elaboratively encode the words. 
Finally, depressed patients exhibited a tendency to falsely recognise the depression­
relevant “lures”. It is clear that the observed findings could have implications for the 
depressed individuals in terms of social interactions with others and in terms of their 
ongoing mood. The lack of positive bias attention bias, the superior identification of
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negative material, and the tendency towards retrieval of false negative memories 
could all colour the depressed individual’s interpretation of social interactions in 
which they are involved, and could conceivably contribute to a worsening of the 
current episode.
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-CHAPTER FOUR-
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY IN MAJOR DEPRESSION: 
DIFFERENT RESPONSES TO VERBAL AND VISUAL EMOTIONAL CUES?
4.1. Introduction
4.1.1. Depression and Autobiographical Memory
There is considerable evidence that, relative to healthy individuals, depressed patients 
exhibit marked changes in autobiographical memory function (see section 1.4.1.1, 
page 17). They tend to demonstrate superior access to negative than positive 
autobiographical memories (ABMs), usually as a consequence of impaired access to 
positive memories, relative to healthy participants. In addition to differences in the 
relative access of positive and negative memories, numerous studies (e.g. Kuyken & 
Brewin, 1995; Williams & Dritschel, 1988) have reported that, when requested to 
retrieve memories of specific autobiographical events, depressed individuals are more 
likely than healthy participants to retrieve general categorical memories (see section
1.4.1.1. page 17).
An account of overgeneral ABM retrieval in depression requires an understanding of 
the organisation of autobiographical knowledge in memory. There is good evidence 
that ABM knowledge is stored within a hierarchy with information of differing 
specificity nested at different levels of the hierarchy. Furthermore, this evidence 
suggests that the information stored in this hierarchy is accessed via a retrieval 
mechanism that is mediated by the central executive (see section 1.4.1.1, page 17). 
Whilst healthy individuals are able to move smoothly tlirough the hierarchy to access
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the required specificity of autobiographical information, depressed individuals (as 
noted above) appear to exhibit problems in moving beyond general descriptions.
It has been suggested (e.g. Williams & Dritschel, 1988) that depressed individuals 
might adopt this retrieval style in order to avoid the painful consequences of accessing 
specific memories of negative events from their past (see section 1.4.1.1, page 17 for 
supportive evidence of this proposal). It is proposed that, during ABM retrieval, once 
the search begins to access elements of emotional events depressed individuals 
strategically terminate the memory search, which results in the retrieval mechanism 
making another attempt at retrieving a specific ABM. It is likely that the patients will 
also terminate the subsequent memory search at the intermediate stage of the 
hierarchy. According to Williams (1996), a consequence of these repeated attempts to 
access specific event memories is a network of chronically activated, mainly negative, 
general memory descriptions. Due to the associations that develop between these 
general memories, future attempts to access specific ABMs will be more likely to 
activate this network of general descriptions; Williams (1996) termed this ‘Mnemonic 
Interlock’ (see section 1.4.1.1, page 17 for more detailed coverage of this process). 
Furthermore he suggested that this process is encouraged by, and is encouraging of 
ruminative self-focus. In line with this there have been a number of studies (e.g. 
Watkins, 2000) demonstrating that preventing rumination, using a distraction 
manipulation, is associated with a reduction in overgeneral ABM retrieval.
4.1.2. Cueing Autobiographical Memories
Traditionally, studies addressing ABM retrieval in major depression (e.g. Clark & 
Teasdale, 1982; Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams & Scott, 1988) have utilised 
the single word cueing task, i.e. participants are required to produce personal
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memories in response to single words (e.g. “happy”). Other researchers have utilised 
modified versions of the verbal cueing task in order to establish if it were possible to 
modify the overgeneral ABM retrieval associated with depression. Williams & 
Dritschel (1988), for example, provided additional contextual information in the fonn 
of supplementary activity cues (e.g. “going for a waW). However, they reported that 
this procedure did not lead to the retrieval of more specific ABMs in depressed 
patients. Moore, Watts & Williams (1988) reported a similar result when they used 
vignettes (e.g. ”a neighbour helped me with a practical problem") to cue 
autobiographical memories.
Despite these findings, there have been a small number of studies demonstrating that 
it is possible to manipulate the specificity of ABM retrieval. For example, Williams, 
Healy and Ellis (1999) reported that highly imageable word cues (i.e. words that 
easily enable an individual to generate an internal image; e.g. library) led to greater 
specificity of ABM retrieval than did less imageable cues (e.g. boredom). 
Subsequently, they demonstrated the superiority of visual imagery in providing access 
to specific event memories relative to other imagery modalities (auditory, tactile, 
olfactory and motor). Williams et al (1999) explained this superiority by suggesting 
that visual images represent a rich source of information concerning a depicted event, 
as they lead to activation of other related events and concepts. Furthermore, they 
proposed that visual images provide the most efficient form of summarising available 
information that can be used by the retrieval processes to search the memory store, 
and to evaluate potential episodes in terms of task specifications. These findings 
demonstrate a clear advantage for the visual modality in the retrieval of specific 
ABMs.
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Given the superiority for visual imagery in the retrieval of specific ABMs the next 
logical step would seem to be to establish the pattern of ABM retrieval that is 
associated with actual images (e.g. photographs) as opposed to images that are 
generated internally by the participant. However, work conducted to date has 
remained focused on the use of verbal stimuli to cue memories. There are good 
grounds to expect that, compared to the traditional verbal stimuli, non-verbal visual 
cues might result in a different pattern of ABM retrieval.
First, consider an everyday example of looking at a photograph taken on a previous 
holiday; it is clear that such an occurrence would lead to recollection of events that 
occurred around the time that it was taken. Moreover, it would seem likely that, in 
common with internally generated images, externally perceived pictorial stimuli 
would provide equally efficient summaries of information that could be used by the 
retrieval mechanisms to search the autobiographical memory store and to evaluate the 
suitability of candidate episodes.
Evidence to support this notion comes from Teasdale and Barnard’s influential 
Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) model of cognition and emotion (1993). 
According to the ICS model, both internally generated images, and perceived 
objects/events in the real world are represented in the same subsystem (OBJECT) of 
the cognitive stmctuie, which supports the notion the two experiences are related 
(Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). Further support for this view comes from a series of 
studies conducted by Dewhurst and Conway (1994), who demonstrated a similar 
advantage in recognition memory performance for pictures compared to words, as for 
high versus low-imageable words. All of which supports the expectation that
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externally viewed pictorial stimuli would provide similarly enlianced access to 
specific autobiographical memories as is provided by internally generated visual 
images.
From the above, it would seem clear that investigation of the different patterns of 
ABM retrieval that are associated with visual and verbal cues would represent an 
interesting and important addition to the existing literature. Furthermore, in light of 
the findings concerning ABM retrieval in patients suffering from major depression, 
another important element of such a study would be to establish the extent to which, 
relative to traditional word cues, visual cues influenced the specificity of ABM 
retrieval exhibited by a sample of clinically depressed patients. The aim of the current 
study is to address both of these issues.
4.1.3. The Visually Cued ABM Test
A primary concern, in terms of the development of the proposed visually cued 
autobiographical memory test, was the type of visual stimuli to be presented to the 
participants in order to elicit retrieval of personal memories. In traditional cueing 
tasks (e.g. Williams & Dritschel, 1988; Williams & Scott, 1988) the words have 
tended to describe either distinct emotions (e.g. happiness, surprise, anger) or 
concepts (mood-congruent & mood-incongruent) that are highly salient to people 
suffering from depression (e.g. lonely, successful). Emotional facial expressions could 
be considered to be the visual equivalent of the first type of word cue (i.e. they 
represent distinct emotions). Furthermore, photographic images depicting emotional 
scenes and social interactions could be considered suitable to represent concepts that 
would be salient to a person suffering from depression. Evidence supporting this
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notion comes from a study conducted by Lang, Greenwald, Bradley and Hamm 
(1993), who argued that, although individuals are able to make the psychological 
distinction between pictures and reality, the information contained within pictorial 
stimuli corresponds with the properties of “real life” objects and events, and as such 
lead to activation of cognitive representations that are associated with powerful 
affective reactions.
4,1,4. Major Depression and the Visually Cued ABM Test
As noted above, Williams and Dritschel (1988) suggested that depressed individuals 
might use the overgeneral retrieval style in order to avoid the negative consequences 
of accessing specific negative memories. However, as noted by Williams, Teasdale, 
Segal and Soulsby (2000), it is possible that the cognitive effort required to suppress 
these memories reduces the amount of available resources that can be utilised to move 
from general to specific memories.
If overgeneral ABM retrieval does represent a strategic avoidance of the emotive 
nature of specific memories, then one possible influence on the specificity of ABM 
retrieval in depressed individuals might be the ease with which the different forms of 
stimuli {yerbal cfe visual) are able to access emotional reactions. It would be expected 
that cues that lead to greater access of emotional content would be more likely to 
result in the strategic avoidance of specific retrieval. Therefore, based on the proposal 
of Williams et al (1997) that pictorial representations are more emotive than verbal 
descriptions, it would be expected that depressed individuals would demonstrate 
greater overgeneral retrieval to image cues than to words. Furthermore, as emotional 
facial expressions are by their nature emotive (see Lundqvist & Dimberg, 1995; Wild,
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Erb & Bartels, 2001 for evidence of emotional contagion from faces) it might also be 
expected that, relative to word cues, emotional faces would result in the retrieval of a 
greater proportion of generic ABMs by the depressed patients. However, if 
overgeneral categorical retrieval does represent sti ategic avoidance of negative affect, 
on the part of the patients, then it would be expected that any observed increase in 
generic retrieval would be restricted to negative memories.
Differences in the emotive properties of the distinct forms of stimuli might also be 
expected to modify other aspects of autobiographical retrieval that are influenced by 
the valence of the memory cues, namely retrieval times and proportion of positive and 
negative memories retrieved. Teasdale and Barnard (1993) proposed that, according 
to their ICS model, different elements of a given event (e.g. visual, spatial, emotional, 
etc) are represented in multiple subsystems within the cognitive architecture. In line 
with Williams (1996), Teasdale and Barnard (1993) suggest that ABM retrieval 
requires constructing a “description” or summary of the required information with 
which to access these stored representations. They further suggested that mood 
congruent retrieval of autobiographical memories depends upon the mood at recall 
enhancing the availability of descriptions relating to material of a similar emotional 
tone. In particular they noted the importance of the distinction between “hot” and 
“cold” cognition in explaining mood-congruent memory. In terms of personal 
memory retrieval, “cold” cognition refers to the access of elements of a given event 
(e.g. its semantic meaning) without a re-experience of the relevant emotional 
reactions. In contrast “hot” cognition reflects the affective representation of the event, 
and hence will be accompanied by the appropriate emotional response. According to 
Teasdale and Barnard (1993) the presence of mood-congruent retrieval bias requires
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access to representations in the Implicational sub-system, as (in the ICS model) this is 
the sub-system that represents affect-related “hot” themes from an individual’s past. 
With this in mind, it would be expected that memory cues that lead to greater access 
of emotional representations (i.e. Implicational representations) would result in 
stronger mood congruent effects. Therefore, based on the assumption that images and 
faces are more emotive than words, and presumably would be more likely to access 
the Implicational code, it would be expected that mood-congruent retrieval effects 
would be stronger for the visual stimuli than for word cues.
4.1,5. Overview and Predictions
Clinically depressed patients and healthy controls were presented with three different 
sets of affective memory cues {words, faces & images) and were asked to retrieve, as 
quickly as they could, a specific autobiographical memory (ABM) in response to each 
cue. The cues were presented in blocks (e.g. all words together etc). Participants were 
also asked to rate the pleasantness of each ABM they retrieved. The following 
predictions were made:
1. In line with Williams et al (1999) it was expected that images would lead to 
greater access to specific ABMs than would words or faces. With this in mind 
it was predicted that participants would be significantly faster to retrieve 
specific ABMs to images than to words or faces. However, in line with 
Williams and Dritschel (1988) it was predicted that depressed individuals 
would not demonstrate enlianced retrieval to images, therefore no differences 
were expected for the depressed individuals retrieval times to the different 
memory cues.
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2. In line with previous findings (outlined in section L4.1.1, page 17) it was 
predicted that depressed patients would be significantly faster to produce 
negative than positive memories. Conversely, it was expected that the controls 
would be faster to produce positive than negative memories.
3. In line with Williams et al (1999), it was expected that, overall, participants 
would retrieve significantly more specific ABMs (as a first response) when 
cued with images than when cued with words or faces. However, it was not 
expected that depressed individuals would demonstrate this specificity 
advantage for the image cues.
4. In line with previous findings (outlined in section 1.4.1.1, page 17) it was 
expected that depressed patients would retrieve significantly fewer specific 
ABMs than would the controls. However, in line with previous findings it was 
also expected that depressed individuals would retrieve significantly fewer 
specific positive than negative ABMs.
5. Based on previous findings (outlined in section 1.4.1.1, page 17) it was 
expected that depressed individuals would make significantly more categorical 
retrieval errors than either omissions or extended errors. Furthermore, it was 
expected that depressed participants would retrieve significantly more 
categorical memories than would the controls.
4.2. Method
4.2,1. Design
This study utilised a 2 between (group) x 3 within (cue type) x 2 within (memory 
valence) mixed factorial design. The independent variables were the type of affective 
stimuli used to cue the ABMs {words, images & faces) and the valence of the
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retrieved ABMs {positive or negative', identified post-hoc based on the participants’ 
own ratings of the pleasantness of the retrieved memories). The dependent variables 
were time taken (in seconds) to retrieve a specific ABM, the number of positive and 
negative ABMs retrieved, the percentage of specific ABMs retrieved as a first 
response to the cues and the number of each type of retrieval error {extended, 
categorical & omissions). The three types of stimuli (words, images & faces) were 
presented in blocks (i.e. all faces in one block, all images in another block & all words 
in a final block). The order in which the participants completed the three blocks of 
stimuli was counterbalanced using the Latin squares technique.
4.2.2.Participants
25 clinically depressed patients (15 females, 10 males) and 25 healthy controls (16 
females, 9 males) took part in the current study. According to Cohen (1992) this 
sample size is suitable to detect the large effect sizes that were predicted in the current 
study based on previous studies (e.g. Williams & Scott, 1988) addressing ABM 
retrieval in depressed patients (see appendix II for full details of this power analysis). 
The participants were recruited according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria cited 
in chapter two (section 2.6.3, page 55). Furthermore, upon admission to the study they 
were assessed according to the standard protocol outlined in chapter two (section
2.6.2, page 54). The characteristics of the individuals making up the two participant 
groups are reported in table 4.1 (page, 118). The two groups were matched in terms of 
age, sex, educational background, and pre-morbid intellectual ability. Prior to their 
participation in the study, the severity of the patients’ depression was quantified by 
one of the psychiatrists at the Affective Disorders Clinic according to the 17-item
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Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD; Hamilton, 1961). The mean HRSD 
score for the patients in the current study was 20.6 (with a range of 14 -  27).
4.2.3. Materials and Apparatus
4.2.3.1. Emotional Words
Ten emotional words (5 positively valenced, 5 negatively valenced) that had been 
used in previous studies addressing autobiographical memory retrieval in psychiatric 
patients (e.g. Williams and Broadbent, 1986) were used in the current study to cue 
autobiographical memories. The five positive cues were '"''Happy", “Interested", 
“Safe", “Successful" and “Surprised" and the five negative cues were "Clumsy", 
"Angry", "Hurt" (emotionally), "Lonely" and "Sorry". Two neutral words {"Bus" 
and "Table ") were included as practice items.
4.2.3.2. Emotional Images
Ten emotional images (5 positively valenced, 5 negatively valenced), drawn from the 
International Affective Picture System {lAPS - Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1997), 
were used during the current study to cue autobiographical memories. lAPS is a 
collection of photographic images of different emotional scenes that have been rated 
by 300 participants in terms of their affective valence on a 9-point scale {\=extremely 
unpleasant/negative, 5= neutral & 9—extremely pleasant/positive). The participants 
also rated how arousing the images were on a 9-point scale {\=not arousing and 
9-extremely arousing). The images incorporated in the current study were matched in 
terms of their arousal ratings (positive p=4.7, SD=0.8; negative p=4.5, SD=0.7); 
t(8)=0.5, p>0.05. However, as expected the two sets of images differed significantly 
in terms of their valence ratings {positive p=7.4, SD=0.3; negative p=3.3, SD=0.8);
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t(8)=10.6, p<0.05. The positive images (see appendix XI) presented during the study 
were "A loving couple” (male with female), "A family group” (mother, father & 
young child), "Granddad fishing with grandchild”, "a very happy woman on a sunny 
day, pouring water over her head” and "a group o f teenage friends having fun at the 
beach The negative images (see appendix XII) presented during the study were "a 
couple arguing/fighting” (male upon female), "a young boy crying”, "mourners at a 
funeral”, "a boy failing a maths problem in front o f his classmates” and "a child 
curled up in the foetal position looking scared”. Two neutral images (see appendix 
XI) were also included as practice items these were "a man playing a guitar” and "a 
shadow o f someone cast onto a road”. The images were chosen by the author to 
represent themes/events that the participants were likely to have experienced. The 
suitability of the chosen stimuli was established in consultation with a second 
researcher (BD).
4.2.3.3. Emotional Facial Expressions
Eight grey-scale photographic images of different individuals portraying either 
happiness or sadness (four of each) were used during the current study to cue 
autobiographical memories (see appendix XIII). A young male and young female (in 
their mid twenties), and an older female and older male (late forties -  early fifties) 
portrayed each expression. The faces were drawn from a set used in a study looking at 
emotion processing in healthy adults (Le Gal & Bruce, 1999). 70 undergraduate 
students (35 male, 35 female) rated the faces in terms of what emotion they 
considered each face to be displaying (a forced choice paradigm was employed in 
their study). The faces used in the current study all achieved over 75% subjective
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agreement concerning the emotion portrayed. Two neutral faces (one male, one 
female) were also included as practice items.
4.2.3.4. Stimulus Presentation
During all three autobiographical memory tasks, an AppleMac PowerBook 3004 
laptop computer loaded with the Superlab® program Version 1.5.7 (Cedrus 
Corporation, 1992, Phoenix, Arizona) was used to present the stimuli to the 
participants one at a time (in a random order).
4.2.3.5. Response Measurement
A stopwatch was used to record the time taken by the participants to retrieve specific 
autobiographical memories. A Sony audiocassette recorder (with an external 
microphone) was used record the details of the memories retrieved by the participants 
to the different cues. Printed record sheets were also used to document the central 
details of the memories, to note the retrieval times for each memory, and to record the 
pleasantness rating (see below) assigned by the participants to each memory they 
retrieved.
4.2.3.6. Pleasantness Rating
A five-point pleasantness rating scale was printed in 36-point bold type on an A4 
sheet. The scale was anchored at one end (nearest the one) with the words extremely 
unpleasant and at the other end (nearest the five) with the words extremely pleasant. 
The scale was designed to allow the participants to rate the memories they retrieved in 
terms of how pleasant or unpleasant they considered them to be.
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4.2,4. Procedure
The procedure was identical for all three of the autobiographical memory tests. The 
participants were presented with memory cues (either words, images or faces) one at a 
time via the computer screen, and were asked to retrieve a specific memory of an 
event from their past that each cue brought to mind. A specific memory was defined 
as "a memory o f an event that occurred at a specific time and place, and that lasted 
less than a day Examples of specific memories were given in the instructions prior 
to all three ABM tests, e.g. "in response to the cue word Boat, you might retrieve a 
memory o f a ferry trip you took to France when you were at school, rather than I  used 
to play with toy boats when I  was a kid”. The participants were not restricted in terms 
of the period of their lives firom which they could recall memories. Furthermore, they 
were instructed that the events they retrieved could be trivial or important. Once a cue 
had appeared on the screen it remained in view of the participant until they retrieved a 
memory. If the participant failed to retrieve a memory within 30 seconds then it was 
coded as an omission and the next cue was presented. However, if the participants 
indicated that they had retrieved a memory (by saying “Yes” or “OK”) then the 
experimenter stopped the stopwatch, noted the time and recorded the basic details of 
the memory (on audiotape and in writing on the response sheet). If the participant had 
retrieved a specific ABM they were asked to rate the memory in terms of how 
pleasant they considered it to be (using the rating scale provided). However, if the 
memory they had retrieved was not specific the experimenter prompted them with 
"Can you give me a specific example -  one single event?” The stopwatch was 
restarted and timing continued until the participant retrieved a specific memory. This 
process was repeated until a specific memory was retrieved or until the time on the 
stopwatch reached 30 seconds. Prior to each of the three ABM tests the participants
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were presented with a summary of the instructions and two practice stimuli in order to 
ensure that they understood their task. The participants were also instructed to provide 
a different memory for each cue (word, face or image) that they viewed during the 
study. Once all three ABM tests had been completed the participants were required to 
rate their recent mood on the 21-item BDI and the HADS. Finally, they were asked to 
complete the NART.
4.2.5. Coding o f retrieved ABMs
The memories that were retrieved by the participants as a first response to each cue 
were coded as one of three types of autobiographical memory. Specific ABMs 
referred to unique events that lasted less than one day (e.g. "going to see a rock band 
last weekend”), extended ABMs referred to particular time periods that lasted longer 
than a day (e.g. "my holiday in the south o f France two summers ago”) and 
categorical ABMs referred to sununaries of events (e.g. "going for a coffee with 
friends”). Failures to retrieve memories to cues within 30 seconds were coded as 
omissions. The author (NR) coded all memories retrieved by the participants as a first 
response. However, a second rater (BD) who was blind to participants’ group 
membership rated all of the memories from a sample of twenty participants (10 
patients, 10 controls). The mean inter-rater agreement was 85% (see appendix XIV 
for full details of this analysis).
4.2.6. Data Analysis
A MANOVA was conducted in order to establish if there were any significant 
differences between the two groups in tenns of age, educational background (years of 
full-time education completed), intellectual ability (full-scale IQ score estimated from
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the number of reading errors on the NART) and scores on the self-report measures of 
depression and anxiety. A chi-squared test was utilised to establish if the two groups 
differed in terms of the number of males and females making up each group. The time 
taken (in seconds) to retrieve specific ABMs, the percentage of specific ABMs 
retrieved as a first response and the number of positive and negative ABMs retrieved 
were analysed using 2 (group) x 3 (cue type) x 2 (memory valence) repeated measures 
ANOVA. The number of each type of retrieval errors committed by the participants 
was analysed using a 2 (group) x 3 (cue type) x 3 (error type) repeated measures 
ANOVA. Subsequent pair-wise comparisons were conducted using Least Significant 
Difference tests when a-priori predictions had been made and Bonferroni tests where 
no predictions had been made. Follow up analyses of significant interactions were 
conducted using one-way and two-way factorial ANOVA, and paired and 
independent t-tests. The alpha level of these tests was adjusted where appropriate, to 
control for multiple comparisons, using Holm’s Sequential Bonferroni Correction 
Method (Green & Salkind, 2003). Initial inspection of the responses to the memory 
cues revealed that two of the images (kids playing on a beach & happy girl on a 
sunny day) had consistently led to memories of holidays or going on holiday. This 
finding was observed in both patients (56% o f the sample) and controls (40% o f the 
sample). These memories were almost exclusively extended (e.g. my holiday in Spain 
last year) or categorical (e.g. I  used to go on holidays with my family). It was 
considered likely that the tendency of the participants to produce general memories to 
these two cues could have obscured evidence of increased specificity to images; 
therefore participants’ responses to these cues were removed from the data set prior to 
the main analysis.
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4.3. Results
4,3,1, Participant Characteristics
Analysis of the data presented in table 4.1 revealed that the two groups were well 
matched in terms of age; F<1, Sex, %^(1)=0.09, p>0.05; educational background 
[F<1], and pre-morbid intellectual ability [F<1]. Although the estimated IQ of the two 
groups did not differ significantly, the observed IQ scores for both groups were 
relatively high, which suggests there may have been a sampling bias, such that 
patients with higher IQ may have been more likely to agree to participate or the 
clinicians may have considered these patients as more suitable for the current study.
Table 4.1. Characteristics of the individuals in the two participant groups
Depressed
(N=25)
Controls
(N=25)
P-Value
Age 42.7 (2.0) 41 (2.1) NS
Sex 15 female 16 female NS
Years of FTE 12.6 (0.6) 12.6 (0.6) NS
IQ (Estimated) 113(7.4) 114(5.8) NS
BDI 28.9(1.9) 3.8 (0.6) <0.0001
HADS_A 13.6 (0.7) 4.4 (0.7) <0.0001
HADS_D 12.6 (0.7) 1.6 (0.4) <0.0001
FTE=fulI-time education, BDI=Beck Depression Inventory, HADS_A=Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale -  Anxiety Scale, HADS_D=Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale -  Depression
Scale.
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As expected the patients rated themselves a significantly more depressed than did the 
controls on the BDI; F(l, 48)=159, p<0.0001 and the HADS depression subscale; F(l, 
48)=184, p<O.OOOL Also as expected, the patients rated themselves as significantly 
more anxious than did the controls on the HADS anxiety subscale, F(l, 48)=84.1, 
p<O.OOOL Analysis of the relative contribution of depression and anxiety in 
explaining the ABM retrieval effects reported in this chapter revealed that it was 
consistently depression and not anxiety that accounted for these effects (see appendix 
XV for full coverage of these analyses).
4.3,2, ABM Retrieval Times
In line with Williams et al (1999) it was expected that images would lead to greater 
access to specific ABMs than would words or faces. With this in mind it was 
predicted that participants would be significantly faster to retrieve specific ABMs to 
images than to words or faces. However, in line with Williams and Dritschel (1988) it 
was also predicted that depressed individuals would not demonstrate enhanced 
retrieval to images, therefore no differences were expected for the depressed 
individuals’ retrieval times to the different memory cues.
Analysis of the participants’ retrieval times (presented in table 4.2) revealed that, 
overall, depressed patients were significantly slower (jli=10 seconds, SE=1.0) to 
retrieve specific ABMs than were the controls (p=7.5 seconds, SE=0.4); f(l, 48)=5.6, 
p<0.05. Furthermore, there was a significant main effect of cue type on the 
participants’ retrieval times; f(2, 96)=11.7, p<0.001. Overall, participants were 
significantly slower to faces (p=9.9s, SE=0.7) than to images (ji=8.1s, SE=0.6) or 
words (p=8.2s, SE=0.5); p<0.001 and p<0.01 respectively.
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Table 4.2. Mean time (seconds) taken by the participants to retrieve specific 
ABMs in response to the different types of affective cues, as a function of the 
valence of the ABM retrieved (Standard errors presented in parentheses).
Type of Cue Valence of ABM 
retrieved
Depressed
(N=25)
Controls
(N=25)
Words Positive 9.7 (1.0) 6.7 (0.5)
Negative 8.3 (0.9) 8.3 (0.8)
Images Positive 9.9 (1.1) 5.5 (0.5)
Negative 8.9 (1.1) 7.9 (0.5)
Faces Positive 11.4 (1.3) 7.3 (0.7)
Negative 11.4(1.4) 9.3 (0.8)
However, analysis of the participants’ retrieval times also revealed some evidence of 
a group X cue type interaction (illustrated in figure 4.1); f(2, 96)=2.4, p=0.09.
Subsequent analysis of these data revealed that depressed individuals were 
significantly slower to retrieve ABMs to faces (p=11.6s, SE=1.2) than to words 
(p=8.9s, SE=0.9) or images (p=9.4s, SE=1.0); t(24)=3.4; p<0.01 and t(24)=3.3, 
p<0.01 respectively. There was no difference in the depressed individuals retrieval 
times for words and images, t(24)=1.0, p>0.05. The participants in the control group 
were also significantly slower to retrieve specific ABMs to faces (p=8.3s, SE=0.5) 
than to images (p=6.7s, SE=0.4), t(24)=3, p<0.001. However, there was no significant 
difference between the controls retrieval times to faces and words (p=7.5s, SE=0.5); 
t(24)=1.5, p>0.05. Similarly, there was no significant difference between the controls 
retrieval times for images and words, t(24)=1.2, p>0.05.
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Figure 4.1, Mean time (in seconds) taken by the participants to retrieve a specific
ABM, as a function of type of memory cue (error bars represent ± one standard
error of the mean)
Further analysis of the participants’ retrieval times to the different cue types revealed 
that depressed individuals were significantly slower (p,=9.4s, SE=1.0) than the 
controls (p=6.7s, SE=0.4) to retrieve specific memories when cued with images; 
t(48)=2.5, p<0.05. Similarly, depressed individuals were slower (p=8.1s, SE=0.6) 
than the controls (p=8.1s, SE=0.6) to retrieve specific ABMs when cued with faces; 
t(48)=2.4, p<0.05. However, the two groups did not differ in their retrieval times to 
word cues (depressed p=8.9s, SE=0.9; controls p=7.5s, SE=0.5); t(48)=L4, p>0.05.
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The main analysis of the participants’ ABM retrieval times also revealed a highly 
significant group x valence interaction (illustrated in figure 4.2); F(l, 48)=17.9,
p<0.001.
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Figure 4.2. Mean time in seconds taken by the participants to retrieve positive
and negative ABMs (error bars represent ± one standard error of the mean)
Subsequent analysis of these data revealed that depressed individuals were 
significantly slower (p=10.4s, SE=1.0) than the controls (p=6.4s, SE=0.4) to retrieve 
positive ABMs; t(48)=3.7, p<0.001. However, the two groups did not differ 
significantly in terms of their retrieval times for negative ABMs (depressed p=9.5s, 
SE=1.0; controls |l i=8.6s , SE=0.5); t(48)=1.0, p>0.05. The depressed individuals were 
significantly faster to retrieve negative (|li=9.5s, SE=1.0) than positive ABMs 
(p=10.4s, SE=1.0); t(24)=l .7, p<0.05 (one-tailed). Conversely, the controls were
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significantly faster to retrieve positive (p=6.4s, SE=0.4) than negative ABMs (p=8.6s, 
SE=0.5); t(24)=4.3, p<O.OOL
4 3 3 , Specificity o f retrieved ABMs
In line with Williams et al (1999), it was expected that, overall, participants would 
retrieve significantly more specific ABMs (as a first response) when cued with images 
than when cued with words or faces. However, it was not expected that depressed 
individuals would demonstrate this specificity advantage for the image cues.
Table 4.3. Percentage of specific ABMs given by the participants as a first 
response to the different types of affective cues, as a function of the valence of the 
ABM retrieved (standard errors presented in parentheses).
Type of Cue Valence of ABM 
retrieved
Depressed
(N=25)
Controls
(N=25)
Words Positive 67.7 (6.9) 92.6 (2.9)
Negative 59.3 (7.0) 87.7 (2.9)
Images Positive 63.6 (6.7) 98.0 (1.4)
Negative 52.6 (6.8) 95.6(1.8)
Faces Positive 50.7 (6.8) 89.2 (4.9)
Negative 42.3 (6.2) 94.0 (4.4)
Analysis of the percentage of specific ABMs retrieved as a first response revealed a 
significant effect of cue type; f(2, 96)=3.5, p<0.05. Subsequent analysis revealed that 
participants retrieved significantly fewer specific ABMs to faces cues (p=69.1%, 
SE=4.7) than to words (p=76.9%, SE=3.9) or images (|li=77.5% , SE=3.9); p<0.05 and
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p<0.01 respectively. However, the percentage of specific ABMs retrieved by the 
participants to words and images did not differ significantly, p>0.05. The main 
analysis of ABM specificity also revealed a significant group x cue type interaction 
(illustrated in figure 4.3); f(2, 96)=3.5, p<0.05.
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Figure 4.3. Percentage of specific ABM retrieved the different cues, as a function 
of participant group (error bars represent ± one standard error of the mean)
Subsequent analysis of these data revealed that healthy controls retrieved significantly 
more specific ABMs to images (p=96.8%, SE=1.1) than to words (p=90.2%, 
SE=2.3); t(24)=2.3, p<0.05. Similarly, controls retrieved more specific ABMs to 
images than to words (p=91.6%, SE=3.5), a difference that approached conventional 
significance, t(24)=1.5, p=0.07. Interestingly, depressed individuals retrieved 
significantly fewer specific ABMs to faces (p=69.1%, SE=4.7) than to words
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(jj,=76.9%, SE=3.9), t(24)=2.8, p<0.01. Similarly, depressed individuals produced 
fewer specific ABMs to faces than to images (p=77.5%, SE=3.9), a difference that 
approached conventional significance, t(24)=2.0, p=0.06.
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Figure 4,4 Percentage of specific positive and negative ABMs retrieved, as a 
function of participant group (error bars represent ± one standard error of the 
mean)
In line with previous findings (outlined in section 1.4.1.1, page 17) it was expected 
that depressed patients would retrieve significantly fewer specific ABMs than would 
the controls. However, in line with previous findings it was also expected that 
depressed individuals would retrieve significantly fewer specific positive than 
negative ABMs. In line with this hypothesis, depressed individuals retrieved 
significantly fewer specific ABMs (p=56.1%, SE=4.9) as a first response to the
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memory cues than did the controls (jj,=92.9%, SE=4.9), f(l, 48)=52.4, p<0.001. 
However, there was also evidence of a group x valence interaction (illustrated in 
figure 4.4); f(l, 48)=3.3, p=0.07. Subsequent analysis of these data revealed that 
depressed individuals retrieved significantly fewer negative (p=51.4%, SE=5.3) than 
positive ABMs (p=60.7%, SE=5.3); t(24)=2.4, p<0.05. On the other hand, the number 
of specific positive (p=93.2%, SE=1.8) and negative memories (p=92.5%, SE=2.6) 
produced by the controls did not differ significantly, p>0.05.
4,3.4, Type o f Retrieval Errors
Analysis of the number of retrieval errors committed by the participants revealed that, 
overall, depressed individuals made significantly more retrieval errors (p=1.8, 
SE=0.7) than did the controls (p=0.7, SE=0.5), f(l, 48)=46.5, p<0.001. This analysis 
also revealed a significant main effect of cue type on the number of retrieval errors; 
f(2, 96)=11.4, p<0.001. Subsequent analysis of these data revealed that participants 
made significantly more errors to faces (p=1.5, SE=0.1) than to words (p=l .2, 
SE=0.1) or images (p=l.l, SE=0.1), p<0.05 and p<0.001 respectively. However, the 
number of retrieval errors committed by the participants did not differ significantly 
for words and images, p>0.05. The main analysis of retrieval errors also revealed a 
significant main effect of error type; f(2, 96)=44.3, p<0.001. Subsequent analysis of 
these data revealed that participants made significantly more categorical (p=2.1, 
SE=0.3) than extended errors (p=0.1, SE=0.02); p<0.001. Participants also made 
more categorical errors that omissions (p=1.6, SE=0.3), a difference that approached 
conventional significance, p=0.07. Furthermore, participants made significantly more 
omissions than extended errors, p<0.001.
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Table 4.4. Mean number of each type of retrieval error committed by the
participants, as a function of type of memory cue (standard errors are presented 
in parentheses)
Type of Type of Depressed Controls
Retrieval Error Memory Cue (N=25) (N=25)
Omissions Words 1.8 (0.3) 1.2 (0.2)
Images 1.5 (0.3) 1.6 (0.2)
Faces 1.9 (0.3) 2.4 (0.4)
Extended Words 0.2 (0.1) 0.2 (0.1)
Images 0.5 (0.1) 0
Faces 0.1 (0.1) 0
Categorical Words 3.2 (0.6) 0.8 (0.2)
Images 3.3 (0.4) 0.5 (0.1)
Faces 4.3 (0.5) 0.6 (0.2)
Based on previous findings (outlined in section 1.4.1.1, page 17) it was expected that 
depressed individuals would make significantly more categorical retrieval errors than 
either omissions or extended errors. Furthermore, it was expected that depressed 
participants would retrieve significantly more categorical memories than would the 
controls.
In line with these predictions, analysis of the participants’ retrieval errors revealed a 
significant group x error type interaction (illustrated in figure 4.5); f(2, 96)=30.2, 
p<0.001. Subsequent analysis of these data revealed that depressed individuals made 
significantly more categorical errors (p=3.6, SE=0.4) than extended (p=0.1, SE=0.03)
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or omissions (p=L7, SE=0.2), t(24)=7.9, p<0.001 and t(24)=3.7, p<0.001 
respectively. Depressed individuals also made significantly more omissions than 
extended errors; t(24)=8.5, p<0.001. On the other hand, controls made significantly 
more omissions (p=l .4, SE=0.2) than extended (p=0.1, SE=0.03) or categorical errors 
(|li=0.6, SE=0.1); t(24)=6.2, p<0.001 and t(24)=3.9, p<0.001 respectively. They also 
made significantly more categorical than extended errors, t(24)=4.6, p<0.001.
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Figure 4.5. Mean number of retrieval errors, as a function of participant group
(error bars represent ± one standard error of the mean)
Further analysis of these data also revealed that depressed individuals made 
significantly more categorical errors (p=3.6, SE=0.4) than did the controls (p=0.6, 
SE=0.1); t(48)=7.1, p<0.001. However, the two groups did not differ in terms of the
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number of omissions or extended errors they made; t(48)=1.0, p>0.05 and t(48)=l.l, 
p>0.05 respectively.
The main analysis of the participants’ retrieval errors also revealed a significant group 
X cue type x error type interaction; f(4, 192)=3.8, p<0.05. In order to elucidate the 
nature of this interaction the number of omissions, extended and categorical errors 
committed by the participants were analysed separately using 2 (group) x 3 (cue type) 
repeated measures ANOVA.
These analyses revealed a significant effect of cue type on the number of omissions; 
F(2, 96)=7.2, p<O.OL Overall, participants made more omissions to faces (p=2.1, 
SE=0.3) than to images (p=Ll, SE=0.2), p<0.05. They also made more omissions to 
faces than to words (p=L5, SE=0.2), a difference that approached conventional 
significance, p=0.09. There was no difference between words and images in terms of 
the number of omissions, p>0.05. There was no significant main effect of group and 
no group X cue type interaction, p>0.05.
Analysis of the number of extended memories retrieved revealed a significant main 
effect of cue type; f(2, 96)=7.5, p<0.001. Overall, participants retrieved significantly 
more extended memories to words (p=0.2, SE=0.1) than to images (p=0.03, SE=0.03) 
or faces (p=0.03, SE=0.03), p<0.01 and p<0.01 respectively. There was no difference 
between images and faces, p>0.05. There was also no significant main effect of group 
and no group x cue type interaction, p>0.05.
129
ABM IN MD: RESPONSES TO VERBAL & VISUAL CUES
Analysis of the number of categorical memories retrieved by the participants revealed 
no significant main effect of cue type, f(2, 96)==2,5, p>0.05. However, depressed 
individuals made significantly more categorical errors than did the controls, f(l, 
48)=44.8, p<0.001. Furthermore, analysis of the number of categorical errors 
committed by the participants revealed a significant group x cue type interaction 
(illustrated in figure 4.6); f(2, 96)=3.1, p<0.05.
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Figure 4.6. Mean number of categorical errors committed by the participants, as 
a function of cue type (error bars represent ± one standard error of the mean)
Further analysis of these data revealed that depressed individuals retrieved 
significantly more categorical memories to faces than to words or images, t(24)=2.2, 
p<0.05 and t(24)==2.6, p<0.05 respectively. The number of categorical memories
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retrieved by the depressed patients to words and images did not differ significantly, 
t(24)=0.2, p>0.05.
In order to gain insight into why the depressed patients might be demonstrating more 
categorical retrieval to the faces compared to the other cue types the content of 
memories was considered. Initial inspection of memory content revealed that the faces 
appeared to be encouraging the patients to reflect on their condition and the 
consequences of their condition. For example in response to sad face cues. Participant 
KH reported “Just how I  feel all the time at the moment - Just now — right at this 
minute Participant MF produced “I  seem to feel like that all the time ”, Participant 
QN retrieved “There are quite a few, as I  feel like that a lot ”, “it is the face I  have 
when I  am determined to do something about how I  am feeling” and participant BT 
reported that “I t ’s like looking in a mirror”. Interestingly, participants’ responses to 
happy face cues also provide evidence that these stimuli might be encouraging the 
participants to focus on their condition and it’s consequences. For example. 
Participant KH in response to a picture of a happy male face “My husband is like that 
all o f the time - except when I  am ill” and in response to a photograph of a smiling 
woman “Feeling happy about life in general - 1 haven’t felt like that fo r  a long time ” 
and Participant MF “Being happy with my family — that was before I  got ill”.
One interpretation of these responses is that they are an indication that the faces were 
encouraging the depressed patients to ruminate. Rumination refers to “focusing of 
one’s thoughts on one’s current mood, the causes of one’s depression and the 
consequences of one’s depressive symptoms” (Wakins & Brown, 2002). Previous 
studies (e.g. Wakins & Teasdale, 2001) have reported that rumination in depression is
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associated with greater levels of categorical retrieval on the traditional 
autobiographical memory test (Williams & Broadbent, 1986). It is plausible that 
induced rumination in the depressed individuals in the face condition contributed to 
the number of categorical memories they produced. In order to investigate this 
possibility, content analysis was performed on the participants’ responses to memory 
cues. These responses were categorised as either ruminative or non-ruminative based 
on the following criterion. Ruminative responses were defined as “responses where 
the participant focused on their symptoms, the causes o f their symptoms and the 
consequences o f these symptoms Two researchers, the author and a senior academic 
(BD) at the university of St Andrews, conducted the content analysis individually, 
which allowed inter-rater reliability concerning the relative coding of ruminative and 
non-ruminative responses to be established. There was significant inter-rater 
agreement in terms of the categorisation of the responses to words; r(50)=0.89, 
p<0.001, images; r(50)=0.6, p<0.05 and faces; r(50)= 0.87, p<0.001.
The results of the content analysis revealed that the control group made very few 
ruminative responses to words (0.8%), images (0.5%) or faces (1.3%). Similarly, 
depressed individuals made very few ruminative responses to images (1.3%). 
However, the depressed individuals made a notable number of ruminative responses 
to both words (9.9%) and faces (14.5%) respectively. In order to establish if faces 
were associated with ruminative responses a chi square test was conducted on the 
number of ruminative and non-mminative responses produced by the depressed 
participants in response to words and faces.
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Table 4.5. Number of ruminative and non-ruminative statements produced by 
the depressed patients in response to words and faces (expected frequencies are
f presented in parentheses).
Ruminative N on-ruminative
Words (N=464) 24 (31.2) 440 (432.8)
Faces (N=458) 37.5 (30.8) 421 (428.2)
Analysis of the data presented in table 4.6 revealed that depressed individuals 
produced a greater number of ruminative responses to faces than would have been 
expected and fewer non-ruminative responses than would have been expected. 
Furthermore, this analysis revealed that the depressed patients retrieved fewer 
ruminative responses to words than would have been expected and a greater number 
of non-ruminative responses than would have been expected, %^(1)=3.6, p<0.05 (one­
tailed).
4.4. Discussion
The aim of the current study was to establish if emotional images would produce 
similar advantage in the retrieval of specific ABMs that was shown for highly 
imagable words in Williams et al (1999). The study also aimed to establish if the 
findings of overgeneral categorical retrieval in clinically depressed individuals that 
has been consistently reported in response to verbal cues (e.g. words) generalised to 
non-verbal memory cues (images & faces).
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4.4.1. ABM Retrieval Times
In line with Williams et al (1999) it was expected that images would lead to greater 
access to specific ABMs than would words or faces. With this in mind it was 
predicted that participants would be significantly faster to retrieve specific ABMs to 
images than to words or faces. However, in line with Williams and Dritschel (1988) it 
was predicted that depressed individuals would not demonstrate enhanced retrieval to 
images, therefore no differences were expected for the depressed individuals retrieval 
times to the different memory cues.
Inspection of the participants’ retrieval times revealed that the first part of this 
hypothesis was not supported as; overall; images did not produce faster retrieval of 
specific ABMs. Overall, the participants’ retrieval times were slower for the faces 
than the other two stimuli. However, when the retrieval times of the two groups were 
considered separately there was some evidence that images were leading to faster 
retrieval to images relative to faces, but not word cues. In general these findings are 
inconsistent with the findings of Williams et al (1999) who reported faster retrieval of 
ABMs in response to highly imageable words compared to low imageable words. 
These findings suggest the images used in the current study were not providing the 
same type of retrieval advantage as the imageable words from the Williams’ study. 
Inspection of the depressed individuals’ retrieval times revealed that they were 
markedly slower to face cues than words or images. A plausible explanation of the 
slower retrieval times to faces compared to the other cue types is that the faces might 
have required greater processing capacity in order to enable access to the required 
specificity of ABMs.
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In line with previous findings (outlined in section 1.4.1.1, page 17) it was predicted 
that depressed patients would be significantly faster to produce negative than positive 
memories. Conversely, it was expected that the controls would be faster to produce 
positive than negative memories.
Inspection of the participants’ retrieval times provided support for these predictions as 
depressed individuals did exhibit faster retrieval of negative than positive ABMs, 
whereas the controls demonstrated faster retrieval of positive than negative ABMs. 
Although the depressed individuals were quicker to produce negative than positive 
memories, comparison of their data with the pattern of ABM retrieval exhibited by the 
controls suggests that this bias was due to impaired access to positive memories rather 
than enhanced access to negative ABMs. These findings are consistent with a number 
of previous findings in the literature (see Williams, 1996).
4.4.2. Specificity o f ABM Retrieval
In line with Williams et al (1999), it was expected that, overall, participants would 
retrieve significantly more specific ABMs (as a first response) when cued with images 
than when cued with words or faces. However, it was not expected that depressed 
individuals would demonstrate this specificity advantage for the image cues.
Inspection of the percentage of specific ABMs retrieved by the participants in 
response to the different cues revealed that, overall, participants retrieved fewer 
specific memories to faces than words or images, which does not provide support for 
the prediction above. However, when the percentage of specific memories retrieved to 
the different cues was analyses separately for the two groups it was revealed that there
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was supportive evidence to suggest that healthy participants retrieved more specific 
memories to images than then other stimuli (it should be noted that this finding was 
stronger for faces than for words). These findings are somewhat consistent with 
Williams et al (1999), as they reported that highly imageable words lead to the 
retrieval of a greater proportion of specific ABMs than did low imageable words. 
They suggested that the memory advantage for the imageable words is that they 
provided summaries of the to-be-recalled material that could be used to search for 
suitable events in memory. It would seem plausible that visual images could have 
provided a similar advantage for the controls in the current study. It should be noted 
that the memory advantage for the images in the current study is smaller than that 
shown for the imageable words in the previous study (Williams et al, 1999). One 
plausible explanation for this difference is methodological differences between the 
two studies. Williams et al (1999) presented the words briefly and then removed them 
from sight, whereas, in contrast, the images (and other stimuli) in the current study 
were presented via a computer screen and remained in view until the participant 
retrieved a suitable memory. It would seem likely that this procedure would have 
required fewer cognitive resources than would the task in the original study, as in the 
current study, the participants would not have had to maintain a representation of the 
cue in working memory, thus the advantage of images as ‘summaries’ of information 
may not have been as strong in the current study. This could be investigated in future 
by comparing retrieval to cues that are presented briefly and then removed and cues 
that are presented for the duration of the memory search.
The failure on the part of the depressed patients to utilise the memory advantage 
provided by the images is consistent with previous findings (e.g. Williams &
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Dritschel, 1988) reporting that adding specific contextual information to the memory 
cues in order to help with the memory search (e.g. in addition to the word cue ‘happy’ 
participants were presented with phrases to add context to the search e.g. ‘when out 
with friends’) did not lead to more specific retrieval in depressed patients.
In line with previous findings (outlined in section 1.4.1,1, page 17) it was expected 
that depressed patients would retrieve significantly fewer specific ABMs than would 
the controls. However, in line with previous findings it was also expected that 
depressed individuals would retrieve significantly fewer specific positive than 
negative ABMs.
Inspection of the percentage of specific ABMs retrieved by the participants to the 
different types of cue revealed that in line with the prediction depressed individuals 
produced significantly fewer specific ABMs than did the healthy controls. This 
finding is consistent with previous findings (e.g. Williams & Scott, 1988; also see 
Williams, 1996). However, inspection of the percentage of specific ABMs retrieved 
by the patients does not support the above prediction as the depressed patients 
exhibited a significant valence effect in the opposite direction to the one that was 
predicted. Depressed individuals actually retrieved significantly more positive than 
negative specific ABMs. This finding is noteworthy as previous findings (e.g. 
Williams & Scott, 1988) suggest that lower proportion of specific positive ABMs is 
consistent with the impaired retrieval times for positive memories that are often 
recorded in the literature (see Williams, 1996, and the retrieval time data above).
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4.4,3, Type o f Retrieval Errors
Based on previous findings (outlined in section 1.4.1.1, page 17) it was expected that 
depressed individuals would make significantly more categorical retrieval errors than 
either omissions or extended errors. Furthermore, it was expected that depressed 
participants would retrieve significantly more categorical memories than would the 
controls.
Inspection of the number of each type of retrieval errors that were committed by the 
participants in response to the different types of memory cue revealed that in support 
of the first of the predictions above depressed individuals retrieved more categorical 
memories than extended or omissions. Furthermore, in support of the second of the 
predictions made above it was found that depressed individuals retrieved considerably 
more categorical memories than did the controls. Importantly, the patients and 
controls did not differ in terms of the number of extended memory retrievals and 
omissions they committed. These findings are consistent with many previous studies 
(e.g. Williams & Dritschel, 1992). Interestingly, inspection of the depressed 
individuals ABM retrieval to the different types of memory cue revealed that they 
demonstrated significantly higher retrieval of categorical memories to faces than 
images or words.
Based on initial inspection of the content of participants’ memories it was apparent 
that depressed individuals exhibited a tendency to respond to face cues by focusing on 
their mood, and the causes and consequences of this mood. It was considered 
plausible (based on previous findings e.g. Watkins & Teasdale, 2001) that this 
mmination might contribute to the increase in categorical retrieval exhibited by the
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depressed patients in response to face cues. Therefore, in order to investigate the 
possibility the content of the participants’ ABMs were examined in more detail. This 
process involved categorising the participants’ responses as either ruminative 
(focusing on the individual’s mood and the causes and consequences of this mood) or 
non-ruminative. The results of this analysis provide some support for the rumination 
explanation as it revealed that depressed individuals produced more ruminative-type 
statements than would be expected by chance in response to face cues. This finding is 
consistent with those reported in previous studies suggesting that higher levels of 
rumination were associated with more categorical ABM retrieval (e.g. Watkins & 
Teasdale, 2001).
Despite the partial support for the rumination explanation, inspection of the results of 
the content analysis revealed that the number of ruminative responses was pretty low 
relative to the non-ruminative, which suggests that although induced rumination 
might account for some of the increase in categorical retrieval, demonstrated by the 
depressed individuals in response to the faces, it is unlikely that it provides a complete 
explanation. There are a number of alternative/additional explanations that are worthy 
of consideration. The first is that retrieval of ABMs from face cues may have required 
greater cognitive resources than retrievals in response to words or images. There is 
some evidence for this proposal as retrieval times were significantly higher for faces 
than words or images. If it were the case that retrieval to faces required greater 
cognitive resources, than images or words, then this would explain why the depressed 
patients and not the controls exhibited the increase in categorical retrieval. There is 
considerable research (e.g. Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988) to support that depression is 
associated with reduced cognitive capacity, thus it would have been expected that the
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increased cognitive demand of the faces would have disproportionately affected the 
patients’ retrieval relative to the controls. Furthermore, it has been reported in the 
literature (see Williams, 1996) that the transition from general to specific ABMs 
requires cognitive resources to inhibit the general descriptions, and to allow the 
contextual information to be added to the memory search. Thus, if the face stimuli in 
the cunent study required high levels of processing capacity then, as a consequence, 
the depressed patients would have fewer resources to apply to inhibiting the 
intermediate descriptions.
A further possible explanation of these results concerns the nature of the different 
memory cues utilised during the current study. Whilst the thematic content of the 
words and images varied considerably the faces represented a more generic theme. 
The generic properties of the faces may have encouraged a more generic retrieval 
style, and might also account for why retrieval to these stimuli appears to have 
required greater processing resources than the other stimuli. Furthermore, blocking 
the stimuli by type may have encouraged this generic retrieval style in response to 
faces. Moreover, as previous literature has demonstrated that depressed individuals 
find it extremely difficult to switch between mindsets, then it would be expected that 
the depressed individuals in the current study would have affected disproportionately 
by these experimental conditions.
4.4.4. Summary and Conclusions
The findings of the current study provide some support for the proposition that the 
image cues would provide superior access to specific ABMs than would the faces or 
words. However, this memory advantage was only observed in the healthy controls.
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and only in terms of the percentage of specific ABMs they retrieved. There was no 
strong evidence from the participants’ retrieval times. The increase in ABM 
specificity for images in the control group is consistent with Williams et al (1999) and 
suggests that externally viewed visual images may provide similar summaries of task 
relevant information that can be used to search memory for suitable events. The 
finding that depressed individuals did not demonstrate this memory advantage is 
consistent with previous studies reporting that depressed individuals were unable to 
make use of additional contextual cues in order to increase specificity of ABM 
retrieval (e.g. Williams & Dritschel, 1988). There was evidence from the retrieval 
time data that depressed individuals had impaired access to positive memories relative 
to the controls. This finding is consistent with a number of findings from the 
literature. However, there was an unusual result in that depressed individuals retrieved 
more specific positive than negative memories, which is in the opposite direction to 
predictions. This finding is inconsistent with previous findings that have usually 
reported lower levels retrieval of specific positive than negative ABMs (see 
Williams, 1996). The findings of the current study confirm the tendency of depressed 
individuals to retrieve overgeneral categorical memories when cued with words and 
furthermore demonstrate that this tendency generalises to ABM retrieval in response 
to important non-verbal cues. Interestingly, the findings of the current study 
demonstrated that this tendency in depressed individuals was particularly marked in 
response to faces cues, relative to the other stimuli. There is some evidence from the 
current study that this finding might, in part, relate to induced rumination in the 
depressed individuals in response to the faces. However, this explanation requires 
further confinnation and is unlikely to provide a complete account. Other important 
factors that could provide alternative/additional explanations include the possibility
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that the faces required greater cognitive processing than the words or images (some 
evidence of this from the retrieval times of the current study) and also the fact that the 
faces were a generic cue might have encouraged generic retrieval style. Future 
research is required to differentiate between these proposals and to investigate the 
properties of images that act to enhance ABM retrieval.
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- CHAPTER FIVE -
MEMORY BIAS FOR EMOTIONAL FACIAL EXPRESSIONS IN 
MAJOR DEPRESSION: DOES IT REQUIRE DIRECT PROCESSING OF 
VALENCE AT ENCODING? 
5.1. Introduction
5.1.1. Mood-congruent memory bias in major depression
As noted in chapter one (page 22) mood-congruent memory (MCM) bias has been 
consistently demonstrated in patients suffering from major depression. The most 
robust finding (e.g. Bradley, Mogg & Williams, 1995; Watkins, Mathews, Williamson 
& Fuller, 1992) is that depressed individuals demonstrate superior memory for 
depression-relevant, self-referent words (e.g. useless) compared to positively valenced 
words (e.g. excited) or neutral words (e.g. moderate). This tendency has been shown 
to be strongest when depressed participants are asked explicitly to recall previously 
presented words, but has also been reported in tests of recognition memory for 
emotionally valenced words (Dunbar & Lishman, 1984).
A recent study (Ridout, Astell, Reid, Glen & O'Carroll, 2003) reported that a similar 
memory bias was observed when clinically depressed patients were given a 
recognition memory test for previously viewed emotional facial expressions. In their 
study (outlined in more detail in chapter one, page 24), clinically depressed patients 
and matched controls were presented with photographs of emotional faces and were 
asked to identify the emotion portrayed in each photograph. The participants were 
subsequently given a recognition memory test for these faces. The groups did not
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differ on the emotion identification task, hut exhibited marked differences on the 
recognition memory test (illustrated in figure 5.1, below), with the depressed patients 
exhibiting superior memory for sad faces, relative to neutral or happy expressions, 
and the controls demonstrating enhanced memory of happy faces, relative to the other 
expressions. Furthermore, depressed patients demonstrated enhanced memoiy of sad 
faces relative to controls, who in turn demonstrated superior memory of happy faces 
relative to the depressed patients.
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Figure 5.1. Percentage of each type of emotional faces correctly recognised by the
participants during recognition memory testing (error bars show ± one standard
error of the mean) - reproduced from Ridout et al (2003).
As outlined in chapter one (page 37), the cognitive theory of depression proposed by 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews (1988; cited in Williams et al, 1997)
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provides a good account of these findings. According to this theory, MCM bias in 
depression results from strategic allocation of cognitive resources, by depressed 
individuals, to the elaboration of depression-relevant material during encoding. 
However, it should be noted that Teasdale and Barnard (1993) argued that MCM bias 
only occurs in circumstances that involve access to affect-related representations in 
the Implicational subsystem (see account of their model in section 1.5.3, page 40). 
According to their ICS model, MCM requires the hedonic features of a given event to 
be represented in the Implicational subsystem during encoding, and also for these 
representations to be accessed during retrieval. As the encoding task of the previous 
study (Ridout et al, 2003) required the paiticipants to explicitly process the emotional 
content of the faces it would seem likely that the affective content of the faces will 
have been represented in memory, which according to the ICS model is a prerequisite 
of MCM bias. However, an important question that arises is "Would the memory bias 
for sad faces persist i f  encoding conditions did not require direct processing o f the 
emotional content o f the faces?” In order to addiess this question, the current study 
took the form of a replication of Ridout et al’s study (2003) with the emotion 
recognition phase being replaced with a gender identification task.
It is clear that gender identification should require little or no cognitive effort on the 
part of the participants, thus presentation times for the faces should be very short. If 
the memory bias reported in Ridout et al (2003) requires explicit processing of the 
valence of the facial expressions, as the ICS model would suggest, then it should not 
be observed in the current study. However, if depressed individuals automatically 
process the valence of facial stimuli they encounter then it is possible that the patients 
will still demonstrate superior memory for the sad faces in the current study. Previous
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research (e.g. Stenberg et al, 1998) has suggested that humans do process the affective 
valence of emotional facial expressions automatically. They also demonstrated that 
this automatic processing of valence exerted an influence on other ongoing cognitive 
activity. There is further evidence of automatic processing of emotional valence from 
faces in the findings reported in chapter three of this thesis (page, 77). If the MCM 
bias were observed in the current study it would represent an important finding as it 
would suggest that depressed individuals are able to demonstrate mood congruent 
memory for important, socially relevant, stimuli after only extremely brief 
presentations. Thus, if even fleeting negative expressions are present in social 
interactions the individual is involved in there is a chance that this interaction will be 
remembered as negative.
5.1.2, Overview and Predictions
Clinically depressed patients and healthy matched controls were presented with a 
series of photographic images of different individuals depicting one of three 
emotional expressions {happiness, sadness or neutrality). Half of the photographs 
featured a male, and half a female. During the encoding phase, participants were 
asked to identify the gender of the individuals featured in the photographs. Following 
a filled delay period, participants were given a recognition memory test for the faces 
they had viewed during the gender identification phase. The following predictions 
were made:
5.1.2.1. Hvpothesis tested during the gender decision phase
As it was expected that gender identification would be an automatic process it was not 
expected that the other properties of the face (e.g. emotional valence) would influence
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the participants’ ability to identify the gender of the individuals featured in the 
photographs therefore no formal hypotheses were made for the gender identification 
phase of the study.
5.1.2.2. Hvpothesis tested during the recognition memorv phase
From Ridout et al (2003) it is expected that the depressed patients will make 
significantly more correct recognitions of sad faces than happy or neutral faces. 
Conversely it is expected that participants in the control group will make significantly 
more correct recognitions of happy faces than neutral or sad faces.
5.2. Method
5.2.1. Design
This study made use of a 2 (group) x 3 (valence) mixed factorial design. The between 
subjects factor was participant group {depressed patients c& controls). The within 
subjects factor was the valence of the emotional facial expressions {happy, sad or 
neutral). The dependent variables in the decision phase were gender identification 
time in milliseconds and the percentage of faces assigned the correct gender. The 
dependent variable during the memory phase was the percentage of correct 
recognitions. Correct recognitions refer to recognising that a face was shown during 
the gender identification (encoding) phase and also recognising that a face was novel, 
i.e. was not presented during the gender decision phase.
5.2.2. Participants
Sixteen clinically depressed patients (5 male & 11 female) and eighteen healthy 
controls (4 male & 14 female) took part in the current study. According to Cohen
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(1992) this sample size is suitable to detect the large effect sizes that were predicted in 
the current study based on previous studies (e.g. Ridout et al, 2003) addressing 
memory bias for emotional faces in depression (see appendix II for full details of 
these power analyses). The participants were recruited according to the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria outline in chapter two (section 2.6.3, page 55). Furthermore, upon 
admission they were assessed according to the standard protocol, also outlined in 
chapter (section 2.6.2, page 54). The two groups were matched (see table 5.1, page 
154) in terms of age, sex, educational background (years of full-time education 
completed), and pre-morbid intellectual ability. Prior to taking part in the current 
study, the severity of the patients’ depression was established, by one of the 
psychiatrists in the ADC (or in the case of five patients, by the author), using the 17- 
item Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD; Hamilton, 1961). The mean 
HRSD score for the patients in the current study was 20 (with a range of 14 -  24).
5.2.3. Materials and Apparatus
5.2.3.1. Emotional facial expressions
The current investigation utilised the identical stimuli used in Ridout et al’s study 
(2003). 62 grey-scale photographic images of people posed in different emotional 
facial expressions (20 happy, 20 sad & 22 neutral) were diawn from a set of images 
used in a series of studies conducted by Le Gal & Bruce (1999). Half of the 
photographs featured a female, whereas the remaining images featured a male. 
Twenty individuals (10 males, 10 females) portrayed both the happy and sad 
expressions, whereas the neutral expressions were portrayed by a different group of 
twenty-two individuals (11 males, 11 females). During one of their studies, Le Gal 
and Bruce (1999) presented the faces to a group of 70 undergraduate students (35
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males, 35 females) and asked them to identify the emotion portrayed by each face 
(using a forced choice paradigm). All faces included in the current study received at 
least 75% subjective agreement concerning the emotion they portrayed. The stimuli 
presented during the gender identification task consisted of two sets (A & B) of 21 
faces (5 happy, 5 sad and 11 neutral) that were compiled from the main array of 62 
photographs. In Set A (see appendix XVI), eleven images (3 happy, 2 sad and 6 
neutral) featured a female and ten photographs (2 happy, 3 sad and 5 neutral) were of 
a male. In set B (see appendix XVII) these gender ratios were reversed. The rationale 
for creating two sets of stimuli for the encoding phase was to control for the effect of 
facial distinctiveness on memory for the faces. It would be expected that highly 
distinctive faces would be remembered more readily than would less distinctive faces, 
regardless of emotional expression. Therefore, the individuals that portrayed 
happiness in set A were posed in a sad expression in set B and vice-versa. 
Furthermore, the 11 neutral expressions featured in set A were replaced in set B with 
an alternative set of 11 neutral images. The stimuli presented during the recognition 
memory phase consisted of two sets (MEM A & MEM B) of 42 faces. MEM A 
consisted of set A from the encoding phase plus an additional 21 images (5 happy, 5 
sad & 11 neutral faces; see appendix XVIII). Likewise, MEM B consisted of set B 
from the encoding phase plus a novel set of 21 faces (5 happy, 5 sad & 11 neutral; see 
appendix XIX). Participants were presented with one set of faces (either A or B) at 
encoding and the corresponding larger set (MEM A or MEM B) during recognition 
memory testing.
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5.2.3.2.Simple reaction time task
As previous studies (e.g. Deijen, Orlebeke & Rijsdijk, 1993; Ilsley et al., 1995) have 
reported that major depression is associated with psychomotor retardation it would be 
expected that the patients would be slower than the controls to respond to the face 
stimuli presented in the current study, which could distort interpretations of the 
patients’ gender identification times. Therefore, a measure of simple reaction time 
was included in the current study in order to allow differences between the groups in 
terms of detecting and responding to stimuli to be controlled for when analysing the 
participants’ response times to the faces. The simple reaction time task included in 
the present study required the participants to maintain their attention on a focus point 
(cross) in the centre of the screen for the duration of the task (approx 3 minutes). At 
various points during the task a stimulus (a solid red circle) appeared in place of the 
cross and the participants were required to press a key (marked “o ff’) in order to 
make the circle disappear. They were asked to press the key as quickly as they could 
once the circle had appeared. However, it was stressed that they should wait until the 
circle appeared before pressing the “o ff’ key. Overall, the task consisted of 60 stimuli 
(plus 10 practice trials, which were completed prior to the main set of trials). The 
stimuli did not appear at regular intervals but rather appeared after one of five inter­
stimulus intervals (500, 750, 1000, 1250 & 1500 milliseconds). Although equal 
numbers of stimuli (12) followed each ISI, the order in which each interval appeared 
was randomised for each participant, in order to prevent the participants anticipating 
the appearance of the stimuli.
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5.2.3.3. Stimulus presentation
During the gender decision, recognition memory and simple reaction time tasks a 
Macintosh PowerBook 3400c loaded with the Superlab program (version 1.74, Cedrus 
Coiporation, 1992; Phoenix Arizona) was used to present the stimuli (in a random 
order) and to measure and record the participants’ responses. The size of the computer 
screen was 250 mm by 175 mm and the dimensions of each face stimuli on the screen 
was 70 mm (height) by 50 mm (width). The diameter of the circle stimuli presented 
during the simple reaction time task was approximately 20 mm.
5.2.3.4. Measurement of self-rated mood
The 21-item Beck Depression Inventory (BDI - Beck et al., 1961) and the 14-item 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS -  Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) were 
used to establish the participants’ mood during the week prior to the test session 
(including the day of testing). The rationale for using these measures is outlined in 
full in chapter two.
5.2.3.5. Assessment of pre-morbid intellectual abilitv
The National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson & Williamson, 1991) was included 
in the current study in order to provide an estimate of the participants’ intellectual 
ability. The rationale for the inclusion of this task is also outlined in full in chapter 
two.
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5.23.6. Other tasks Idistracter tasksi
The Digit Symbol Substitution Task (DSST) and Digit Span Task both drawn from 
the WAIS-R IQ test (Wechsler, 1981) were included as distracter tasks during the 
five-minute delay period between the encoding and recognition memory testing.
5.2.4. Procedure
5.2.4.1. Gender identification Task
The participants were presented with one of the sets (A or B) of 21 faces and were 
asked to indicate, via a key press, whether the person featured in each photograph was 
a male or female. They were urged to respond as quickly and accurately as they could. 
Following completion of the gender identification task there was a five-minute filled 
delay, during which time the participants were asked to complete the digit symbol and 
digit span tasks (Wechsler, 1981). Participants were subsequently given a recognition 
memory test for the faces they had viewed during the gender decision phase.
5.2.4.2. Recognition Memorv Test for Emotional Faces
During memory testing participants were presented with one of the two sets (MEM A 
or MEM B) of 42 faces. The participants were required to indicate, via a key press, 
whether they recognised the face as being from the set they had viewed during the 
first part of the study. They were asked to make their decisions as quickly and 
accurately as possible. Once all of the faces had been viewed and judged, the 
participants were asked to complete the simple reaction time task. Finally, they were 
assessed on the NART and asked to complete the self-report measures of mood (BDI 
and HADS).
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5.2.5. Data Analysis
A MANOVA was conducted in order to establish if there were any significant 
differences between the two groups in terms of age, educational background (years of 
full-time education completed), intellectual ability (full-scale IQ score, estimated 
from the number of reading errors on the NART) or self-rated mood (indexed by the 
BDI & HADS). A chi-squared test was utilised to establish if the two groups differed 
in terms of the number of males and females making up each group. A further 
MANOVA was conducted to establish if the two groups differed in their performance 
on the digit symbol, digit span and simple reaction time tasks. Participants’ mean 
simple reaction time was subtracted from their gender identification time in order to 
control for any group differences in detecting, and responding to, the face stimuli. 
The adjusted gender identification times and the percentage of correct recognitions 
made by the participants during the recognition memory phase were all analysed 
using 2 (group) x 3 (valence) repeated measures ANOVA, with face valence as the 
within subjects factor and participant group as the between subjects factor. 
Subsequent pair-wise comparisons were conducted using LSD tests (where a-priori 
predictions were made) and Bonferroni corrected t-tests (where no prior predictions 
were made). Significant interactions were investigated using one-way and two-way 
factorial ANOVA, paired and independent t-tests.
5.3. Results
5.3.1. Participant Characteristics
Analysis of the participant characteristics presented in table 5.1 revealed that the two 
groups were well matched in terms of age; F(l, 32)=1.6, p>0.05, sex; %^(1)=0.7, 
p>0.05, educational background; F<1, and pre-morbid IQ; F<1. Although the
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participants did not differ significantly in terms of their general intellectual ability 
(estimated firom the NART), the estimated IQ scores for both groups are relatively 
high, which could reflect a sampling bias. It is possible that patients with higher IQ 
would have been more willing to participate or perhaps the clinicians were more 
likely to consider patients with higher IQ as suitable participants for the current study.
Table 5.1. Characteristics of the individuals in each participant group
Depressed
(N=16)
Controls
(N=18)
Age 43.7 (2.8) 39.3 (8.8)
Sex 11 females, 5 males 14 females, 4 males
Y ofF T E 12.6 (0.9) 13.4 (0.5)
Full-scale IQ^ 113.6 (1.1) 114.1 (0.8)
BDI (21-item)* 31.8 (1.8) 2.6 (0.4)
HADS (Anxiety)* 14.1 (0.5) 3.4 (0.7)
HADS (Depression)* 14.6 (0.7) 0.8 (0.2)
Y of FTE= Years of Full-time Education, BDI=Beck Depression Inventory, HADS=Hospital 
Anxiety & Depression Scale. Estimated from participants’ error score on the National Adult 
Reading Test. * Significantly different at 0.001 level
As expected, analysis of the participants’ self-rated mood revealed that the patients 
produced significantly higher ratings of depression than did the controls; on both the 
BDI; F(l, 32)=277.5, p<0.001 and the HADS depression sub-scale; F(l, 32)=418.6, 
p<0.001. Also as expected, the patients produced significantly higher ratings of 
anxiety on the HADS anxiety sub-scale than did the controls, F(l, 26)=147.4, 
p<0.001. Analysis of the relative contribution of depression and anxiety in explaining
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the observed memory results of the current study revealed that it was consistently 
depression and not anxiety that accounted for these effects (see appendix XX for full 
details of these analyses).
5.5.2. Digit Symbol and Digit Span Tasks
Analysis of the participants’ performance on the digit symbol task revealed that 
depressed patients made significantly fewer symbol substitutions (]li=42.3, SE=2.3) 
than did the controls (p=58.0, SE=2.1); F(l, 32)=25.5, p<0.001. However, although 
the depressed individuals remembered fewer digit spans (|ii=15, SE=0.6) than did the 
controls (p=16.9, SE=0.7), this difference only approached conventional significance, 
F(l, 32)=3.9, p=0.056.
5.5.5. Simple Reaction Time
Analysis of the participants’ simple reaction time revealed that the patients were 
significantly slower to respond to the stimuli (p=355.4ms, SE=23.7) than were the 
controls (p=324ms, SE==13.6); F(l, 32)=5.5, p<0.05. Therefore, the participants’ 
simple reaction times were subtracted from their gender identification times in order 
to control for this difference in general psychomotor speed.
5.3.4. Gender Identification Time
Inspection of the gender identification times (illustrated in figure 5.2) revealed that 
there was no significant group x valence interaction, p>0.05. Likewise, there was no 
significant effect of face valence on the gender identification times of the participants 
and no significant difference between the two groups in tenns of the speed of gender 
identification, both tests p>0.05.
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Figure 5.2. Mean gender identification times of the participants, as a function of
the valence of emotional expression portrayed in the photographs (error bars
show ± one standard error of the mean)
5.5.5. Percentage o f  Correct Recognitions
From Ridout et al (2003) it was predicted that the depressed patients would make 
significantly more correct recognitions of sad faces than happy or neutral expressions. 
Conversely it was expected that the participants in the control group would make 
significantly more correct recognitions of happy faces than neutral or sad expressions. 
In line with these predictions, analysis of the percentage of correct recognitions 
revealed a group x valence interaction (illustrated in figure 5.3) that approached 
conventional significance; F(2, 64)=3.1, p=0.053.
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Figure 5.3. Percentage of faces correctly recognised by the participants, as a 
function of the valence of the faces (error bars show ± one standard error of the 
mean)
However, further analysis revealed that, contrary to predictions, the percentage of sad 
faces correctly recognised by the depressed individuals did not differ significantly 
from the percentage of happy or neutral expression they correctly recognised. 
Furtheimore, the percentage of happy faces that were correctly recognised by the 
healthy participants did not differ significantly from the percentage of sad or neutral 
expressions they correctly recognised, which is also in contrast to the predictions. 
Overall, the two groups did not differ significantly in terms of the percentage of 
happy and neutral faces they correctly recognised, p>0.05. Interestingly, controls
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made significantly more correct recognitions of sad faces (p=82%, SE=1.9) than did 
the depressed patients (p=66%, SE=3.1); t(32)=4.5, p<0.001.
5.4. Discussion
The aim of the current study was to establish if the MCM hias for sad faces, 
demonstrated by a group of depressed patients in a previous study (Ridout et al, 
2003), would still be observed in circumstances that did not require direct processing 
of the emotional expression of the faces during encoding.
5.4.1. Gender Identification Times
No formal hypotheses were made for this phase of the study as it was expected that 
gender identification would be an automatic process requiring little or no cognitive 
effort. The focus of this study is whether these brief presentations of faces with no 
explicit reference to the valence of the expressions portrayed would still result in a 
mood-congruent memory bias. If it did that would suggest that automatic, 
unconscious processing of the emotion portrayed in a face is enough to lead to the 
bias in memory function.
5.4.2. Percentage o f Correct Recognitions
During the recognition memory phase it was expected that the depressed patients 
would make significantly more conect recognitions of sad faces than happy or neutral 
faces. Conversely it was expected that participants in the control group would make 
significantly more correct recognitions of happy faces than neutral or sad faces. 
Contrary to these predictions, the depressed individuals did not exhibit MCM for the 
sad faces they viewed during the gender identification phase. Also contrary to the
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predictions, the healthy controls failed to demonstrate a MCM bias for previously 
viewed happy expressions. Interestingly, they appeared to demonstrate a memory bias 
in the opposite direction to that predicted, i.e. they exhibited superior memory for the 
sad faces relative to the patients.
These findings suggest that, in line with the previous literature (e.g. Williams et al, 
1997), MCM bias in depression is not related to automatic unconscious processing of 
the emotional content of the stimuli, but rather requires explicit processing of the 
stimuli to-be-remembered in order to elaborate them in memory. Furthennore, as 
automatic processing of the faces for gender clues was all that would have been 
required to identify the gender of the individuals featured in the photographs, it would 
also seem unlikely that the affective features of the photographs would have been 
registered in the Implicational subsystem, which according to Teasdale and Barnard
(1993) is a pre-requisite of MCM bias.
The finding that healthy participants did not demonstrate a MCM bias for happy 
expressions can also be explained in terms of the notion that the processing required 
to identify the gender did not lead to elaborative encoding of the faces. However, the 
evidence that they demonstrated superior memoiy for the sad faces, relative to the 
patients is anomalous, and would not fit with this notion. As noted above, an 
explanation in terms of elaboration is unlikely, as the depth of processing required to 
identify the gender would not have encouraged elaboration of the faces. It is plausible 
that this finding represents a difference between the groups in implicit memory for the 
faces. However, this finding would require replication and further investigation before 
any strong conclusions could be drawn.
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5.4,3. Comparison o f the current study and Ridout et at (2003)
The previous study conducted by Ridout et al (2003) reported that a significant MCM 
bias for sad faces in depressed patients (see figure 5.4-A, below). During the encoding 
phase of the original study, participants were required to identify the emotion 
portrayed by the faces, which it can be argued would have encouraged elaboration of 
the faces. Furthermore, as the emotion of the faces was salient, this task would 
plausibly have led to these affective elements of the faces being encoded. Both of 
these findings would account for the observed MCM biases. In the current study, the 
emotion recognition phase was replaced with a gender identification task and there 
was no longer evidence of an MCM bias in the depressed patients (see figure 5.4-B).
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Figure 5.4. Comparison of the pattern of recognition memory exhibited by the 
participants (depressed & controls) in (A) Ridout et al (2003) and (B) the current 
study
The failure, in the current study, to replicate the MCM bias for sad faces in the 
depressed patients suggests that this bias is dependent upon direct processing of the 
valence of the faces at encoding. This notion corresponds with the ICS model
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proposed by Teasdale and Barnard (1993), who proposed that a prerequisite of MCM 
bias is the representation of the affective features of stimuli in the Implicational 
subsystem and the subsequent access to these representations at retrieval.
However, another point that requires consideration is the depth of processing that 
would have been required by the different encoding tasks. From Ridout et al (2003) it 
can be seen that on average it took the patients around two and a half seconds and the 
controls around one and a half seconds to identify the emotion portrayed by the faces. 
In the current study, it took the patients less than a second and the controls just over 
half a second to identify the gender of the faces. From these findings it is clear that the 
gender identification task will have required shallower processing than would the 
emotion identification phase. A potential future study could involve a task that would 
require deeper processing of the faces whilst still avoiding explicit processing of the 
emotion. For example, participants could be asked to estimate the age of the 
individuals in the photographs.
5,4.4. Summary and Conclusions
At encoding, the two groups did not differ significantly in terms of the time taken to 
identify the gender of the individuals featured in the photographs. Importantly, the 
valence of the faces did not exert any influence on the participants’ gender 
identification times. At recognition memory testing the depressed patients did not 
exhibit the predicted MCM bias for sad faces. Likewise, the controls did not exhibit 
the expected positive bias for happy faces. There was some evidence of an anomalous 
mood incongruent bias in the controls, which plausibly relates to differences in 
priming or implicit memory function. However, there is a need to replicate this
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finding and to investigate this phenomenon further before any conclusions can be 
drawn. Taken as a whole, the current results suggest that the MCM bias for faces 
reported in Ridout et al (2003) is not a consequence of automatic processing of face 
valence but rather requires direct processing of the emotion content of the faces. This 
notion corresponds with Teasdale and Barnard (1993) who proposed that a 
prerequisite of MCM bias is encoding of the affective features of the stimuli, which 
can subsequently be accessed during retrieval. Ridout et al (2003) proposed that 
biased memory for the sad faces of significant others could act to colour the patients’ 
interpretation of social interactions in which they were involved. The current finding 
suggests that this bias would only occur if the patients became aware of the emotion 
being portrayed by the person with whom they were interacting. In line with this 
notion, previous work on selective attention has reported that depressed individuals 
are not more sensitive to detecting negative material in their environment, but rather 
exhibit a deficit in disengaging from negative material that has become the focus of 
attention. It is likely that this ‘locking on’ of attention to depression-relevant material 
would subsequently lead to enhanced memory for these stimuli.
162
EMOTION RECOGNITION AND SOCIAL PERCEPTION IN MD
-CHAPTER SIX-
EMOTION RECOGNITION AND SOCIAL PERCEPTION IN 
MAJOR DEPRESSION: IMPAIRED INTERPRETATION OF
VIDEOTAPED SOCIAL INTERACTIONS?
6.1. Introduction
6.1. L  Background
As noted in chapter one (section 1.4.3, page 30) there is evidence that clinical 
depression is associated with impaired social functioning (e.g. Cooley & Nowicki, 
1989). Furthermore, other studies have demonstrated that depressed individuals 
exhibit deficits in social perception. Social perception has been defined as the ability 
to read social cues and use them to make judgements about the behaviour, attitudes 
and emotions of others (McFall, 1982). For example, depressed individuals tend to 
provide negative interpretations when asked to judge stories concerning social 
situations that have an ambiguous meaning (e.g. Krantz & Hammen, 1979; Butler & 
Mathews, 1983). Furthennore, in a recent study, Ambady and Gray (2002) reported 
that depressed mood (indexed by elevated BDI score) impaired the accuracy of 
participants’ social judgements. It would seem likely that these deficits in social 
perception contribute to the problems that depressed individuals experience in social 
interactions. In line with this notion, Persad & Polivy (1993) proposed that deficits in 
recognising emotional facial expressions might contribute to the difficulties in social 
functioning that are associated with clinical depression. Facial expressions are 
extremely powerful social stimuli that are highly salient features of most human 
interpersonal interactions. Thus, it is clear that deficits in processing the message
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being transmitted by these stimuli could have serious consequences for depressed 
individuals, such as creating misunderstandings between them and their significant 
others (e.g. spouse), which in turn could lead to interpersonal tension and possibly 
social isolation. The next section of this study will consider the evidence that clinical 
depression is associated with changes in the processing of emotion from faces, 
relative to healthy individuals. Furthermore, the limitations with previous studies 
addressing emotional processing and social perception in clinical depression will also 
be considered.
6.1.2. Processing o f emotional faces in major depression
The evidence that major depression is associated with changes in the accuracy of 
processing emotion portrayed by facial expressions has been equivocal. Some studies 
(e.g. Feinberg, Rifkin, Schaffer & Walker, 1986; Persad & Polivy, 1993) have 
reported that depressed patients exhibit a general deficit in detecting emotion from 
faces. However, other studies (e.g. Mandai & Bhattacharya, 1985; Murray & Perret, 
2000) have reported that depression is associated with superior recognition of sadness 
relative to the other emotions. Conversely, there have been other studies (e.g. Loeb et 
al, 1964; Ridout et al, 2003) that have reported no differences between depressed 
participants and healthy controls on emotion recognition from facial cues. The 
variability of these findings could relate to a number of factors, including the type of 
emotional stimuli used (e.g. schematic drawings, photographs etc), the make up of the 
depressed sample (e.g. clinical, analogue etc) and the type of task used to investigate 
the accuracy of emotion recognition in the participants (e.g. forced choice labelling, 
stimulus description etc). Thus, it is clear that there is a need for further investigation 
of emotional processing from faces in major depression.
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One criticism that could be levelled at many of these previous studies is that the 
stimuli utilised have been static photographs of posed expressions. In everyday social 
interactions faces are not static but rather are dynamic and rapidly changing. 
Furthermore, in normal social exchanges other “channels” of information (e.g. body 
posture, tone of voice, gestures) combine with the facial expressions in order to 
transmit the desired message. Therefore, correct understanding of social interactions 
requires accurate processing and integration of these various sources of information. 
As mentioned above, depressed individuals appear to exhibit impaired 
understanding/interpretation of verbal descriptions of social interactions. However, it 
can be argued that these studies lack ecological validity, as under normal 
circumstances interpretation of social exchanges requires spontaneous judgements 
“on-line” rather than a considered reflection. Therefore, what is required is a test of 
emotion recognition and social perception that includes stimuli that resemble “real 
world” social exchanges. A study addressing depressed individuals’ processing of 
naturalistic social interactions would represent a significant advance in the 
understanding of how depression affects social perception. Therefore, the aim of the 
current study is to conduct such an investigation.
6.1.3. The Awareness o f Social Inference Test (TASIT)
The Awareness of Social Inference Test is a recently developed neuropsychological 
tool for assessing social perception in patients that have suffered traumatic brain 
damage (McDonald, Flanagan & Rollins, 2002). TASIT consists of thi*ee related 
sections, all of which involve the presentation of brief videotaped social interactions 
to the participants and asking them to make judgments concerning the behaviour of 
the featured protagonists. The first section of TASIT provides an ecologically valid
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test of the participants’ ability to recognise spontaneous displays of the primaiy 
emotions, whereas the second and third phases assess the participants’ ability to make 
inferences about the thoughts, feelings and intentions of the characters featured in the 
vignettes.
McDonald, Flanagan, Rollins & Kinch (2003) reported that patients with traumatic 
brain injury (TBI) exhibited a general deficit in recognising the primary emotions, 
with particular impairment of fear, disgust, and neutral displays. Patients with TBI 
were indistinguishable from healthy individuals in terms of their understanding of
sincere exchanges and interactions involving ‘white lies’. However, they j
I
demonstrated significantly impaired understanding of sarcasm. These findings suggest |
i
ithat, whilst patients with TBI have little problem understanding literal meanings, they 
are impaired in detecting (or understanding) the implied meaning of social 
interactions. As TASIT has been shown to be a reliable measure, with good ecological 
validity, that is able to detect subtle changes in social perception associated with 
certain clinical groups, it would appear to be the ideal tool with which to conduct the 
proposed study.
6.1.4. TASIT and Major Depression
TASIT has not previously heen used to assess emotional processing in clinically 
depressed patients. However, it could be argued that such a study will represent an 
important extension to previous work on emotion recognition and social perception in 
this patient group. Based on the findings of previous studies (reported ahove), it might 
be expected that, relative to healthy participants, the depressed patients would be 
impaired on the emotion evaluation phase of TASIT. Furthermore, as a number of
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studies have reported that depressed patients are more sensitive to detecting negative 
than positive emotions, it might be expected that the depressed patients would exhibit 
a negative bias in their emotion recognition.
As noted above, McDonald et al. (2003) reported that patients with TBI exhibited 
impaired comprehension of sarcastic interactions. It is possible that this impairment 
was a consequence of a deficit in executive processing in these patients. In line with 
this notion, it would seem likely that the patients reported in McDonald et al (2003) 
would have experienced injury to the frontal lobes, as this portion of the brain is 
particularly susceptible to damage in cases of traumatic closed head injury. 
Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that frontal lobe damage is associated 
with marked impairment of executive processing, which also provides support for this 
proposal.
If impaired comprehension of sarcasm is related to deficits in executive function then 
it might be expected that depressed individuals would also demonstrate similar 
impairments in understanding these exchanges, as there is considerable evidence that 
major depression is associated with marked deficits in executive processing (see 
section 1.2.4, page 9). Furthermore, if executive processes are involved in the 
comprehension of sarcasm then it would be expected that individuals who 
demonstrate impaired interpretation of sarcasm would also exhibit deficits on other 
cognitive tasks that tap executive processing. In order to address this proposal, the 
participants were also assessed on a number of neuropsychological tests that are 
thought to tap executive processing.
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Impaired comprehension of sarcasm in depressed patients could have negative 
consequences in terms of their social relationships. For instance, many people use 
sarcasm in their everyday conversations in an affectionate manner in order to ‘send 
up’ their conversational partner. This is particularly common amongst friends and 
more intimate relationships. With this in mind, insensitivity to sarcasm could lead to 
misunderstandings between depressed patients and their significant others. For 
example, if a patient failed to register the sarcasm expressed by her husband’s voice 
and facial expression when he says, “Yeah, I  think you’re so fa t” then she could 
interpret this as an insult about her weight, which in turn could contribute to 
interpersonal tension and ultimately lead to social isolation.
6.1.5, Overview and Predictions
Clinically depressed patients and healthy matched controls will be presented with all 
three sections (Emotion recognition, Social Inference-minimal & Social Inference- 
enriched) of the Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT). In addition to TASIT 
the participants will be asked to complete a number of tasks that assess participants’ 
executive function (the traditional Stroop colour-naming task, FAS verbal fluency, & 
the Hayling’s sentence completion task). The following predictions were made:
1. During the Emotion Recognition phase it was expected that the depressed 
patients would correctly recognise significantly fewer of the emotional 
displays than would the controls. However, it was expected that the depressed 
patients would demonstrate superior recognition of the negative emotional 
expressions relative to positive.
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2. During the Social Inference (minimal) phase of the current study it was 
expected that the depressed patients would make significantly fewer correct 
interpretations of the sarcastic interactions than would the controls. However, 
it was not expected that the two groups would differ on the sincere 
interactions.
3. Likewise, during the Social Inference (enriched) phase it was expected that the 
depressed patients would make significantly fewer correct interpretations of 
the sarcastic interactions than would the controls. However, it was not 
expected that the two groups would differ on the interactions involving ‘white 
lies’.
6,2. Method
6.2.1. Design
All three phases of the current study that involved TASIT utilised a 2 x 2 mixed 
design. For all three elements the between subjects factor was group (depressed & 
controls). During the Emotion Recognition phase the within subjects factor was the 
valence of the emotion expressed in the video clips (positive or negative). The 
dependent variable was the percentage of emotional displays correctly recognised. 
Duiing the Social Inference phases (SIM & SIE) the within subjects factor was the 
type of social interaction. The social interactions presented during the SIM phase 
featured protagonists that were either being sincere or sarcastic. The social 
interactions presented during the SIE phase featured protagonists that were either 
telling ‘white lies’ or being sarcastic. The dependent variable for both Social 
Inference phases was the percentage of correct interpretations of the different social 
interactions.
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6.2.2. Participants
Fourteen clinically depressed outpatients (3 males & 11 females) and fourteen healthy 
individuals (2 males & 12 females) took part in the current study. This sample size 
was considered reasonable, as it was comparable to previous studies addressing 
emotion recognition in major depression (e.g. Persad & Polivy, 1993; who tested 16 
depressed patients and 16 controls). The participants {depressed & controls) were 
recruited according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria cited in chapter two (section
2.6.3. page 50). Furthermore, upon admission to the study they were assessed 
according to the standard protocol outlined in chapter two (section 2.6.2, page 49). 
The characteristics of the individuals making up the two participant groups are 
reported in table 6.1 (page 162). The two participant groups were matched in terms of 
age, sex, educational background, and pre-morbid intellectual ability. Prior to their 
participation in the study, the severity of the patients’ depression was quantified by 
one of the psychiatrists at the ADC (or for six of the patients by the author) using the 
17-item Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD; Hamilton, 1961). The mean 
HRSD score for the patients in the current study was 21.9 (with a range of 16 -  25.5). 
It should be noted that, in addition to this study, the participants (depressed & 
controls) were included in the experiment reported in chapter seven (page 177), acting 
as clinical and healthy controls for a group of patients that had undergone 
neurosurgical intervention for chronic, treatment-refractory depression.
6.2.3. Materials and Apparatus
6.2.3.1. The Awareness of Social Inference Test ITASITI
The stimuli used during the Emotion Recognition phase of TASIT consisted of two 
sets (A & B) of 28 short video clips (each lasting 1 5 - 6 0  seconds) of simple social
170
EMOTION RECOGNITION AND SOCIAL PERCEPTION IN MD
interactions (a further video clip was provided in order to allow the participants to 
practice the task). The video clips featured either a single individual (speaking on the 
telephone or directly addressing the viewer) or two different individuals engaged in 
conversation. In each scene the central protagonist portrayed (via their facial 
expression, body posture & tone of voice) one of seven emotions {happiness, sadness, 
surprise, anger, anxiety, disgust & neutral affect). Each emotion was displayed in 
four separate video clips (presented in a pseudo-random order). Four printed response 
cards were provided to illustrate the possible responses for the participants. Each 
response card featured seven emotional descriptors {happy, sad, neutral, angry, 
surprised, revolted & anxious) printed in a different order (a fifth response card was 
also provided for use with the practice clip).
The stimuli used during the second phase of TASIT {Social Inference -  Minimal) 
consisted of two sets (A & B) of 15 video clips of simple social interactions between 
pairs of individuals (each lasting 15 to 60 seconds). In a third of these interactions the 
protagonists are being sincere (their facial expression, tone of voice are congruent). 
Conversely, a third of the exchanges involve one of the protagonists being sarcastic. 
The final third of the interactions involved paradoxical sarcasm, i.e. the viewer can 
only make sense of the text if they realize that one of the individuals is being 
sarcastic. For example, Martin: “Do you have the tickets?” Helen: “No I burnt them” 
Martin: “Good, can I have them then please”. Following each scene the participants 
were asked four questions concerning the actions, thoughts and feelings of the 
protagonists and also about the meaning of the text (e.g. Do you think Martin was 
annoyed with Helen?).
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The stimuli used during the final phase of TASIT (Social Inference -  Enriched) 
consisted of two sets (A & B) of 16 video clips of simple social interactions between 
two individuals. In all of these interactions the speaker is saying something that is 
contrary to what they actually think. In half of the interactions they are trying to 
conceal their tme thoughts from the other individual by telling a ‘white lie’. However, 
in the other half of the exchanges the speaker uses sarcasm to deliberately make clear 
to the other individual that their true feelings are contrary to the words that they are 
actually saying. In this section of the task the participants are provided with additional 
information concerning the true state of affairs and the speaker’s true thoughts and 
feelings. These cues take the form of either a visual cue (e.g. an empty CD box visible 
to the viewer when the speaker says “Yes, Simon has returned my CD”) or a verbal 
cue in the form of an epilogue or prologue in which one of the protagonists is seen by 
the viewer to express their true feelings to a third party. There are eight visual cues 
and eight verbal cues (four of each during “lie” scripts and four of each during 
“sarcasm” scripts). Following the presentation of each interaction (including the 
verbal or visual cue) the participants were asked questions in the same format as those 
asked in the Social Inference (minimal) section of the task (see above). All of the 
video clips making up TASIT were digitised and presented to the participants, via a 
PC laptop, in a Microsoft PowerPoint presentation. Printed score sheets containing 
instructions and the questions for sections two and three of TASIT were also provided 
with the task.
6.2.3.2. Tasks Assessing Executive Processing
Three neuropsychological tasks (the traditional Stroop colour-naming task, FAS 
verbal fluency, & the Hayling’s sentence completion task) were included in the
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current study in order to assess the participants’ executive functioning. The Stroop 
task included in the current study consisted of two printed sheets of A4 each 
containing 120 stimuli. The experimental sheet consisted of the words ‘blue’, ‘green’, 
‘red’ and ‘brown’ printed in incongruent colours (e.g. the word ‘blue’ printed in red 
ink). The order of words and colours was pseudo-randomised (i.e. it was ensured that 
no coloured ink or word appeared consecutively). On the control sheet the colour 
words are replaced with arrays of capital X’s printed in the same colours.
During the FAS verbal fluency task the participants were asked to provide as many 
words as they could that began with the letters ‘F’, ‘A’ and ‘S’. Participants were 
instructed to avoid proper nouns (e.g. Bristol), repeating words with alternative 
endings (e.g. eat, eating, eaten) and swear words. Participants were given 60 seconds 
for each letter to produce as many words as they could (according to the rules).
The Hayling’s sentence completion task is made up of two related sections. The first 
section consists of 15 printed sentences (plus two practice stimuli) that have the final 
word missing (e.g. “The old house will be tom ...”). The sentences are read out to the 
participants, whose task is to complete the sentence with a word that will make sense 
(e.g. for the above example the word “down” would be acceptable). The second 
section also consists of 15 sentences (plus two practice stimuli) with the final word 
omitted. However, the participants’ task is to complete the sentence with a word that 
does not make sense and that is not related to the meaning of the sentence (e.g. in 
response to the sentence “London is a very busy...” a suitable response would be 
“doormat”).
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6.2.3.3. Assessment of Self-rated mood
As in all previous studies making up this thesis the participants’ recent mood was 
assessed using the 21-item Beck Depression Inventory and the 14-item Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale (see chapter 2 for rationale for using these measures).
6.2.3.4. Assessment of Pre-morbid Intellectual Abilitv
Participants completed the National Adult Reading Task in order to provide an 
estimate of their general intellectual ability (the rationale for using this test is outlined 
in chapter 2).
6.2.4. Procedure
6.2.4.1. General Assessment
At the outset of the session, once general demographic information had been 
collected, the participants were asked to complete the BDI and HADS mood 
questionnaires. Upon completion of these the participants were assessed on the NART 
(according to the standard procedure) and were then presented with the Stroop task. 
The order that they completed each sheet of the Stroop (experimental/control) was 
counterbalanced across all participants. Upon completion of the Stroop task they were 
assessed on the FAS Verbal Fluency and Hayling’s sentence completion tasks. 
Participants were subsequently assessed on all sections of TASIT.
6.2.4.2. The Awareness of Social Inference Test ITASITI
The participants were presented with all three sections of one of the versions of 
TASIT (either A or B). Dining the Emotion Recognition phase the participants were 
presented the video clips one at a time and were asked to watch the clips to the end.
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Following each stimulus the participants were asked to identify (from the response 
cards) the emotion they considered was being displayed by the central character in the 
video clip. The participants were informed that if they considered that more than one 
emotion was present that they should report which was the strongest emotion present. 
The experimenter marked down the participant’s response on the scoring sheet 
provided with the test (see appendix XX). Following each response, the participants 
were asked to place the response card they had just used to the back of the pack of 
four (in order to change the order that the seven emotion descriptors appeared to the 
participants). Once the participants had viewed and responded to all 28 video clips 
from section one they went straight on to complete section two of TASIT.
During the Social Inference (Minimal) phase the participants were presented with the
15 video taped social interactions and were instructed to watch the clips carefully 
right to the end. Following each clip the participants were asked the four questions 
that were assigned for each clip. The possible responses for the participants to the 
questions were ‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘don’t know’, although it was stressed that participants 
should try wherever possible to respond with either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. The experimenter 
read out each question in turn and marked down the participants response in the space 
provided on the record sheet (see appendix XX). Once all clips making up section two 
of TASIT had been viewed and responded to by the participants they went straight on 
to complete the final section.
During the Social Inference (Enriched) phase the participants were presented with the
16 video taped social exchanges (including the visual/verbal cues) and were asked to 
watch each clip carefully right to the end. In line with section two, following each clip 
the participants were read the relevant questions and, as before, were asked to give a
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‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘don’t know’ response (see appendix XX). Once the participants had 
viewed and responded to all of the clips in this section they were informed about the 
aims of the study, given a further opportunity to ask questions pertaining to the study, 
and then thanked for their participation in the study.
6.2.5. Data Analysis
A  MANOVA was conducted to establish if the two groups differed significantly in 
terms of age, educational background (years of full-time education), general 
intellectual ability (estimated from the NART error score), verbal fluency, scaled 
error score on section two of the Hayling’s sentence completion task, Stroop 
interference index (% increase in colour-naming time from control to experimental 
condition), number of Stroop errors, and self-rated mood (indexed by their scores on 
the BDI and HADS). Details concerning the scoring procedure for TASIT are given in 
appendix XX. The percentage of emotional displays correctly recognised during the 
Emotion Recognition phase of TASIT was analysed using a 2 (group) x 2 (valence) 
repeated measures ANOVA. The percentage of correct interpretations of the social 
interactions made by the participants during section two of TASIT (Social Inference 
Minimal) was analysed using 2 (group) x 2 (type of social interaction) repeated 
measures ANOVA. A further 2 x 2  repeated measures ANOVA was used to analyse 
the percentage of correct interpretations made by the participants during the third 
section of TASIT (Social Inference -  Enriched). Subsequent pair-wise comparisons 
were made using Least Significant Difference tests where a-priori predictions were 
made and Bonferroni tests where no such predictions had been made. Significant 
interactions were investigated using paired and independent t-tests, with alpha 
adjusted where appropriate.
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6.3. Results
6.3.1. Participant Characteristics
Analysis of the participant characteristics (presented in table 6.1, below) revealed that 
the ages of the participants making up the two groups differed significantly, F(l, 
26)=4.3, p<0.05. Furthermore, the groups also differed in terms of the years of full­
time education they had completed, F(l, 26)=5.0, p<0.05. Therefore, these differences 
were controlled for in all subsequent analyses, using ANCOVA with age and 
education as covariates. Importantly, the two groups did not differ in terms of their 
overall intellectual ability (estimated from the participants’ NART error scores), F<1. 
However, it should be noted that the estimated IQ scores appear to be relatively high, 
which might represent a response bias in terms of the individuals who are likely to 
agree to participate or on the part of the clinicians in terms of who they would 
approach to take part in the study.
As expected, the depressed patients produced significantly higher ratings of 
depression than did the controls; on both the BDI; F(l, 26)=263.9, p<0.001 and the 
HADS depression subscale; F(l, 32)=191.8, p<0.001. Also as expected, the patients 
produced significantly higher ratings of anxiety on the HADS anxiety subscale than 
did the controls; F(l, 26)=104.7, p<0.001. Analysis of the relative contribution of 
depression and anxiety to the observed deficits in emotion recognition and social 
perception revealed that it was depression and not anxiety that was the most 
significant factor in explaining these deficits (see appendices XXI & XXII for full 
details of these analyses)
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Table 6.1. Characteristics of the individuals making up the two participant 
groups
Characteristic Depressed
(N=14)
Controls
(N=14)
Significance
Mean SD Mean SD
Age 45.7 7.2 40.2 7.0 p<0.05
YofFTE 12.2 2.4 14.4 2.6 p<0.05
Full-scale IQ^ 114.5 4.3 113.8 4.2 n.s.
BDI (21-item) 31.4 6.3 2.1 2.5 p<0.001
HADS (Anxiety) 14.1 3.0 2.9 2.8 p<0.001
HADS (Depression) 14.8 3.2 0.9 2.0 p<0.001
Hayling’s SES 2.6 1.8 5.8 1.1 p<0.001
FAS Verbal Fluency 46.2 9.0 44.7 8.7 n.s.
Stroop % Increase RT 146.6 65.3 63.1 21.4 p<0.001
Stroop error score 4.6 3.7 1.8 2.1 p<0.05
Y of FTE= Years of full-time education completed, BDI=Beck Depression Inventory, 
HADS=Hospital Anxiety & Depression Scale. Estimated from participants’ error score on the 
National Adult Reading Test. Hayling’s SES = Scaled error score on section two of the 
Hayling’s sentence completion task.
Analysis of the participants’ performance on the Stroop task revealed that depressed 
patients were subject to significantly greater interference from the incongruent words 
than were the controls; F(l, 26)=20.7, p<0.001. Furthermore, the patients made 
significantly more colour-naming errors than did the controls; F(l, 26)=5.9, p<0.05. 
Analysis of the number of words produced by participants during the FAS verbal 
fluency task revealed no difference between the depressed patients and the controls,
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F<1. However, analysis of the participants’ scaled error scores from section two of the 
Hayling’s sentence completion task revealed that the patients scored significantly 
lower than did the controls, indicating a marked impairment in performance of this 
task; F(l, 26)=31.5, p<O.OOL
6.3.2. Emotion Recognition
The first hypothesis predicted that the “depressed patients would correctly recognise 
significantly fewer o f the emotional displays than would the controls”. Contrary to 
this prediction, analysis of the percentage emotional displays correctly recognised by 
the participants revealed that the two groups did not differ significantly, F<1.
The first hypothesis also predicted that, “depressed patients would demonstrate 
superior recognition o f the negative emotional expressions relative to positive. ” In 
line with this prediction there was some evidence to suggest that the two groups 
differed in terms of which type of emotional display they were better at identifying, 
evidenced by an interaction between group and the valence of the emotion displayed 
that approached conventional significance (illustrated in figure 6.1), F(l, 26)=2.6, 
p=0.11. Further analysis revealed that the depressed patients demonstrated better 
recognition of negative (p=92.0%, SE=2.4) than positive emotional displays 
(p=81.5%, SE=4.2); t(13)=2.0, p<0.05 (one-tailed). Furthermore, depressed 
individuals recognised fewer positive emotions than did the controls (p==89.3%, 
SE=2.4), a difference that approached conventional significance, t(26)=1.6, p=0.06 
(one-tailed).
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Figure 6.1. Percentage of positive and negative emotional displays correctly
identified, as a function of participant group (error bars represent ± one
standard error of the mean)
In order to investigate this finding further the percentage of each type of emotional 
expression categorised (according to the TASIT manual) as positive will be 
considered. Inspection of the data presented in table 6.2 revealed that the depressed 
individuals appeared to exhibit poorer recognition of happiness than did the controls. 
An independent t-test revealed that this difference approached conventional 
significance; t(26)=1.9, p=0.06.
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Table 6.2. Percentage of correct recognitions of each type of positive emotional
expression, as a function of participant group (one standard error of the mean 
presented in parentheses)
Emotional Expression Depressed Controls
(N=14) (N=14)
Happiness 78.6 % (7.8) 94.6% (2.8)
Surprise 92.9% (3.1) 91.1% (3.3)
Neutral 73.2 % (8.5) 82.1% (7.1)
6.3.3. Social Inference (Minimal)
Analysis of the percentage of sincere and sarcastic interactions correctly interpreted 
by the participants during the Social Inference (minimal) phase of the study revealed 
that the two groups did not differ significantly in terms of the overall number of 
interactions they correctly interpreted; F(l, 26)=3.0, p>0.5. However, the second 
hypothesis predicted that, “depressed individuals would make significantly fewer 
correct interpretations o f the sarcastic social interactions than would the controls 
In line with this prediction the main analysis revealed a significant interaction 
between participant group and the type of social interaction (illustrated in figure, 6.2); 
F(l,26)=4.3,p<0.05.
Further analysis revealed that the depressed individuals made significantly fewer 
correct inteipretations of the sarcastic interactions (p=83.9%, SE=3.1) than did the 
controls (p=95.9%, SE=1.2); t(26)=3.6, p<0.01. However, as expected, the two 
groups did not differ in terms of the percentage of sincere interactions they correctly
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interpreted. Furthermore, the percentage of sincere and sarcastic interactions correctly 
interpreted by the depressed patients did not differ significantly. However, the 
controls correctly interpreted significantly more sarcastic than sincere interactions 
(p=84.3%, SE=4.2); t(13)=2.8, p<0.05.
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Figure 6.2. Percentage of social interactions correctly interpreted during the 
social inference (minimal) phase, as a function of participant group (error bars 
represent ± one standard error of the mean)
6.3.4. Social Inference (Enriched)
In the third hypothesis it was predicted that, “depressed patients would make 
significantly fewer correct interpretations o f sarcastic interactions than would the 
controls However, there was no evidence of the expected interaction between the 
type of social interaction and participant group; F<1. Analysis of the percentage of
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each type of social interaction correctly interpreted by the participants during the 
Social Inference (enriched) phase revealed that, overall, depressed individuals 
correctly interpreted significantly fewer social interactions (p=76.5%, SE=2.9) than 
did the controls (p=89.7, SE=1.7); F(l, 26)= 11.0, p<0.01.
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Figure 6.3. Percentage of social interactions correctly interpreted during the
social inference (enriched phase), as a function of participant group (error bars
represent ± one standard error of the mean)
6.3.5. Executive Function and Interpretation o f Social Interactions
6.3.5.1. Social Inference IminimaD
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were calculated in order to assess if participants’ 
ability to correctly interpret social interactions was related to their general executive 
function. These analyses revealed that the percentage of sarcastic interactions
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correctly identified during the SIM phase was significantly positively correlated with 
the participants’ error score on the Hayling’s and significantly negatively correlated 
with the number of Stroop colour-naming errors; r(27)=0.5, p<0.01 and r(27)=~0.5, 
p<0.01 respectively. The percentage of sarcastic interactions that were correctly 
interpreted during the SIM phase was not significantly related to either the 
participants FAS verbal fluency score or the amount of interference on the Stroop task 
they experienced; r(28)=-0.3, p>0.05 and r(28)=-0.3, p>0.05 respectively. Pearson’s 
correlations also revealed that the percentage of sincere social interactions correctly 
interpreted during the SIM phase was not significantly related to any of the executive 
measures; Stroop interference, Stroop error score, Hayling’s error score, or FAS 
verbal fluency; r(28)=0.1, p>0.05, r(28)=-0.1, p>0.05, r(28)=0.1, p>0.05 and 
r(28)==0.08, p>0.05 respectively.
6.3.5.2. Social Inference fenrichedl
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were calculated in order to assess if participants' 
ability to correctly interpret social interactions during the SIE phase was related to 
their general executive function. These analyses revealed that the percentage of 
sarcastic interactions that were correctly interpreted during the SIE phase was 
significantly positively correlated with the participants’ error score on the Hayling’s 
and significantly negatively correlated with the participants Stroop interference index 
(% increase in colour-naming time), r(27)=0.7, p<0.001 and r(23)=-0.4, p<0.05 
respectively. These analyses also revealed that the percentage of sarcastic interactions 
correctly interpreted during the SIE phase was not significantly related to the 
participants’ score on the FAS verbal fluency task or the number of errors made by 
the participants on the Stroop task; r(28)=-0.1, p>0.05 and r(28)=-0.29, p>0.05
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respectively. Pearson’s correlations also revealed a positive relationship between the 
Hayling’s error score and the number of interactions involving white lies that were 
correctly interpreted during the SIE phase; this relationship approached conventional 
significance; r(28)=0.4, p=0.06. There was also a significant negative relationship 
between the participants’ Stroop error score and the number of interactions containing 
lies that they correctly interpreted during the SIE phase; r(28)=-0.4, p>0.05.
6.3.6. Depression Severity  ^Executive Function and Social Perception
As depression impairs both executive function (see section 1.2.4, page 9) and social 
processing (see section 1.4.3, page 30) it was appropriate to investigate if the 
influence of executive function on interpretation of social interactions reported above 
was related to the severity of depression being experienced by the participants. To this 
end, Pearson’s correlation coefficients were calculated to establish if depression 
severity (indexed by BDI score) was related to the correct interpretation of social 
interactions and to participants’ performance on the executive tasks. These analyses 
revealed that BDI score was significantly negatively correlated with the percentage of 
sarcastic interactions correctly interpreted by the participants during both the SIM and 
SIE phases; r(28)=-0.6, p<0.001 and r(28)=-0.55, p>0.01 respectively. BDI score was 
also significantly negatively correlated with the percentage of interactions involving 
lies that were correctly interpreted during the SIE phase; r(28)=-0.7, p<0.001. 
However, BDI score was not significantly correlated with the percentage of sincere 
interactions that were coiTectly interpreted during the SIM phase, r(28)=-0.1, p>0.05. 
Importantly, Pearson’s correlations also revealed that depression severity (indexed by 
BDI score) was significantly negatively correlated with participants’ Hayling’s scaled 
error score; r(28)=-0.7, p<0.001, and significantly positively related to Stroop
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interference and error scores; r(28)=0.6, p<0.01 and r(28)=0.4, p<0.05 respectively. 
However, BDI score was not significantly related to participants score on the FAS 
verbal fluency score; r(28)=0.2, p>0.05.
In order to assess the influence of depression severity on the observed relationships 
between executive function and interpretation of social interactions (reported in 
section 6.3.5, page 166) the correlation coefficients were recalculated partialing out 
the participants’ scores on the BDI. These results revealed that, once depression 
severity had been controlled for, the percentage of sarcastic interactions correctly 
interpreted during the SIM phase was no longer significantly correlated with 
Hayling’s error score; r(25)=0.1, p>0.5. However, a small but significant relationship 
was still observed between the number of errors on the Stroop task and the percentage 
of sarcastic interactions correctly interpreted during the SIM phase; r(25)=-0.3, 
p<0.05 (one tailed). These analyses also revealed that, even after controlling for 
depression severity, the percentage of sarcastic interactions correctly interpreted 
during the SIE phase was significantly correlated with the participants’ error score on 
the Hayling’s; r(25)=0.6, p<0.01. However, once depression severity was controlled 
for, the percentage of interactions containing lies that were correctly interpreted 
during the SIE phase was no longer significantly related to Hayling’s error score or 
Stroop error score; r(25)=-0.1, p>0.5 and r(25)==-0.2, p>0.05 respectively.
6.4. Discussion
The aim of the current study was to extend the literature concerning the profile of 
emotion recognition and social perception that is associated with major depression. A
186
EMOTION RECOGNITION AND SOCIAL PERCEPTION IN MD
secondaiy aim was to establish if impaired comprehension of social interactions was 
related to deficits in executive functioning.
6.4.1. Emotion Recognition Phase
The first hypothesis predicted that "the depressed patients would correctly recognise 
significantly fewer o f the emotional displays than would the controls This prediction 
was not supported by the results of the current study, as the two groups did not differ 
in their overall ability to recognise the emotions portrayed in the video clips. This 
finding corresponds very well with previous studies (e.g. Ridout et al, 2003) and 
suggests that depression is not associated with a general impairment of emotion 
recognition. However, there was some support for the second part of the first 
hypothesis, as depressed individuals were shown to recognise significantly more 
negative than positive expressions. Further inspection of these results would seem to 
suggest that this result was due to impaired recognition of positive emotions relative 
to the controls. In particular there was evidence to suggest that the depressed 
individuals were impaired in their recognition of happiness. These findings 
correspond with the pattern of mood-congruence that has been reported on a number 
of different cognitive tasks (e.g. autobiographical memory retrieval). Furthermore this 
pattern of data corresponds with the findings of Ridout et al (2003), who reported 
impaired recognition memory of happy faces relative to neutral expressions. 
However, it should be noted that in that study there was no significant evidence of 
impaired emotion recognition during the encoding phase. The finding, from the 
current study, that the depressed patients were impaired in recognising positive 
expressions in general, and happy expressions in particular, has implications for their 
ongoing depressive episode. If a depressed individual is insensitive to the happy
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expressions they encounter they will perceive social encounters in a more negative 
light, which could reduce the positive effects social interaction and act to maintain or 
even worsen the episode. Furthermore, if  a depressed individual fails to recognise that 
someone if being friendly then this could lead to misunderstandings and social 
tension.
6,4,2, Social Inference Minimal (SIM)
Hypothesis two predicted that "the depressed patients would make significantly fewer 
correct interpretations o f the sarcastic interactions than would the controls”. This 
prediction was supported by the findings of the current study. Furthermore, as 
expected the two groups did not differ in terms of the number of correct 
interpretations they made of sincere interactions. These results conespond with the 
pattern that was observed for patients who had suffered traumatic brain injury, 
reported in McDonald et al (2003). It would appear that, in common with patients 
who have suffered TBI, depressed individuals are quite able to comprehend social 
interactions where the meaning is explicit, but experience difficulties understanding 
social exchanges where the meaning is implied. The extent to which this might relate 
to deficits in executive processing is discussed in section 6.4.4 below.
Interestingly, investigation of the results of the SIM phase revealed that the controls 
made significantly more correct interpretations of the sarcastic interactions than the, 
supposedly easier, sincere exchanges. This finding suggests that the observed 
difference between the two groups in terms of the interpretation of sarcastic 
interactions might be a consequence of a bias on the part of the healthy controls 
towards making a sarcastic inference, rather than a deficit in the interpretation of
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sarcasm by the depressed individuals. If the controls exhibited a tendency towards 
interpretation of the interactions as being sarcastic then it would be expected that they 
would get more of the sarcastic interactions correct than would the patients (if these 
individuals were not showing such a bias). However, if they were applying this 
strategy it would also be expected that they would get more of the sincere interactions 
incorrect than would the patients, but this pattern was not observed. Importantly, 
inspection of the data reported by McDonald et al (2003) reveals the identical pattern. 
One possibility is that the control group in their study demonstrated the same 
tendency towards making the sarcastic inference as the controls in the current study. 
However, a plausible alternative is that a number of the sincere interactions may have 
been ambiguous in terms of their meaning and hence may have led to 
misinterpretations by both groups of participants. The difference in the percentage of 
sincere and sarcastic interactions correctly interpreted by the controls cannot be 
explained in terms of the sincere interactions being generally harder to interpret as the 
percentage of these interactions correctly identified during the SIM phase of the 
current study was not correlated with deficits in cognitive performance (evidenced by 
the participants’ performance on the Stroop and Hayling’s tests). Evidence that the 
percentage of sarcastic interactions correctly interpreted by the participants during the 
SIM phase of the current study is significantly correlated with both their BDI score, 
and with their performance on the Stroop and Hayling’s tasks is suggestive that the 
difference in sarcastic inference is due to impairment on the part of the patients. This 
finding requires confirmation in the future before strong conclusions can be made. 
Furthennore, an explanation based on a greater tendency on the part of healthy 
individuals towards making a sarcastic inference also requires further investigation.
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The presence of impaired social interpretation on the part of the patients would be 
consistent with the findings of previous studies (e.g. Ambady & Gray, 2002; Butler & 
Mathews, 1983; Krantz & Hammen, 1979) that have reported dysfunctional social 
perception in depressed individuals. It can be argues that there is at least some 
evidence from the current study to suggest that, relative to healthy participants, 
clinically depressed individuals are impaired in their comprehension of sarcasm. This 
finding is important, as it could have real implications for these patients in their 
everyday social exchanges. As outlined previously, such insensitivity could lead the 
patients to misunderstand the behaviour/intentions of significant others, which in turn 
could act to undermine these important relationships.
6.43, Social Inference - Enriched
The third hypothesis predicted that "the depressed patients would make significantly 
fewer correct interpretations o f the sarcastic interactions than would the controls 
This hypothesis was supported. However, contrary to the predicted pattern of results 
the depressed patients were also impaired in their interpretation of interactions 
involving lies. This pattern of results does not correspond with the findings of 
McDonald et al (2003). During this phase of the study it appears that depressed 
individuals exhibited difficulties in comprehending social interactions, even when the 
meaning was made explicit. It is possible that the significant impairment in 
understanding interactions involving lies might relate to the well-reported negative 
bias in the depressed patients’ social judgements. The majority of the social 
exchanges portrayed in TASIT that involve one of the protagonists lying involve the 
use of white lies to protect the conversational partner fr om the truth. For example, in 
one scene we see a female character (Ruth) talking to a male character (Michael)
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about how she thinks that their friend (Gary) has put on weight. In the next scene we 
see Ruth insisting to Gary that he hasn’t put on weight. The correct interpretation of 
this interaction is that Ruth is trying to be nice to her friend by playing down the truth. 
However, in line with previous studies (e.g. Krantz & Hammen, 1979; Butler & 
Mathews, 1983), it would seem plausible to assume that on some occasions at least 
the depressed individuals would have provided a more negative, and hence incorrect, 
interpretation of these interactions. The extent to which the observed impairments in 
social processing might relate to executive functioning will be addressed in the next 
section.
6.4,4. Executive Function and Interpretation o f Social Interactions
As noted above the percentage of sarcastic interactions correctly interpreted by the 
participants during the SIM and SIE phases of TASIT was significantly related to 
their performance on the Hayling’s and Stroop tasks. These findings provide good 
evidence that the ‘executive’ processes, particularly those involving conflict 
resolution and inhibition of pre-leamed responses, are implicated in the successful 
comprehension of social exchanges that involve sarcasm. Furthermore, it appears that 
these processes were involved to some extent in the correct interpretation of 
interactions involving deception. As previous studies (e.g. Pardo et al, 1990; van Veen 
& Carter, 1992) have implicated the anterior cingulate (AC) region of the prefrontal 
cortex in the successful performance of these executive tasks, it is plausible that the 
observed deficits in social inference related to a disruption of normal frinctioning of 
this cortical region. Evidence for this notion comes from previous studies 
demonstrating that lesions to the AC are associated with impaiiment of emotion 
recognition (e.g. Homack et al, 2003).
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6.4.5. Depression Severity, Executive Function and Interpretation o f Social 
Interactions
As noted in section 6.3.6, the percentage of sarcastic interactions correctly identified 
during both SIM and SIE phases of TASIT was negatively related to depression 
severity (indexed by the BDI). Furthermore, the participants’ performance on the 
executive tasks (Hayling’s and Stroop tasks) was also significantly related to the 
participants’ depression severity. One plausible interpretation of these findings is that 
the observed deficits in social inference and executive function were both a 
consequence of the participants’ ongoing depression. The finding that controlling for 
depression severity significantly reduced the strength of relationships between 
performance on executive tasks and correct social inference provides support for this 
notion. It is plausible that these deficits were a consequence of reduced cognitive 
capacity in the depressed patients. It is also plausible, based on previous studies (e.g. 
George, 1993) that these findings related to a disruption of anterior cingulate function 
in the depressed patients.
6.4.6. Methodological Considerations
There are a number of points that require consideration. The first is that there was a 
relatively small n in this study, which means that the findings should be treated with 
caution. A replication of this study with a larger n would be required to confirm the 
findings. Secondly, as TASIT is Australian (it features Australian actors with fairly 
strong accents) and has not been validated in this country there might be cultural 
differences that could influence the results (differences in voice inflection for 
example). However, this would be the same for both depressed patients and controls. 
A potential future study could involve developing a UK version of TASIT in order to
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confirm the findings with culturally relevant stimuli. A further consideration was that 
the patients were being medicated at the time of testing. However, previous research 
(Thompson, 1991) has reported that the cognitive performance of depressed patients 
improves when they are medicated and if the drugs were impairing performance 
would it not be expected that there would be a general deficit not the specific 
impairment observed in the current study. Although an improvement on previous 
studies, the participants are still required to make their interpretations of the social 
interactions some time (approx 15 to 60 seconds) after they have viewed the scenes. 
The participants had to rely on their memory of the interactions to a certain extent and 
there is a vast literature demonstrating selective memory in depressed participants for 
negative material. All of the responses in TASIT are forced choice, which does not 
allow room for alternative explanations of the exchanges. This is necessity in the 
current study as it allowed the participants’ social perception skills to be quantified. 
However, it is important that this limitation of the methodology is noted. Despite 
these limitations the current study represents a genuine extension of the previous 
literature on both emotion recognition and social perception in major depression
6.4.7. Summary and Conclusions
Relative to the healthy participants, the depressed individuals did not exhibit a general 
deficit in their recognition of emotion from realistic social displays. However, there 
was some evidence, that they exhibited a selective impairment in their recognition of 
positive emotional expressions, most notably of happiness. Relative to healthy 
participants, depressed patients exhibited significantly impaired comprehension of 
sarcasm, despite being unimpaired in their interpretation of sincere social exchanges. 
Furthennore, there is evidence from the current study that this deficit might relate to a
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disruption of the ‘executive’ processes, particularly those involved in the detection 
and resolution of cognitive conflict. The finding that the patients were also 
significantly impaired in their interpretation of social exchanges that involved “white 
lies” could be a consequence of the tendency of depressed individuals to judge 
ambiguous social situations in an overtly negative light. Alternatively, this deficit 
could simply relate to depression-related reductions in available cognitive resources 
that could be applied to interpret the social interactions. It is plausible that the 
observed deficits in executive performance and social inference were a consequence 
of a disruption to the normal function of the anterior cingulate region of the preffontal 
cortex. It is clear from the current study that depression is associated with changes in 
emotion recognition and social perception and that these changes could seriously 
impact on their lives. The relatively poor sensitivity to happy expressions, for 
example, could colour the patient’s view of the social interactions they are involved 
in. Likewise, impaired comprehension of sarcasm and a tendency towards negative 
interpretation of ambiguous events could lead to social misunderstandings that could 
lead to, or increase, social discord, which in turn could act to weaken important social 
bonds and increase social isolation. Overall, it would seem likely that the observed 
biases and impairments of emotion recognition and social perception in the depressed 
patients could act to maintain or even worsen their ongoing depressive episode.
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- CHAPTER SEVEN-
NEUROSURGERY FOR CHRONIC, TREATMENT- 
REFRACTORY, DEPRESSION: SUBSEQUENT IMPAIRMENT OF 
EMOTION RECOGNITION AND SOCIAL PERCEPTION?
7.1. Introduction
7.1.1. Background
Recent advances in the understanding of the neurobiological underpinnings of mental 
disorders (e.g. based on structural & functional imaging techniques), coupled with the 
development of more precise stereotactic neurosurgical procedures, have contributed 
to the relatively recent resurgence in the use of neurosurgery as a treatment option for 
treatment-refractory psychiatric conditions. However, the use of these interventions 
has been confined to patients whose psychiatric condition has been considered 
severely disabling and who have failed to respond to all other appropriate treatment, 
either physiological (e.g. antidepressant medication & ECT) or psychological (e.g. 
cognitive behavioural therapy) in nature. The next section of this introduction will 
outline the types of neurosurgical intervention for chronic mental disorders that are 
currently perfoimed at Ninewells hospital in Dundee. The subsequent sections will 
consider the consequences of these interventions, with particular reference to potential 
impairments of emotional processing that might be associated with these procedures. 
Finally, an overview of the aims and predictions of current study will be provided.
7.1.2. Neurosurgery for Mental Disorders (NMD) in Dundee
Between 1992 and 2001 thirty-foui* neurosurgical procedures were performed in 
Dundee in an attempt to manage chronic treatment-refractory mental disorders
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(Matthews & Eljamel, 2003). There are cun'ently two different surgical interventions 
for mental disorders that are offered at Ninewells in Dundee; these are anterior 
cingulotomy and anterior capsulotomy. Anterior cingulotomy, performed to manage 
treatment-refractory depression (CTRD), involves bilateral thermal lesions of the 
anterior cingulate gyri in order to disconnect the Papez circuit (Binder & Iskandar, 
2000). The anterior capsulotomy, performed to manage treatment-refractory OCD and 
CTRD, involves bilateral thermal lesions of the anterior limbs of the internal capsule, 
in order to disconnect the orbitofrontal cortex and certain limbic structures, most 
notably the midline thalamic nuclei and caudate nucleus (Binder & Iskandar, 2000).
7.1.3. What are the long-term consequences o f neurosurgery?
The majority of follow-up studies addressing the long-term effects of neurosurgery 
have tended to focus mainly on the efficacy of the different procedures (see Binder & 
Iskandar, 2000). However, there have been a small number of studies addressing the 
cognitive consequences of these procedures. For example, Vasko and Kullberg (1979) 
reported that anterior cingulotomy was associated with impaired spatial memory in a 
number of patients. They also reported that capsulotomy was related to deficits in 
performance on tests of verbal memory. Cohen et al (1999), on the other hand, 
reported that cingulotomy was associated with impaired sustained attention and 
response production. Other studies have examined the effects of these procedures on 
certain personality measures. For example, Mindus et al (1999) reported deviant 
psychopathic traits in one capsulotomy patient on the Karolinska scales of personality.
It is clear that the majority of outcome studies that have addressed negative 
psychological consequences have tended to focus on general cognitive/intellectual
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function. However, as the aim of both of these surgical interventions is to dismpt the 
functioning of areas of the prefrontal cortex and limbic system that are involved in 
emotional behaviour, it would seem feasible that they could also have a negative 
effect on patients’ ability to process emotional stimuli. Evidence for this position 
comes from a study conducted by Happé, Malhi & Checkley (2001), who reported 
‘theory of mind’ deficits in a patient that had undergone an anterior capsulotomy as an 
intervention for chronic bipolar affective disorder. The patient (PB) demonstrated 
impaired understanding of stories that involved references to mental states (e.g. 
double bluffs, persuasion or ‘white lies’), relative to a psychiatric control (DR, who 
was also suffering from chronic bipolar disorder but who had not received surgery) 
and a group of matched healthy controls. Furthermore, relative to DR and the 
controls, PB demonstrated impaired understanding of newspaper cartoons where the 
humour was dependent upon what one of the featured characters mistakenly thought 
or did not know.
Further evidence supporting the view that these neurosurgical interventions might be 
associated with an impairment of social perception comes from a study conducted by 
Homak, Rolls and Wade (1996), who reported that patients with ventral frontal lobe 
damage exhibited deficits in emotion recognition from faces and vocalisations. 
Similarly, Homak et al (2003) reported that circumscribed lesions to areas of the pre­
frontal cortex exerted significant effects on emotion perception and behaviour. Most 
notably for the current study, they demonstrated that individuals with lesions to the 
anterior cingulate and orbito-frontal cortex were impaired in their ability to identify 
emotion from faces and voices.
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The findings of a number of imaging studies (e.g. Calarge et al, 2003; Gallagher et al, 
2000) also provide evidence that these neurosurgical procedures might be associated 
with changes in the ability to comprehend social information, as they have indicated a 
possible role for the medial frontal cortex and anterior cingulate in comprehending 
other’s state of mind.
Despite the evidence provided above there have been very few studies addressing the 
possible changes in emotional processing that might be associated with these 
neurosurgical interventions. Therefore the aim of the current study is to provide a 
detailed account of the effects of circumscribed neurosurgical lesions of two 
important regions of the pre-frontal cortex on the patients’ subsequent ability to 
correctly interpret important social signals.
Previous studies that have examined changes in emotional processing that are 
associated with neurosurgery have tended to rely on presentation of verbal tasks (e.g. 
stories), recorded emotional sounds (e.g. crying) or static emotional facial 
expressions. Furthermore, these stimuli have invariably been presented in isolation. 
However, as outlined in the previous chapter, in everyday social interactions 
protagonists are required to interpret multiple channels of information in order to 
make sense of the interaction. Therefore, in order to understand the true impact of 
these neurosurgical interventions on social functioning, it is important to assess how 
they influence the processing of more ecologically valid stimuli (such as videotaped 
social interactions). The study outlined in the previous chapter utilised a recently 
developed neuropsychological task (TASIT) to assess changes in emotion recognition 
and social perception associated with clinical depression. TASIT was developed 
specifically to investigate changes in emotion processing that are associated with
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traumatic brain injuiy (TBI). Using TASIT, patients with TBI have been shown to 
exhibit emotion recognition deficits and also significant impairment in 
comprehending social interactions that involve sarcasm (MacDonald et al, 2003). 
Furthermore, the findings of the previous chapter demonstrate that TASIT was 
sensitive to changes in social perception that are associated with clinical depression. 
Therefore, TASIT would seem to be an ideal tool with which to conduct the proposed 
investigation.
One of the central findings of the previous chapter demonstrated that impaired 
comprehension of sarcasm was related to deficits in the participants’ central executive 
functioning (as indexed by performance on the Stroop colour-naming and Hayling’s 
Sentence Completion tasks). As the anterior cingulate has been implicated in normal 
perfonnance on such tasks (see section 1.6, page 41), it would seem likely that 
patients who have received lesions to this brain region might be particularly impaired 
in comprehending these sarcastic social exchanges.
As noted in Mathews & Eljamel (2003), only around fifty percent of patients that 
undergo neurosurgery will show marked improvement in their mood, which means 
that a number of the surgery patients that will participate in the current study will still 
be depressed. Therefore, of particular interest in the current study is whether these 
depressed surgery patients will demonstrate greater impairment on these social 
processing tasks than the other patient groups.
7.1.4. Overview and Predictions
In order to establish if neurosurgical interventions for chronic, treatment-refractory, 
mental disorders are associated with impaired emotion recognition and social
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perception a group of patients that have undergone surgery will be assessed on ail 
three sections of TASIT. The perfonnance of the surgery patients in the current study 
will be compared with that of the depressed patients and healthy controls from the 
study reported in the previous chapter (page 163). The following predictions were 
made:
7.1.4.1. Hvpothesis tested during the Emotional Recognition lERI phase:
1. It is expected that there will be a significant interaction between surgery 
status, depression status, and the valence of emotional displays, such that 
depressed surgery patients will correctly recognise significantly fewer 
emotional displays than will other participant groups. It is expected that this 
finding will be particularly strong for positive emotional displays.
7.1.4.2. Hvpothesis tested during the Social Inference (Minimal: SIM & Enriched: 
SIEI phases:
2. It is expected that there will be a significant interaction between depression 
status, surgery status and type of social interaction, such that depressed 
surgery patients will identify fewer sarcastic interactions than will the 
participants in the other participant groups.
7.2. Method
7.2.1, Design
All three sections of the study that involved TASIT utilised a 2 (depression status) x 2 
(surgery status) x 2 (type of social interaction) repeated measures ANOVA design. 
For all sections of the study, the first between participants variable was depression 
status (depressed or non-depressed) and the second between participants variable was 
surgery status (surgery or no surgery). In the Emotion Recognition (ER) phase, the
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within participants variable was valence of emotional display (positive or negative). 
In the Social Inference-Minimal (SIM) and Social Inference- Enriched (SIE) phases 
the within participants variable was type of social interaction (SIM: sincere or 
sarcastic & SIE: lies or sarcasm). The dependent variable during tire ER phase was the 
percentage of emotional displays correctly recognised. During the SIM and SIE 
phases the dependent variable was the percentage of social interactions correctly 
interpreted.
7.2.2. Participants
Eight individuals (2 males, 6 females) that had undergone a neurosurgical intervention 
for chronic, treatment-refractory mental disorder took part in the current study. Prior 
to surgery, seven of these patients had a primary ICD-10 diagnosis of recurrent 
depressive episode, one of whom also had a secondary diagnosis of obsessive- 
compulsive disorder (OCD). The remaining participant had a primary diagnosis of 
OCD and a secondary diagnosis of recurrent depressive episode. Four out of the eight 
surgery patients had undergone both an anterior capsulotomy and anterior 
cingulotomy. One patient had (at the time of testing) only undergone an anterior 
capsulotomy. The remaining three patients had undergone only an anterior 
cingulotomy. At the time of testing, four of the eight surgery patients no longer met 
ICD-10 criteria for major depression (or any other psychiatric disorder), whereas four 
were still diagnosed as suffering from a major depressive episode. The mean 
Hamilton rating score of the recovered group was 4 (SD=1.4), whereas the mean 
HRSD rating for the participants who remained depressed was 25.8 (SD=2.9). Of the 
four participants who were recovered at testing two had undergone both procedures 
and two had only undergone an anterior cingulotomy. Similarly, two of the patients
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that remained depressed (at the time of testing) had undergone both procedures. Of 
the other two depressed patients, one had only undergone an anterior capsulotomy and 
the other had only undergone an anterior cingulotomy. As it was not possible to test 
the eight patients prior to surgery their performance on the different tasks utilised in 
the current study was compared with that of the clinically depressed sample (n=14) 
from the study outlined in the previous chapter (in order to establish how the surgery 
patients might have performed on these tasks prior to their surgeiy). The performance 
of these two clinical groups was compared to that of the healthy controls (n=14) from 
the study reported in the previous chapter (page 163). The characteristics of the 
individual making up the three participant groups are reported in table 7.1 (page 205). 
It should be noted that the findings of the current study must be treated with caution, 
as, due to the infrequency of these surgical procedures, the number of surgery patients 
that were available to participate was relatively small. This problem is particularly 
marked in cases where the performance of the depressed and non-depressed surgery 
patients is compared. According to Cohen (1992) a sample size of 18 depressed and 
18 recovered surgery patients would have been required to detect a large effect size 
(with a power of 0.80). It is therefore clear that, this element of the current study was 
underpowered (full details of these power analyses can be found in appendix II).
7.2.3. Materials and Apparatus
This study made use of the identical materials and apparatus that were utilised to 
conduct the study outlined in the previous chapter (page 171).
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7.2.4. Procedure
Participants were assessed following the identical procedure to that used to conduct 
the study outlined in the previous chapter (page 174)
7.2.5. Data Analysis
A MANOVA was conducted to establish if the three groups differed significantly in 
terms of age, educational background (years of full-time education), general 
intellectual ability (estimated from the NART error score), verbal fluency, scaled 
error score on section two of the Hayling’s sentence completion task, Stroop 
interference index (% increase in colour-naming time from control to experimental 
condition), number of Stroop errors, and self-rated mood (indexed by their scores on 
the BDI and HADS). The percentage of emotional displays correctly recognised 
during the Emotion Recognition phase of TASIT was analysed using a 2 
(depressed/non-depressed) x 2 (surgery/no surgery) x 2 (positive/negative) repeated 
measures ANOVA. The percentage of correct interpretations of the social interactions 
made by the participants during the Social Inference Minimal phase was analysed 
using 2 (depressed/ non-depressed) x 2 (surgery/no surgery) x 2 (sincere/sarcastic) 
ANOVA. A further 2 (depressed/ non-depressed) x 2 (surgery/ no surgery) x 2 
(lies/sarcasm) ANOVA was used to analyse the percentage of correct interpretations 
made by the participants during the Social Inference -  Enriched phase. Subsequent 
pair-wise comparisons were made using Least Significant Difference tests where a- 
priori predictions were made and Bonferroni tests where no such predictions had been 
made. Significant interactions were investigated using one-way and two-way 
ANOVA and t-tests (paired & independent), with alpha adjusted where appropriate.
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7.3. Results
7,3.1. Participant Characteristics
Analysis of the data (presented in table 7.1) revealed that the three groups did not 
differ significantly in terms of their educational background (years of full-time 
education completed) and their general intellectual ability (estimated from the number 
of reading errors on the NART); F(2, 29)=2.7, p>0.05 and F<1 respectively. 
However, this analysis revealed that the groups differed significantly in terms of age; 
F(2, 29)=3.4, p<0.05. Further analysis revealed that the age of the surgery patients 
did not differ significantly from that of the controls but the depressed patients were 
significantly older than the surgery patients, p<0.05. Therefore, age was controlled for 
in all subsequent analyses using ANCOVA, with age entered as a covariate.
As expected, the groups differed significantly in terms of their self-rated depression 
on both the BDI and the HADS depression subscale; F(2, 29)=33.2, p<0.001 and F(2, 
29)=35.3, p<0.001. Subsequent analysis revealed that the surgery patients did not 
differ significantly from the depressed patients on the BDI or HADS depression 
subscale, both tests p>0.05. However, they rated themselves as significantly more 
depressed on both the BDI and the HADS than did the controls, p<0.001 and p<0.01. 
Also, analysis of the Hamilton ratings provided by the clinicians (or in some cases by 
the author) for the depressed and surgery patients revealed that the depressed sample 
were rated as being significantly more depressed than were the surgery patients; 
t(20)=2.2, p<0.05. As expected, the three groups also differed significantly in terms of 
their self-rated anxiety (indexed by the HADS anxiety subscale), F(2, 29)=36.3, 
p<0.001. Further analysis revealed that the surgery patients rated themselves a
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significantly more anxious than did the controls, p<0.001. However, they rated 
themselves as significantly less anxious than did the depressed patients, p<0.05.
Table 7.1. Profile of the participants in the three groups
Participant Surgery Patients Depressed Controls P-Valne
Characteristic (N=8) (N=14) (N-14)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 39.3 4.9 45.7 7.2 40.2 7.0 <0.05
Y_FTE 13.9 2.5 12.2 2.4 14.4 2.6 n.s.
IQ" 117 3.5 114.5 4.3 113.8 4.2 n.s.
HRSD 14.9 11.9 21.9 2.9 - - <0.05
BDI 26.0 24.0 31.4 6.3 2.1 2.5 <0.001
HADS_A 8.6 6.0 14.1 3.0 2.9 2.8 <0.001
HADSD 9.4 8.5 14.7 3.1 0.9 2.0 <0.001
FAS 39.8 5.8 46.2 2.4 44.1 8.6 n.s.
H_SES 3.3 2.0 2.6 1.8 5.8 1.1 <0.001
Stroop Errors 7.0 6.5 4.6 3.7 1.8 2.1 <0.05
Stroop % Inc CNT 99.1 73.1 146.6 65.3 63.1 21.4 <0.01
Y_FTE= Years of full-time education completed, HRSD= Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression, 
BDI= Beck Depression Inventory, HADS_A= Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (anxiety 
subscale), HADS D= Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (depression subscale), FAS= Verbal 
Fluency Task, H SES= Scaled Error Score from Hayling’s Sentence Completion Task (section 
two) and Stroop % Inc CNT=Percentage increase in colour-naming time. ^Estimated from the 
number of reading errors on the NART
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Analysis of the data presented in table 7.1 also revealed that the three groups differed 
significantly on their performance on the traditional Stroop task, both in terms of the 
interference index (% increase in colour-naming time) and the number of colour- 
naming errors; F(2, 29)=9.2, p<0.01 and F(2, 29)=4.2, p<0.05 respectively. 
Subsequent analyses revealed that the Stroop interference index of the surgery 
patients did not differ from that of the depressed patients or the controls, both tests 
p>0.05. Further analysis revealed that the surgery patients made significantly more 
colour-naming errors than did the controls, p<0.05. However, they did not differ 
significantly from the depressed patients in terms of the number of colour-naming 
errors they committed, p>0.05. The main analysis also revealed that the participants 
differed significantly on their performance on section two of the Hayling’s sentence 
completion task (indexed by the scaled error score); F(2, 29)=14.4, p<0.001. Further 
analyses revealed that the surgery patients were significantly impaired on this task 
relative to the controls, p<0.001. However, their performance did not differ 
significantly from that of the depressed patients, p>0.05.
7.3.2, Emotion Recognition
It was expected that during the emotion recognition phase *'there would be a 
significant interaction between surgery status, depression status, and the valence o f 
emotional displays, such that depressed surgery patients would correctly recognise 
significantly fewer emotional displays than would other participant groups. It was 
expected that this finding would be particularly strong for positive emotional 
displays
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Table 7.2. Percentage of positive and negative emotional displays correctly 
recognised, as a function of depression and surgery status
Positive Negative
Depression Status Surgery Mean SE Mean SE
Depressed Yes 77.1% 8.6 81.3% 8.1
No 81.5% 4.2 92.0% 2.4
Non-depressed Yes 83.3% 5.9 79.7% 2.1
No 89.3 2.7 89.7% 2.3
Contrary to this prediction, there was no significant interaction between depression 
status, surgery status and valence; F<1. However, analysis of the percentage of 
correctly recognised emotional displays did reveal a significant main effect of surgery 
status; F(l, 31)=5.0, p<0.05. Overall, patients that had undergone surgery correctly 
recognised significantly fewer of the emotional displays (p=80.3%, SE=4.5) than did 
participants who not had surgery (p=88.1%, SE=L4). Importantly, there was no 
significant interaction between depression status and surgery status in terms of the 
number of correctly recognised emotional displays, F<1.
7.5.5. Social Inference -  Minimal (SIM)
During the SIM phase it was expected that "there would be a significant interaction 
between depression status, surgery status and type o f social interaction, such that 
depressed surgery patients would identify fewer sarcastic interactions than would the 
participants in the other participant groups In line with this prediction, analysis of 
the data presented in table 7.3 revealed the expected significant interaction between 
depression status, surgery status and the type of social interaction; F(l, 31)=5.3,
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p<0.05. In line with this prediction, analysis of the data presented in table 7.3 revealed 
the expected significant interaction between depression status, surgery status and the 
type of social interaction; F(l, 31)=5.3, p<0.05.
Table 7.3. Percentage of sincere and sarcastic interactions correctly interpreted 
by the participants, as a function of depression and surgery status
Sincere Sarcastic
Depression Status Surgery Mean SE Mean SE
Depressed Yes 61.3% 8.3 87.5% 2.3
No 83.2% 3.8 83.9% 3.1
Non-Depressed Yes 71.3% 14.7 81.3% 5.5
No 81.4% 4.6 95.9% 1.2
In order to elucidate the nature of this three-way interaction the percentage of 
correctly interpreted sincere and sarcastic interactions were analysed separately using 
2 (depressed & non depressed) x 2 (surgery & no surgery) between participants 
ANOVA.
Analysis of the percentage of correctly interpreted sarcastic interactions revealed a 
significant depression status x surgery status interaction (illustrated in figure 7.1); F(l, 
31)=6.5, p<0.05. Further analysis revealed that participants that were not depressed 
and had not undergone surgery correctly interpreted significantly more of the sarcastic 
interactions than did non-depressed surgery patients, depressed patients that had not 
had surgery, and depressed surgery patients; t(16)=4.1, p<0.01; t(26)=3.6, p<0.01 and
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t(16)==3.2, p<0.01. However, the percentage of sarcastic interactions correctly 
interpreted by the different patient groups did not differ significantly.
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Figure 7.1. Percentage of sarcastic interactions correctly interpreted by the 
participants during the SIM phase, as a function of their depression and surgery 
status (error bars represent ± one standard error of the mean).
Analysis of the percentage of sincere interactions correctly interpreted by the 
participants during the SIM phase revealed a significant main effect of surgery status; 
F(l, 32)=6.5, p<0.05. Overall, participants that had undergone surgery correctly 
interpreted significantly fewer sincere interactions (p=66.3%, SE=8.1) than did 
participants that had not undergone surgery (p=83,8%, SE=2.8). There were no other 
significant main effects and the depression status x surgery status interaction was not 
significant, F<1.
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7,3,4. Social Inference-Enriched (SIE)
During the SIE phase it was expected that "there would be a significant interaction 
between depression status, surgery status and type o f social interaction, such that 
depressed surgery patients would identify fewer sarcastic interactions than would the 
participants in the other participant groups” However, the expected interaction 
between depression status, surgery status and type of social interaction was not 
significant; F(l, 31)=1.5, p>0.05. Analysis of the data presented in table 7.4 revealed 
that, during the SIE phase, patients that had undergone surgery exhibited a non­
significant trend towards poorer interpretation of the social interactions (p,=76.8%, 
SE=4.4) than participants that had not undergone surgery (p=83.1%, SE=2.1); F(l, 
31)=2.7, p=0.11.
Table 7.4. Percentage of social interactions correctly interpreted by the 
participants during the SIE phase of the study, as a function of depression and 
surgery status
Lies Sarcastic
Depression Status Surgery Mean SE Mean SE
Depressed Yes 74.2% 9.5 75.0% 3.4
No 79.0% 3.2 73.9% 3.8
Non-Depressed Yes 85.9% 4.9 71.9% 9.3
No 92.9% 1.9 86.6% 2.7
210
NEUROSURGERY, EMOTION RECOGNITION AND SOCIAL PERCEPTION
7.4. Discussion
The aim of the ciin ent study was to establish if neurosurgical intervention for chronic, 
treatment-refractory mental disorders is associated with subsequent impairments of 
emotion recognition and social perception. Of particular interest was whether patients 
who had undergone surgery and that were still depressed would be particularly 
impaired on these social processing tasks.
7.4.1. Emotion Recognition Phase
The expectation that surgery patients that remained depressed would demonstrate 
greater impairment on the emotion recognition task than would the other patient 
groups was not supported by the results of the current study. However, analysis of the 
emotion recognition data did reveal that patients that had undergone surgeiy correctly 
recognised significantly fewer emotional displays than did the participants that had 
not undergone neurosurgery. This result conesponds with the pattern demonstrated by 
the brain-injured patients in MacDonald et al (2003). Furthermore, this finding is 
consistent with Homak et al (2003) who reported that circumscribed lesions of both 
the orbito-ffontal cortex and the anterior cingulate were associated with impaired 
identification of emotion from static facial expressions and audio-taped emotional 
sounds. These findings provide support for the proposition that the orbito-frontal 
cortex and the anterior cingulate perform an important role in the recognition of 
emotion from important social cues. The general impairment of emotion recognition 
exhibited by the surgery patients has clear implications for these patients in terms of 
their social interactions. Relative insensitivity to the emotional signals of other people 
could lead to misunderstandings that could act to cause inteipersonal tension and 
possibly social isolation.
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7.4.2. Social Inference Minimal (SIM)
The expectation that depressed surgery patients would identify fewer sarcastic 
interactions than would the other patients was not supported by the results of the SIM 
phase of the current study. Unsurprisingly, participants that were not depressed and 
had not had surgery demonstrated superior comprehension of the sarcastic interactions 
than did any of the patient groups. On the other hand, there were no significant 
differences between the different patient groups in terms of their ability to correctly 
interpret sarcasm. Importantly, the current findings suggest that although both 
depression and neurosurgery alone might impair comprehension of sarcastic 
interactions their effects do not appear to combine to further impair performance. The 
findings that surgery patients were impaired in their understanding of sarcasm 
corresponds with the pattern of social perception reported by McDonald et al (2003) 
for patients that had suffered traumatic brain injiuy. Notably, these findings are 
consistent with the pattern reported in the previous chapter for the clinically depressed 
patients and provide support for the notion that impaired understanding of sarcasm 
might relate to a disruption of the attentional processes that are thought to involve the 
anterior cingulate.
Contrary to expectations, surgery patients also demonstrated impaired interpretation 
of sincere interactions. This finding does not correspond with the findings of 
MacDonald et al (2003) as they reported that patients with TBI were selectively 
impaired on the sarcastic interactions and did not differ from the controls on the 
sincere interactions. It is possible that this general deficit in comprehension of social 
interactions could relate to a general impairment of cognitive function. However, 
inspection of the participants characteristics presented in table 7.1 revealed that the
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surgery patients did not differ from either group in terms of their pre-morbid IQ, or 
educational background. Furthermore, they did not differ from the other two groups in 
terms of their performance on the verbal fluency task, suggesting that there was no 
general impairment of executive function. The surgery patients were impaired on a 
number of cognitive tasks (namely the Stroop and Hayling’s sentence completion 
task), relative to the healthy controls, but importantly their performance was 
indistinguishable from that of the depressed group. This pattern of general impairment 
of comprehension of social interactions is consistent with the broad-based deficit in 
emotion recognition that was observed in these patients during the ER phase of the 
current study. It is plausible that the process of comprehending social exchanges 
involves the same brain regions as the relatively more simple process of emotion 
recognition. The wide-ranging deficit in ‘reading’ social cues exhibited by the surgery 
patients in the current study has clear implications in terms of their ability to conduct 
successful social exchanges.
7,4.3. Social Inference Enriched (SIE)
There was no support for the expectation that depressed surgery patients would 
demonstrate greater impairment on this task than would the other patient groups. 
Inspection of the evidence from the SIE phase revealed that, in line with their 
performance on the ER and SIM phases, the surgery patients exhibited a general 
deficit in comprehending the social interactions. Again these findings are not 
consistent with the pattern reported in McDonald et al (2003) for patients with 
traumatic brain injury. It is possible that these findings represent a general cognitive 
deficit or a greater error-proneness in these patients relative to the healthy non- 
depressed controls. However, as noted previously the groups were matched for pre-
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morbid IQ and educational background. Furthermore, they did not differ from the 
controls in tenns of their performance on the verbal fluency task, which suggests that 
the patients were not subject to a general executive deficit. This finding also creates 
doubt in terms of an explanation based on lack of motivation, as the verbal fluency 
task is sensitive to differences in motivation. However, as noted in the previous 
section, a general inability to comprehend the emotional signals of others could have a 
negative impact on the social functioning of these patients, and could represent a 
possible risk factor for future depression as it is feasible that impaired social 
functioning in these patients could result in social isolation.
7.4.4. Methodological Considerations
There are a number of factors from the current study that require consideration. The 
first and most important is the small number of surgery patients that were included in 
this study. Due to the relative infrequency of these procedures it was not possible to 
recruit more participants. For this reason the findings of the current study must be 
treated with some caution. This is particularly true when the difference between 
depressed and non-depressed surgery patients is considered, as this represented the 
difference between two groups of four patients. Another factor that needs to be 
considered is that the depressive episode suffered by the participants making up the 
psychiatric control group may not have been as severe as that of the patients that had 
required neurosurgery. A further consideration is that the surgery group contained 
participants that had undergone a variety of interventions (anterior cingulotomy, 
anterior capsulotomy and in half the cases both procedures). Possible weaknesses 
concerning TASIT were discussed in the previous chapter. It would appear that 
neurosurgery is associated with a general impairment in social perception. However,
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these findings require replication with a larger sample in order to confirm them and 
for stronger conclusions to be made.
7,4,5. Summary and Conclusions
Overall, patients that had undergone a neurosurgical intervention for a chronic, 
treatment-refractory, mental disorder were significantly impaired in their ability to 
recognise the basic emotions from realistic portrayals of simple social interactions. 
This finding is consistent with Homak et al (2003) who reported emotion recognition 
deficits in patients that have undergone circumscribed lesions to the anterior cingulate 
and orbitofrontal cortex. Notably, patients who had undergone neurosurgery and 
remained depressed did not demonstrate a greater impairment in emotion recognition 
than the other patient groups. Evidence from the social inference phases of TASIT 
(minimal & enriched) revealed that patients who had undergone surgery demonstrated 
a general impairment in their ability to interpret social interactions relative to 
participants who had not undergone neurosurgery. These findings do not correspond 
with McDonald et al (2003), who reported that patients with traumatic brain injury 
were selectively impaired in their interpretation of sarcasm. It is plausible that these 
findings relate to a dismption of the processes involved in conflict resolution and 
inhibition of pre-leamt responses, as proposed in the previous chapter. It is clear that 
the general impairment in social perception demonstrated by the surgery patients 
could have a negative impact on their social functioning and could lead to 
misunderstandings and conflict with significant others, which in turn could result in a 
loss of social support, as well as contribute to feelings of social isolation. These 
consequences could represent a risk factor for future episodes or could worsen the 
depression of the patients who had remained depressed.
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- CHAPTER EIGHT -
GENERAL DISCUSSION
8.1. Overview
As outlined in chapter one, it has been demonstrated consistently that major 
depression is associated with marked changes in many domains of emotional 
processing, most notably explicit memory for depression-relevant affective material. 
The main aim of this thesis was to expand upon the existing knowledge base in the 
area of emotional processing in major depression. In particular the aim was to 
continue with the avenue of research initiated in the study conducted by Ridout et al 
(2003) that addressed the profile of cognitive processing exhibited by clinically 
depressed individuals in response to important non-verbal social stimuli; namely 
emotional facial expressions. This approach represents an extension to previous work, 
as prior studies have tended to focus on depressed individuals’ processing of affective 
verbal material (words, stories etc). It was proposed (see section 1.7, page 39) that the 
profile of emotional processing associated with non-verbal stimuli (faces, images etc) 
might differ from the pattern that is related to processing of affective verbal stimuli. 
This proposition was based on the assumption that the non-verbal stimuli would be 
more emotive than would the affective words. According to Teasdale and Barnard’s 
ICS model (1993), mood-congruent biases in depression are only present under 
circumstances that result in the affect-related “hot” elements of the emotional stimuli 
being represented in the cognitive system, and in the case of MCM biases subsequent 
access to these “hot” representations is required. With this in mind, it would be 
expected that more emotive stimuli would result in stronger mood congruent effects. 
In line with this notion. Power and Dalgleish (1997) suggested that the processing of
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emotional facial expressions might be more sensitive to attentional bias in depressed 
individuals than verbal stimuli. However, a further aim of the current body of work 
was to consider the pattern of emotional processing exhibited by depressed 
individuals in light of the general cognitive dysfunction that has been reported in the 
literature, as this type of consideration has been lacking in the literature. The 
following sections (8.2, 8.3 & 8.4) of this chapter will consider the contribution of the 
thesis to the current understanding of changes in selective attention, memory function 
and emotion recognition/social processing that are associated with major depression. 
The subsequent section (8.5) will consider these findings in light of the different 
cognitive models/theories, in an attempt to establish the possible cognitive 
mechanisms underlying the observed profile of emotional processing. Section 8.6 will 
highlight the importance of executive processes in emotional processing. Section 8.7 
will consider the possible neural underpinnings of these changes in emotional 
processing. Section 8.8 will outline the implications of the findings in terms of the 
everyday function of depressed individuals and the maintenance of their current 
depressive episode. Section 8.9 will consider general limitations of the studies 
reported in the thesis. Future directions for this work will be considered in section 
8.10 and, finally, section 8.11 will take the form of a summary of the contribution of 
the thesis to the current knowledge of emotional processing in major depression.
8,2. Selective attention for emotional material in major depression
As noted in the introduction to this thesis (section 1.4.2, page 26) evidence that 
depressed individuals selectively attend to depression-relevant elements of the 
stimulus environment is equivocal at best. However, there have been a number of 
studies, particularly those that have utilised the emotional version of the Stroop
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colour-naming task (e.g. Gotlib & Cane, 1987), that have demonstrated that depressed 
individuals may, under certain circumstances, demonstrate biased attention for 
depression-relevant stimuli. Furthermore, other studies have demonstrated that 
depressed individuals fail to exhibit the positive attention bias in that is characteristic 
of healthy mood, which can also be inteipreted as evidence of a negative bias in 
depressed individuals’ attentional processing (as suggested by Power & Dalgleish, 
1997). The study reported in chapter three of this thesis (page, 52) extended this work 
by utilising a face-word variant of the emotional Stroop task to investigate if clinically 
depressed individuals selectively processed emotional faces and affective words. This 
task had been used successfully by Stenberg et al (1998) to conduct a similar study in 
healthy adults. Their study reported that the participants exhibited a general positive 
word identification advantage that was enhanced when the words were presented with 
happy faces and abolished in the presence of sad faces. They interpreted their results 
as evidence that the faces were processed automatically for emotional valence and 
that this automatic access to emotional valence interfered with the valence 
identification of the affective words that were presented concurrently. It was expected 
that depressed individuals in the current study would demonstrate the opposite pattern 
to that shown by the healthy adults in Stenberg et al’s study, i.e. a negative word 
identification advantage that would be enhanced by the presence of sad faces and 
abolished in the presence of happy faces. Furthermore, in the current study, a set of 
neutral words was also included and superimposed across happy, sad and neutral 
faces in order to establish if depressed individuals would demonstrate a selective 
attention bias for the sad faces (evidenced by slowed neutral word identification times 
in the presence of sad faces). The findings of the current study (pages 70-79) did not 
support these expectations. Overall, depressed individuals’ valence identification
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times were slowed when the words were paired with incongruent faces (e.g. a positive 
word paired with a sad face). This finding is consistent with previous studies 
demonstrating that clinical depression is associated with impaired inhibition of 
distracting information (e.g. Lamelin et al, 1997; MacQueen et al, 1999). The 
depressed patients did not demonstrate slower neutral word identification in the 
presence of sad faces, suggesting that the depressed individuals did not exhibit a 
selective attention bias for the sad faces. In contrast, the controls demonstrated slower 
neutral word identification in the presence of happy faces, suggesting their attention 
was being captured by the happy expressions. In line with Power and Dalgleish 
(1997) these findings can be interpreted as evidence of a negative attention bias on the 
part of the depressed patients, as they failed to selectively attend to the happy 
expressions. These findings will be considered fiuther in section 8.5 when the current 
results are discussed in light of the different cognitive models.
8.3, Memory function and major depression
8.3.1. Memorv for affective material in maior depression
As reported in the introduction (section 1.4.1.2, page 22) numerous studies have 
reported that depressed individuals demonstrate superior memory for self-referent 
depression-relevant words relative to material of neutral or positive valence. 
However, all of these studies have presented the to-be-remembered stimuli in 
isolation, which is in contrast to everyday processing where multiple sources of 
stimuli may be present concurrently. Therefore, the experiment reported in chapter 
tliree (page 52) extended this work by establishing if the robust MCM bias was still 
observed when distracting information was presented concurrently with the to-be- 
remembered stimuli during the encoding phase. The reported findings (page 80)
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suggested that the presence of the distracting information at encoding disrupted the 
preferential processing of depression-relevant material by the depressed patients. In 
contrast, the presence of distracting material at encoding appeared to have exerted a 
lesser effect on the processing of the controls, as there was still evidence of the 
expected positive memory bias exhibited by these participants. However, it should be 
noted that signal detection analysis suggested that this finding related to increased 
false recognition of positive words in the control group rather than superior ‘pure’ 
memory for these words. It is plausible that the controls were relying on a feeling of 
familiarity, often referred to as ‘knowing’, when making their recognition judgements 
rather than actually remembering the previous presentation of the words, which could 
be tested in future using the ‘remember-know paradigm (Gardiner & Java, 1993). 
These findings will be discussed in more detail in section 8.5 in the light of the 
different cognitive theories of depression.
In a previous study, Ridout et al (2003) demonstrated that the MCM bias for 
depression-relevant words that had been demonstrated consistently in depressed 
individuals generalised to their processing of sad emotional faces. The experiment 
reported in chapter five of this thesis (page, 125) extended this work by assessing if 
direct processing of the emotional valence of the faces was required at encoding for 
this MCM hias to be observed at memory testing. To this end, the encoding task 
(emotion identification) that was utilised in the original study was replaced with a task 
(gender identification) that did not require active processing of the emotional content 
of the faces. The findings of this study (page 139) demonstrated that there was no 
evidence of the MCM bias for sad faces in the depressed participants and no evidence 
of a MCM bias for happy faces in the control group, both of which suggests that
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explicit processing of the emotional content of the stimuli is a prerequisite for mood- 
congruent retrieval to occur. Interestingly, although the controls did not demonstrate 
preferential memory for any particular type of facial expression (i.e. they recognised a 
similar percentage of happy, sad & neutral expressions), they did recognise more sad 
faces than did the depressed patients. This finding is not consistent with the results of 
Ridout et al (2003), who reported the opposite pattern of data. These finding will be 
discussed later in the light of the different cognitive models (see section 8.5).
A further contribution of the thesis to the understanding of memory for experimental 
materials in major depression was to directly investigate the extent to which depressed 
individuals might be susceptible to falsely recognising negative stimuli. Based on the 
proposal of Segal et al (1995) that depression-relevant concepts are highly organised 
in the cognitive systems of depressed individuals it was expected that viewing a series 
of depression-relevant words would lead the depressed participants in the current 
study to falsely recognise highly related depression-relevant words that were not 
presented at encoding. The findings of the study outlined in chapter three (page 84) 
provided some evidence for this proposal as the depressed patients exhibited a strong 
tendency to falsely recognise depression-relevant words that were not presented 
during the encoding phase but that were highly related to the words that were 
presented. It should be noted that this was not a general tendency on the part of the 
depressed patients, as they did not exhibit false memory for the highly related positive 
words. This finding suggests that depression-relevant Tures’ were primed in the 
depressed patients. These findings will be considered further in section 8.5 when the 
current results are discussed in light of the different cognitive models.
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8.3.2. Autobiographical memorv retrieval in MD
As noted in the introduction of this thesis (section 1.4.1.1, page 16) major depression 
is associated with marked changes to autobiographical memory function. For 
example, it has been reported consistently that major depression is associated with 
impaired access to positive memories (evidenced by slower retrieval times for these 
memories). A further robust finding of particular note is that, when requested to 
provide specific autobiographical memories (ABMs), depressed individuals tend to 
retrieve overgeneral, categorical memories. The study reported in chapter four of this 
thesis (page, 90) extended this work by establishing the pattern of ABM retrieval that 
is associated with healthy and depressed mood in response to important non-verbal 
memory cues (affective images & emotional faces). This study was based on the 
findings of Williams et al (1999), who reported that, compared to word cues that were 
low in imageability, highly imageable word cues provided greater access to specific 
ABMs (evidenced by faster retrieval times and retrieval of a greater proportion of 
specific ABMs as a first response to the cues). In line with Williams et al (1999) the 
current study demonstrated that visual images were associated with greater specificity 
of ABM retrieval than were words or faces. However, this finding was only observed 
in the healthy controls, as depressed individuals failed to demonstrate enhanced 
retrieval of specific ABMs to images cues. Tins finding is consistent with Williams 
and Dritschel (1988), who reported that depressed individuals were not able to make 
use of additional contextual information to enhance their access to specific ABMs.
Another finding of particular note observed in the current study, was that when the 
faces were used to cue ABMs depressed individuals demonstrated even greater 
impairment of ABM retrieval than they exhibited to words or images. Further analysis
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revealed that this reduction in specificity was related to a marked increase in 
categorical retrieval in the face condition compared to the other cueing conditions. 
Content analysis of the memories retrieved by the participants provided some 
evidence to suggest that the increase in categorical retrieval by the depressed patients 
may have, at least in part, been related to induced rumination in these individuals in 
response to the face cues. However, the finding that depressed individuals’ retrieval 
was significantly slower in the face condition than in the conditions cued with images 
or words also suggests that ABM retrieval to face cues may have required greater 
cognitive resources than retrieval to the other types of cue. It would be expected from 
previous research (e.g. Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988) that such increased cognitive demand 
would have disproportionately affected the depressed patients relative to the controls, 
as it has been suggested that major depression is associated with reduced cognitive 
capacity. Another finding, from the current study, that is of particular note is that 
depressed individuals exhibited a bias towards superior access to specific positive 
rather than negative ABMs, Interestingly tliis was only demonstrated in the 
percentage of specific ABMs retrieved as a first response. The pattern of retrieval 
times observed was consistent with previous findings, as they demonstrated that 
depressed individuals were quicker to access negative than positive memories. 
However, the finding that the depressed patients retrieved fewer specific negative than 
positive ABMs is inconsistent with previous studies that have generally reported the 
opposite pattern of retrieval. These findings will be considered further in section 8.5 
in light of the different cognitive models.
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8.4. Emotion recognition and social perception in major depression
8.4.1. Emotion recognition and MD
Previous research outlined in the introduction (see section 1.4.3, page 30) has 
demonstrated that major depression is associated with changes in the recognition of 
emotion from static photographs of facial expressions. The study reported in chapter 
six of this thesis (page, 146) extended this research by assessing depressed 
individuals’ recognition of the seven basic emotions from video taped presentations of 
dynamic social displays. The findings of the current study (see page 163) revealed 
that, overall, depressed individuals were not significantly impaired in their ability to 
identify the primary emotions. However, they did demonstrate a specific impairment 
in terms of recognising happiness in the dynamic social displays. This finding is 
consistent with Bouhuys et al (1995), who reported that depressed patients perceived 
less happiness even in explicit displays of happiness.
In a previous study, Murphy et al (1999) reported that depressed individuals more 
sensitive to detecting depression-relevant words (evidenced by faster valence 
identification times). The findings of the experiment reported in chapter three of this 
thesis (page, 70) failed to replicate this finding. However, during that study there was 
evidence that the depressed patients were more accurate in their identification of 
negative words, relative to positive or neutral words (i.e. they made fewer 
identification errors). The failure to observe a negative word advantage in the 
depressed individuals’ valence identification times was probably due to the inability 
of the patients to inhibit the faces that were presented concurrently with the words. 
The negative word advantage in the accuracy of valence identifications reported
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above possibly related to the depressed patients’ relative expertise in processing 
verbal material that relates to depression.
8.4.2. Social perception and MD
Previous research (see section 1.4.3, page 30) has demonstrated that major depression 
is associated with impaired social judgement. However, these studies have tended to 
involve interpretation of verbal descriptions or static drawings of social situations. 
The study reported in chapter six of this thesis (page, 146) extended this previous 
research, as it assessed depressed individuals’ interpretation of videotaped depictions 
of ‘realistic’ social interactions. Evidence from this study (page, 165) revealed that 
depressed individuals did not demonstrate a general impairment in their ability to 
correctly interpret social interactions. However, these results did provide evidence 
that depressed patients exhibited impaired understanding of certain types of social 
interactions; most notably where the meaning of the interaction has to be implied, e.g. 
when one of the protagonists in the scenes was being sarcastic. Further investigation 
of these findings demonstrated that impaired interpretation of sarcastic interactions 
was strongly related to deficits in the participants’ executive function (see pages 167- 
68). Another important factor affecting correct interpretation of sarcastic interactions 
was depression severity; individuals with higher BDI scores were shown to exhibit 
poorer social perception. It is clear that the social interactions that required the 
meaning to be inferred required a greater processing capacity, so it is likely that the 
observed impairments in social perception relate to a depression-related deficit in 
executive functioning due to a reduction in cognitive capacity in these patients. A 
further finding of note (reported in chapter six, page 172) was that depressed 
individuals exhibited deficits in correctly interpreting social interactions that involved
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one of the protagonists telling a ‘white’ lie. As argued in chapter six, it is plausible 
that this finding relates to the well-reported tendency of depressed individuals to 
interpret ambiguous situations in an overtly negative light. This proposal is consistent 
with the findings of a number of studies addressing social perception in depressed 
participants (e.g. Bollenbach & Madigan, 1982; Hoehn-Hyde et al, 1982). Of 
particular relevance to the current study are the findings of Hollander and Hokanson 
(1988), who reported that depressed individuals perceived less genuineness in people 
they viewed on videotape than did non-depressed individuals. However, it should also 
be noted that the ability to correctly interpret the interactions involving lies was also 
strongly related to executive performance and depression severity, which suggests 
that the failure to correctly interpret these interactions may have related to the same or 
similar deficits that were implicated in the interpretation of sarcasm. These findings 
will be considered further in the next section in light of the different cognitive models.
8,5. Cognitive theories o f MD and the profile o f emotional processing
As outlined in the introduction (section 1.5, page 31) early cognitive theories of 
depression, such as Beck’s schema theory (Beck et al, 1967) or Bower’s semantic 
network theory (Bower, 1981), predicted that depression would be associated with 
negative biases across all cognitive domains. However, as reported earlier, the 
empirical evidence that has been amassed over the subsequent decades since their 
theories were proposed does not support this prediction. Williams, Watts, Macleod 
and Mathews (1997) proposed an alternative cognitive model of depression that can 
account for some of the discrepancies in the data that could not he explained in terms 
of the early cognitive theories. The central proposal of their theory is that depression 
affects the strategic elaboration phase of cognitive processing but exerts little or no
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affect on pre-attentive processing. For example, according to this model, the robust 
MCM bias associated with major depression is a consequence of the patients 
strategically allocating processing resources to the elaboration of the depression­
relevant material. This notion can be applied to the findings of two experimental 
studies included in this thesis (reported in chapters 3 & 5, pages 52 & 125 
respectively) in order to account for the failure to demonstrate the predicted MCM 
bias for depression-relevant material. During the encoding phase of the study 
(reported in chapter 3, page 52) the to-be-remembered words were presented 
concurrently with to-be-ignored emotional faces. Inspection of the performance of the 
depressed patients during encoding revealed that they failed to inhibit the faces, 
suggesting that they were processing all elements of the stimulus. A consequence of 
the patients’ unconstrained attentional style may have been a reduction in the amount 
of available cognitive resources that could have been allocated to elaborate the 
depression-relevant words, which would account for the lack of MCM bias in this 
study.
In the second of these studies (reported in chapter 5, page 125) the encoding task 
simply required the participants to identify the gender of a series of individuals 
featured in a set of photographs. The individuals featured in the photographs also 
portrayed emotional expressions, but no explicit reference was made to this fact (i.e. 
the participants were not explicitly requested to ignore the emotion portrayed in order 
to make their gender judgement). It is likely that gender identification is a largely 
automatic process and thus would not have required deep processing of the faces at 
encoding. In line with this notion, inspection of the encoding task data (page 137) 
revealed that both groups of participants were able to make the gender identifications
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extremely quickly and moreover the emotional valence of the faces did not influence 
the participants’ performance of this task. Thus in terms of the model proposed by 
Williams et al (1997) gender identification would not have required elaborative 
processing of the faces and hence a MCM memory bias would not be expected.
The finding that the gender identification times of the depressed individuals (reported 
in chapter 5, page 137) were not affected hy the valence of the facial expressions is 
consistent with the Williams et al’ model (1997). As the faces were only present on 
the screen for a relatively short duration a mood congruent bias in this circumstance 
would have suggested biased processing at the early pre-attentive (automatic) stage, 
which was not evident in the current study.
The finding from the study that utilised the face-word variant of the emotional Stroop 
task (reported in chapter 3, page 79) that depressed individuals did not selectively 
attend to sad faces is also consistent with the model proposed by Williams and 
colleagues. However, it is plausible that the positive face bias demonstrated by the 
controls (page, 79) represented biased attention at the early, automatic, processing 
stage. As proposed by Power and Dalgleish (1997) the lack of such a positive bias in 
the depressed individuals could also be interpreted as a negative bias and would 
therefore suggest that there might be changes in pre-attentive processing associated 
with major depression. This notion is not consistent with the model proposed by 
Williams et al. (1988; 97). Furthermore, the finding (reported in chapter 3, page 84) 
that, relative to the healthy individuals, depressed individuals demonstrated a greater 
incidence of false recognition of non-presented, but highly-depression-related, words 
also suggests that major depression might be associated with changes in automatic
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processing, as this finding is best accounted for as a consequence of emotional 
priming. This finding is also not consistent with the Williams’ model (1988; 97). It is 
clear that the cognitive model proposed by Williams et al (1997) is able to account for 
the considerable amount of the available empirical evidence concerning the profile of 
emotional processing in major depression. In particular, this model represents a good 
starting point to investigate why certain types of cognitive bias may be more or less 
evident in the different emotional disorders. However, as noted above, there are a 
number of findings that are not easily accommodated within this model. These 
findings tend to be complex in nature and, as such, cannot be adequately explained in 
terms of the relatively simple frameworks outlined above. Therefore, in order to 
completely ‘capture’ the nature of major depression, particularly the complex 
interaction between the cognitive and emotional elements of this disorder a more 
complex cognitive model is required, such as the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems 
(ICS) model (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993).
According to the ICS model, depression is a consequence of the generation of 
depressogenic schematic models in the implicational subsystem and is maintained via 
a feedback loop with the propositional subsystem. In effect, the active schematic 
model generates propositions such as “I am useless” that feed back to the 
implicational subsystem reinforcing the active schematic model. The activation of 
depressogenic schematic models biases ongoing processing towards negative material 
and away from positive material. Therefore, it is clear that a number of the findings in 
the current studies fit this notion. For example, the lack of positive bias in the study 
reported in chapter three and the impaired identification of happiness reported in 
chapter six. Furthermore, the findings of greater accuracy of negative word
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identification and the priming of depression-relevant words reported in chapter three 
are also consistent with this notion. It is plausible that the findings, from chapter four, 
that face cues significantly impaired depressed individuals’ retrieval of specific 
memories relates to a greater propensity of these to activate representations of the 
affective elements of previous events. Finally, the failure to demonstrate MCM bias in 
chapter tliree and five can also be accounted for in terms of the ICS model, as it is 
unlikely that the encoding phases of these studies would have enabled, or encouraged, 
the representation of the affective elements of the experimental stimuli. These 
proposals are speculative and would require future investigation in order to elaborate 
them. The subsequent section will now consider the role of the executive processing 
in terms of the observed pattern of emotional processing
8.6. Executive function, emotional processing and major depression
As noted in the introduction to this thesis (section 1.2.4, page 9) there is considerable 
evidence to suggest that major depression is associated with marked deficits in 
executive function. A consistent theme that has emerged during the body of work 
reported in this thesis is that the executive processes appear to play an important role 
in emotional and social processing, as deficits in executive function that are 
associated with depression appear to be implicated in many of the changes in 
emotional processing exhibited by the depressed patients in the current studies. For 
instance, the finding that depressed individuals exliibited difficulty in inhibiting the 
distracting faces during the selective attention task of chapter tliree. This suggests that 
depression is associated with deficits in controlled attention and is consistent with 
previous findings (e.g. MacQueen et al, 1999) that have reported impaired 
performance on tasks that require inhibition of ‘off-task’ stimuli in order to respond to
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the to-he-attended-to stimuli. In the recognition memory phase of the study reported 
in chapter three, relative to healthy controls, depressed individuals demonstrated 
impaired memory for the words that had been paired with the faces at encoding. 
Hertel (1997) proposed that the failure of depressed individuals to control the 
allocation of attention was central to the memory impairments exhibited by these 
participants, thus it is plausible that the observed memory deficit was a consequence 
of the patients impaired ability to inhibit the processing of the faces at encoding. It 
has been suggested in numerous studies (e.g. Conway et al, 2001) that the central 
executive may play an important role in the retrieval of specific ABMs. Furthermore, 
Williams (1996) argued that access to specific ABMs requires inhibition of 
intermediate descriptions in order for contextual information (e.g. time & place) to be 
added to the search, which he suggested involved executive processes. In the current 
ABM study depressed individuals were particularly impaired at producing specific 
ABMs to face cues. There is some evidence to suggest that this was a consequence, at 
least in part, of induced rumination in depressed patients. In line with this notion, 
previous studies (e.g. Watkins & Teasdale, 2001) have reported that rumination in 
depression was associated with greater overgeneral retrieval. Watkins and Brown 
(2002) reported that rumination in depression impaired executive processes involved 
thought to be involved in inhibition, which is consistent with the rumination 
explanation of the increase in categorical retrieval by the patients in the faces 
condition. Alternative/additional explanations of the increased retrieval of categorical 
memories by the depressed patients in the face condition of the study reported in 
chapter four include that the face cues may have required greater processing capacity 
than the other stimuli. It is plausible that the increased cognitive demand associated 
with the face cues depleted available resources. It is also plausible that the increase in
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categorical retrieval was a consequence of the generic properties of the face cues. The 
generic nature of these cues may have encouraged activation of general memories that 
would have to have been inhibited in order to progress to a specific ABM, and as 
depression is associated with deficits in the executive processes that involve inhibition 
they would have experienced greater difficulty than the controls in inhibiting these 
intermediate memories. Evidence from chapter six revealed that depressed individuals 
demonstrated impaired recognition of happy expressions relative to the controls. 
Further analysis revealed that the percentage of happy expressions correctly identified 
by the participants was negatively correlated with the number of errors committed on 
the Stroop task, suggesting that the impaired identification of happiness in depression 
was related to deficits in their executive processing. This relationship was still 
significant when depression severity was controlled for. Similarly, the depressed 
patients were shown to exhibit a deficit in the interpretation of social interactions that 
involved implied meaning (especially interactions involving sarcasm but also 
interactions involving ‘white lies’). Further investigation revealed that the percentage 
of sarcastic interactions (and white lies) correctly interpreted by the participants was 
negatively correlated with the number of Stroop errors and positively related to errors 
on the Hayling’s, these data suggest that performance on the emotional processing 
tasks required executive processes. However, it should be noted that these 
relationships were markedly diminished when depression severity was controlled for, 
suggesting that depression severity accoimted for the difference in both emotional 
processing and executive performance, perhaps by reducing the capacity of available 
processing resources. The findings of chapter seven also provide evidence implicating 
the executive processes in the processing of emotional material. This study reported 
that patients that had undergone a surgical intervention for chronic, treatment-
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refractory depression exhibited a general deficit in emotion recognition from dynamic 
social displays. Further analysis revealed that the percentage of emotional displays 
correctly recognised was negatively correlated with the participants’ performance on 
the Stroop task, which suggests that the deficit in emotion recognition was related to 
impaired executive processing. This relationship held even when depression severity 
was controlled for, suggesting that it may have been a consequence of the surgery. 
The next section of this chapter will consider the possible neural underpinnings of 
emotional processing in major depression.
8,7. Neural correlates o f emotional processing in MD
As the studies reported in this thesis did not involve direct measurement (e.g. using 
brain imaging techniques) of the neural systems that were utilised by the participants 
to perform the different cognitive tasks, it will not be possible to make any strong 
claims concerning the neural basis of the reported findings. However, based on the 
participants’ performance on the standard neuropsychological tests (with well 
documented neural underpinnings) utilised during the current studies and the findings 
of previous studies investigating the neural correlates of major depression and the 
associated cognitive impairment, it will be possible to make some plausible 
speculations. Furthermore, the findings of chapter seven demonstrating emotion 
recognition and social processing impairments in patients that have undergone 
circumscribed lesions to particular brain regions also provided neuropsychological 
evidence of the possible neural underpinnings of the processes involved in performing 
these tasks.
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8.7.1. Anterior cineulate fACI function and the profile of emotional processing in MD 
As reported in chapter one (section 1.6, page 36) there is strong evidence to suggest 
that major depression is associated with reduced activity in the anterior cingulate 
(AC) cortex. Furthermore, there is empirical support for the proposal that the AC 
plays an important role in many executive processes (including conflict monitoring & 
resolution). With this in mind, it would seem plausible that the finding (reported in 
chapter 3, page 70) that depressed individuals were impaired in identifying the 
emotional valence of words that were presented with incongruent emotional faces 
relates to impaired AC function in these patients. Furthermore, evidence presented in 
chapters six and seven (pages 146 & 177 respectively) provides evidence in support 
of the proposal that depressed individuals’ impaired interpretation of social 
interactions involving sarcasm may also have related to a disruption of AC function in 
these patients, as correct interpretation of these emotional displays was strongly 
related to performance on the executive tasks (Stroop and Hayling’s). Further 
supportive evidence of the involvement of the AC in correct interpretation of sarcasm 
comes from the findings of the investigation outlined in chapter seven (page 177) 
demonstrating that surgical lesions to the AC were also associated with impaired 
interpretation of sarcasm. Importantly, the impairment of social perception 
demonstrated by the surgery patients (reported in chapter 7) was independent of the 
influence of depression severity.
Numerous studies have implicated the central executive in the retrieval of specific 
ABMs (see chapter 4, page 90) and, in line with this proposal Conway et al (2001) 
reported increased activation in the frontal lobes during ABM retrieval. However, it is 
also possible that the AC plays a role in the retrieval of specific ABMs. For example.
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Williams (1996) suggested that successful retrieval of specific ABMs requires the 
inhibition of the intermediate categorical descriptions in order to allow contextual 
infonnation (e.g. time and place etc) to be added to the memory search and it is 
plausible that the AC could be involved in this process of inhibition. In line with this 
notion there is evidence (see section 1.6, page 36) that the AC is involved in the 
control processes that are associated with memory function.
8.7.2. Orbitoffontal cortex fOFCI and emotional processing in MD
It has been suggested (e.g. Rolls, 1999) that the OFC is involved in the processing of 
emotional material. In line with this notion Homak et al (2003) reported that lesions 
to this region were associated with impaired recognition of emotion from faces and 
vocalisations. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated (see section 1.6, page 36) that 
major depression is associated with reduced activity in this brain region. With this in 
mind, it would seem highly plausible that the observed impairment in the recognition 
of positive emotion, and happiness in particular (reported in chapter 6, page 163) 
could relate to the dysfunction of the OFC reported in these patients. However, as the 
percentage of happy expressions correctly recognised was related to executive 
performance it also possible that attentional control mediated by the AC was involved 
in this finding.
8.7.3. Summarv and conclusions: Neural correlates of emotional processing in MD 
From the above it would seem likely that disruption to the normal functioning of the 
AC and OFC in major depression contributed to a number of the changes in emotional 
processing that were observed in the depressed patients during the experiments 
making up this thesis. It is speculative, but plausible, that these deficits in cortical
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function also contributed to the other changes in emotional processing obseiwed 
during the current experiments. However, further research is required (e.g. using brain 
imaging techniques) in order to confirm the role of these regions in the performance 
of the tasks mentioned above, and also to establish if these regions are recruited 
during the performance of the other emotion processing tasks (e.g. memory for 
emotional material).
8.8. Implications o f the current findings
8.8.1. Theoretical and methodological implications
From the introduction of this thesis it can be seen that there have been numerous 
studies addressing impairments in cognitive performance in major depression. 
Similarly, there has been a considerable amount of work concerning changes in 
emotional processing in these patients. However, it is clear that these two lines of 
enquiry have largely taken place in isolation from each other. With this in mind, one 
of the aims of the current body of work was to consider the pattern of emotional 
processing exhibited by depressed individuals in light of the general cognitive 
dysfunction that has been reported in the literature. There is clear evidence from the 
current studies that impairment in general cognitive function was implicated in the 
observed pattern of emotional processing exhibited by the depressed patients. This has 
implications for the interpretation of many previous studies findings. As previous 
studies addressing emotional processing in depression have rarely included concurrent 
assessment of cognitive performance it is possible that the changes/deficits reported in 
these studies could well relate to general cognitive impairments in the patients, for 
example deficits in executive processing. Furthermore, it is clear from the current 
studies that depressed individuals demonstrated greater impairments when the stimuli
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in question require greater cognitive processing or when the task difficulty was high, 
which suggests that reduced cognitive capacity in the depressed group may be 
implicated in the observed differences. With these findings in mind it is important that 
future investigations of emotional processing in depression take account of the 
difficulty of the tasks utilised, the possibility that reduced cognitive resources in the 
patients might account for their results and also the possible role of the executive 
processes.
It has been suggested that slowed retrieval times in depressed patients for positive 
ABMs represents reduced access to specific event memories. This has been 
demonstrated to relate to increased hopelessness in depressed patients. However, 
although the depressed patients in the current study demonstrated slowed retrieval of 
specific positive than negative memories they actually retrieved a greater percentage 
of specific positive than negative memories, which brings the explanation outlined 
above into question. Furthermore, according to the ICS model conditions that lead to 
direct access to emotional representations should lead to stronger mood-congruent
I
effects. Thus in the current ABM study, as it was assumed that faces and images {
i
would have been associated with greater access to emotional representations than I
I
would the verbal cues, it would have been expected that stronger mood-congruent !
effects would have been observed in the responses to these stimuli. However, this !
pattern was not observed, which suggests that the non-verbal cues did not lead to i
greater access to emotional representations. However, the failure to observe the }
predicted mood-congruent effect on percentage of specific positive and negative |
ABMs cannot be accounted for in terms differences in stimulus type, as there was no i
differences in the patterns observed for words, faces or images.
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8.8.2. Implications for depressed individuals evervdav functioning
It is clear that the pattern of emotional processing, demonstrated by the depressed 
patients during the experimental studies reported in this thesis, could have serious 
consequences for their everyday functioning, particularly in terms of their social 
interactions with significant others. Of particular note are the findings concerning 
poor recognition of happiness and impaired understanding of sarcasm, as these 
deficits could lead to misunderstandings with significant others. The finding that the 
MCM bias for sad faces requires direct processing of the valence of the face is an 
important finding, particularly as there was no evidence that, relative to the controls, 
the depressed individuals were more sensitive to the valence of the faces at encoding. 
However, as everyday social interactions tend to occur over several minutes rather 
than seconds or parts of seconds it would seem likely that depressed individuals 
would become aware of sad expressions, which could lead to the MCM bias and 
reinforce their negative view of the world. Furthermore, in day-to-day social 
interactions the emotional expressions of others may be more salient than was the 
case in the studies reported in the current work (e.g. chapter five, page 125).
8.8.3. Implications for duration of ongoing episode
A number of the findings reported in this thesis have implications in terms of the 
maintenance of the depressive episode. For example, the observation that depressed 
patients fail to selectively attend to positive elements of their environment has been 
implicated in their failure to repair their mood. The poor recognition of happiness 
would also have the effect of colouring their view of the social interactions they are 
involved in. Likewise, a misunderstanding of social interactions (e.g. of sarcasm) 
could lead to interpersonal tension with significant others, which could undermine
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these important social bonds and, subsequently lead to a worsening of mood. The 
findings of the ABM study suggest that certain types of stimuli (i.e. sad faces) might 
be more likely to result in negative ruminative cycles, which could act to reinforce or 
worsen ongoing depressed mood.
8.8.4. Implications for possible therapeutic intervention
As reported above, a number of findings reported in this thesis have suggested that 
major depression appears to be associated with impairment of the executive processes 
involved in detecting and resolving cognitive conflict. Furthermore, it has been 
demonstrated (e.g. chapters six & seven) that this impairment might contribute to 
other important deficits that have been observed in depression (e.g. comprehension of 
social interactions), which potentially have serious consequences in terms of the 
duration and severity of the patient’s ongoing depressive episode. It is plausible that 
the impairment of executive processing that has been implicated in a number of the 
changes in emotional processing observed in the current studies might relate to a 
reduction in the capacity of available cognitive resources as a consequence of ongoing 
rumination in the depressed patients. Previous studies (e.g. Watkins et al, 2000) have 
reported that prevention of rumination (e.g. using a distraction manipulation) results 
in a marked improvement in cognitive performance. Furthermore, current 
psychological therapies that reduce the tendency of patients to ruminate (e.g. 
‘Mindfulness’ therapy) have also been shown to improve cognitive performance, 
including on tasks relating to social functioning (Williams et al., 2000). If the 
observed impairments of social perception are related to increased rumination in the 
patients then it is feasible that therapies such as ‘mindfuhiess’ would lead to
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improvements in the patients’ social functioning, which could have positive effects 
upon the patients ongoing depressive episode.
8.9. Limitations o f the current investigations
There were a number of limitations to the studies reported within this thesis that 
require note. In general, although the clinical assessment depressed sample was 
conducted according to a recognised diagnostic system (ICD-10; WHO, 1993) there 
was no information concerning the co-morbid conditions that may have been present 
in the patient group. This is important, as changes in cognitive/ emotional processing 
have also been reported in other psychological conditions (e.g. PTSD). In terms of the 
studies included in the thesis the most important co-morbid condition was considered 
to be anxiety, therefore a measure of anxiety was included in every study and the 
influence of anxiety on task performance was controlled for statistically. Furthermore, 
the assessment of the control group prior to inclusion in the studies took no formal 
measure of past depression, which means that it is possible that some of the control 
group may have experienced depressive symptoms in the past.
8.10. Future directions
The findings that the MCM for sad faces was not observed in the current study could 
be explained in terms of lack of elaboration due to the shallow depth of processing or 
in terms of the failure to represent the affective properties of the faces. A future study 
could examine this by manipulating the level of processing but still direct processing 
away from emotional valence (e.g. estimate age of person in picture). It is possible 
that the greater processing of the faces required for this task would not require access 
to semantic representations of the faces but might allow the emotional valence to
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come to the attention of the participants, which could be observed in terms of a 
valence effect on age estimations times.
During the ABM study, the findings of increased categorical memories in the 
depressed patients under the face condition compared to the image or words 
conditions could be accounted for in terms of induced rumination on the part of the 
patients or it could be that the emotive properties of the faces were leading to the 
patients abandon the memory search early in the cycle in order to avoid the possibility 
of accessing a negative specific ABM. This could be investigated by establishing if 
manipulation of rumination prior to the ABM study (using the rumination/distraction 
paradigm) increases or decreases the production of the categorical ABMs in the face 
condition.
As noted in the previous section, it is possible that the cognitive impairment 
underlying the observed deficit in the patients’ interpretation of social interactions 
relates to a reduction in available cognitive resources due to rumination. This could be 
tested in future by manipulating rumination in patients (using the 
rumination/distraction manipulation) prior to the social inference task.
8,11. Summary o f thesis and conclusions
The primary aim of this thesis was to extend the previous work concerning the profile 
of emotional processing that is associated with major depression; in particular the aim 
was establish the pattern of processing that is associated with non-verbal stimuli. 
There was considerable support from the studies reported in this thesis that MD is 
associated with a negative bias in the processing of emotional material. This is
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evidenced either by privileged processing of depression-relevant material (e.g. more 
accurate identification of negative words and false recognition of negative words) or 
by deficits in the processing of positive stimuli (e.g. impaired recognition of 
happiness, lack of positive attention bias to happy faces). These findings are 
consistent with the pattern of emotion processing reported in the literature for 
depressed individuals and suggest that the processing biases associated with words 
generalise to the processing of important non-verbal cues (e.g. faces & images). 
However, there were some notable differences between the verbal and non-verbal 
stimuli. For example, the finding from chapter four that controls retrieved more 
specific ABMs to images than to words. A further difference between the verbal and 
non-verbal stimuli was also observed in the ABM study, that was the finding that face 
cues produced even greater impairment of ABM specificity in the depressed group 
than was observed for words or images, this finding was unexpected, and possibly 
related to induced rumination in the patients or increased cognitive demand of the 
faces, which disproportionately affected the patients due to their reduced cognitive 
capacity. Another unexpected finding from this study was the finding that depressed 
individuals retrieved fewer specific negative than positive ABMs, a direct reverse of 
the normal pattern of data. This finding brings into question the normal interpretation 
of depressed individuals slowed retrieval times for positive ABMs. Other studies from 
the thesis also produced some unexpected findings, e.g. the failure to replicate the 
findings of Stenberg et al (1998) for the healthy participants on the face-word variant 
task was also unexpected, findings which might reflect differences in participant 
samples used in the two studies. An important theme that emerged throughout the 
thesis was that there appears to he an important role for the central executive in the 
processing of emotional material. Furthermore, many of the impairments in emotional
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processing exhibited by the depressed patients appear to relate to the deficits in 
executive function. For example, the finding that depressed individuals exhibited 
marked impairment in their ability to inhibit their responses to the distracting faces on 
the face-word variant of the Stroop task. It was considered plausible that such 
executive deficits may account for many of the previous findings in the literature. 
However, as depression severity was also related to many of these findings it is also 
possible that both emotion processing deficits and impaired executive performance 
are a consequence of reduced processing capacity in the depressed sample. With this 
in mind, it is important that future studies addressing emotional processing in major 
depression take account of processing demands of the tasks they use, as well as 
depression severity and executive function of the participant sample. There is some 
evidence from the studies reported in the thesis that the executive dysfunction 
reported above relates to changes in the function of the anterior cingulate region of the 
prefrontal cortex. Evidence of the involvement of this region comes from the studies 
demonstrating strong relationships between emotion processing and performance on 
tasks (e.g. Stroop task), which are known to depend on normal AC function. It is clear 
that many of these findings have implications for depressed individuals’ everyday 
functioning, particularly in teims of social interaction with significant others. 
Furthermore, the negative bias (or lack of positive bias) reported in many of the 
current studies could act to maintain or even worsen the ongoing depressive episode.
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APPENDIX I 
SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CONTROL GROUP
PARTICIPANT CODE: DATE:
DATE OF BIRTH SEX M / F
YEARS OF FULL-TIME EDUCATION COMPLETED
I am now going to ask you a few questions to establish if you are 
suitable to take part in the current study. I have to warn you that 
some of the questions are of a personal nature. You do not have to 
answer them if you do not wish to.
Are you currently receiving treatment for depression? YES/NO 
Have you ever suffered from depression? YES/NO
Have you ever received a head injury that resulted in loss 
of consciousness? YES/NO
If yes, did you require hospital treatment? YES/NO
Are you currently on any medication? YES/NO
If yes, what medication____________________
Are you currently being treated for drug or alcohol
problems? YES/NO
Are you currently being treated for any medical conditions? YES/NO
If yes, what medical condition_______________________
SUITABLE FOR STUDY: YES/ NO
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APPENDIX II 
Power calculations
d=(^ - fi)/a
a=0.05
d=effect size
 ^= sample mean
p=population mean
a = population standard deviation
Chapter 3: Selective attention 
Gotlib & Cane (1987)
Depressed: negative v neutral words (860-803)7180 = 0.3 
Depressed: negative v positive words (860-819)7184.5 = 0.2 
Positive words: depressed v controls (860 -  750)7102 = 0.98 
Neutral words: depressed v controls (819 -  750)7113 = 0.6 
Negative words: depressed v controls (803 -  7357102) = 0.7 
(0.3 + 0.2 + 1.0 + 0.6 + 0.7)75 = 0.6 medium effect size 
Stenberg, Wicking & Dahl (1998)
Negative v positive words; 726.7- 686 754=0.8 
Positive words; Happy v neutral faces; 676-706750 = 0.6 
Happy V sad faces; 676 -  717750 = 0.8 
Negative words: Happy v sad; 730 -  694758 = 0.6 
Neutral v sad; 729 -  6947 58 = 0.6 
Happy faces: Positive v negative; 676 -  730754 = 1 
Neutral faces: Positive v negative; 706 -  729754= 0.4 
Sad faces: Positive v negative; 717 -  694754=0.4
(0.8 + 0.6 + 0.8 + 0.6 + 0.6 + 1.0 + 0.4 + 0.4)78 = 0.65 (medium to large effect size)
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According to Cohen (1992) the number of participants required to detect a large effect 
size using a 3 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA design is 13. However, as we have a 
between subjects factor we need to double this number 26 participants (13 depressed, 
13 controls). The two effect sizes reported are 0.6 and 0.65, as we should aim to be 
conservative we should predict a medium effect size and aim for the larger sample 
size of 64 participants (32 depressed patients, 32 controls).
Chapter 4: ABM study 
Williams & Scott (1988)
RT
Positive ABMs: depressed v controls (21-14)76.4 =1.1 
Negative ABMs: depressed v controls (14 -  17.5)75.6 = 0.6 
Depressed: positive v negative (21 -14)77 = 1 
Controls: positive v negative (17.5 -  14)75.6 = 0.6 
Mean d=(1.0 + 0.7 + 1.1 + 0.6)74 = 0.85 (large effect size)
% Specific ABMs
Positive ABMs: depressed v controls (0.7-0.3)70.22 = 2.0 
Negative ABMs: depressed v controls (0.6 -  0.5)70.22 = 0.5 
Depressed patients: positive v negative (0.3 -  0.5)70.3 = 0.7 
Controls: positive v negative (0.7 -  0.6)70.13 = 0.8 
Mean d=(0.8 + 0.7 + 0.5 + 2.0)74 = 1.0 (very large effect size)
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Kuyken & Dalgleish (1995)
Overgeneral ABMs
Positive ABMs: depressed v controls (2.1 -  1.2)71.25 = 0.7 
Negative ABMs: depressed v controls (2.1 -  1.4)71.1 = 0.6 
Mean d=(0.7 + 0.6)72 = 0.7 (medium to large effect size)
Williams, Healy & Ellis (1999)
RT
Low image words v high image words (11.2 -  6.9)71.7 = 2.5 (v large effect size)
% Specific ABMs
Low image words v high image words (2.0 -  2.4)70.2 = 2.0 (v large effect size)
Mean d=(2.0 + 2.5)72 = 2.25 (v large effect size)
The reported effect sizes vary from 0.7 (medium to large) to 2.25 (very large) 
According to Cohen (1992) the number of participants required to detect a medium 
effect size (at 0.8 power) using a 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA is 35. However, as 
we have a between subjects factor this number should be doubled to 70 participants 
(35 patients 35 controls). The number of participants required to detect a large effect 
using a 2 X 3 repeated measures ANOVA is 14. However, as there is a between 
subjects factor this should be doubled to 28 (14 depressed patients, 14 controls). Also 
cited in Cohen (1992) is the number of participants required to detect a (large) 
difference between 2 means is 26 in each group.
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Chapter 5: Face memory study 
Ridout et al (2003)
Depressed patients: Sad v happy faces (87.5 -  73.8)716.4 =0.84 
Sad V neutral faces (87.5 -  75.6)712.7 = 0.94 
Controls: Happy v sad (88.7 -  78.1)712.4 = 0.85
Happy V neutral (88.7 -  78.4)711.1 = 0.93 
Happy faces: controls v depressed (88.7 -  73.8)714.8 = 1.0 
Sad faces: depressed v controls (87.5 -  78.1)714 = 0.67 
Mean d=(0.84 + 0.94 + 0.85 + 0.93 + 1.0 + 0.67)76 = 0.87 (large effect size)
According to Cohen (1992) the number of participants required to detect a large effect jI
size (at 0.8 power) using one-way repeated measures ANOVA is 21. However, as we j
have a between subjects variable this number should be doubled to 42 (21 patients & j
21 controls). ;
Chapter 6: Emotion recognition & Social processing study
Emotion recognition 
Persad & Polivy (1993)
Controls v depressed (0.96 -  0.85)70.1 = 1.1 
McDonald et al (2003)
Controls v brain injured (25.9 -19.8)73 = 2 
Mean d= (1.1 + 2)72= 1.6 (very large effect size)
Social perception 
McDonald et al (2003)
Sincere: BI v controls (18.3 -  16.1)72.5 = 0.8
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Sarcastic: controls v BI (38.6 -  30.8)75.6 = 1.4
Lies: controls v BI (27.7 -  25.5)74 = 0.6
Sarcastic (II): controls v BI (28.1 -  21.1)75 = 1.4
Mean d= (0.8 + 1.4 + 0.6 + 1.4)74 = 1.1 (very large effect size)
According to Cohen (1992) the number of participants required to detect a large effect 
(with a power of 0.8) using a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA is 18. However, as we 
have a between subject factor this number must be doubled to 36 (18 depressed 
patients, 18 controls).
Chapter 7: Neurosurgery, emotion recognition and social perception 
McDonald et al (2003)
As noted above McDonald et al (2003) reported very large differences between the 
brain injured patients and healthy controls (Mean d=l.l).
According to Cohen (1992) the number of participants required to detect large effects 
is 18 as we have three groups this number should be trebled to 54 (18 surgery 
patients, 18 depressed patients and 18 controls). Also as we hope to make 
comparisons between recovered and still depressed surgery patients the number 
should really be quadrupled to 72 (18 recovered, 18 still depressed surgery patients, 
18 depressed patients and 18 controls)
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APPENDIX III 
Characteristics of the words presented during the selective attention 
phase of the study reported in chapter 3
Word % agreement Emotionality Length Frequency Valence
LOVABLE 100 5.59 8 2 positive
PLEASANT 100 4.29 8 35 positive
CARING 100 5.29 6 10 positive
CHEERFUL 100 5.08 8 10 positive
CONFIDENT 100 4.93 9 17 positive
CONSIDERATE 99 4.63 11 4 positive
TRUSTWORTHY 99 4 j# 11 3 positive
CREATIVE 99 4.6 8 49 positive
EXHILARATED 98 5.68 11 1 positive
ELATED 93 5.34 6 3 positive
ENCHANTING 97 4.82 10 9 positive
AMUSING 96 4.59 7 14 positive
Mean 98.4 5.0 8.6 13.1
SD 2.2 0.4 1.8 14.7
RESIDENT 100 1.85 8 28 neutral
SIDEBOARD 100 1.57 9 2 neutral
EQUIVALENT 98 1.99 10 36 neutral
PACKAGE 98 1.65 7 14 neutral
MEDIUM 98 1.61 6 9 neutral
INITIAL 97 1.68 7 69 neutral
LODGE 97 1.36 5 17 neutral
LIBRARY 96 1.68 7 20 neutral
BUNCH 96 1.61 5 18 neutral
FURNISHmG 96 1.57 10 12 neutral
GENE 95 2.13 4 11 neutral
GRAPHITE 95 L72 8 5 neutral
Mean 97.2 1.7 7.2 20.1
SD 1.7 0.2 1.9 18.1
ASHAMED 100 5.37 7 17 negative
HOPELESS 100 5.58 8 14 negative
HURT 100 5.46 4 1 negative
UNHAPPY 100 5.58 7 26 negative
UNPOPULAR 100 5.3 9 6 negative
HUMILIATED 100 5.86 11 2 negative
HELPLESS 99 5.17 8 21 negative
GLOOMY 99 4.9 6 3 negative
MISERABLE 99 5.83 9 13 negative
INCOMPETENT 98 4.79 11 2 negative
SULKING 98 4.72 7 1 negative
ISOLATED 98 5.17 8 35 negative
Mean 99.3 5.3 7.9 11.8
SD 0.9 0.4 2.0 11.3
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APPENDIX IV 
Characteristics of the distracters presented during the recognition 
memory phase of the study reported in chapter 3
W ord % agreement Emotionality Length Frequency Valence
ENTHUSIASTIC 100 5.26 12 24 positive
I? LOVING 100 6.1 6 14 positive
MERRY 100 4.89 5 8 positive
UNSELFISH 100 4.75 9 1 positive
* • FRIENDLY 99 5.04 8 61 positive
JOLLY 99 5.15 5 4 positive
EUPHORIC 99 6.09 8 4 positive
EXCITED 99 5.44 7 21 positive
CHARMING 98 4.53 8 24 positive
GENEROUS 98 5.1 10 9 positive
ENTERTAINING 97 4.41 12 4 positive
JUBILANT 95 5.44 8 4 positive
r M ean 98.7 5.2 8.2 14.8
SD 1.5 0.5 2.3 16.7
CLOCK 100 1.48 5 28 neutral
LOCKER 99 1.35 6 19 neutral
CIVILIAN 98 2.06 8 10 neutral
PENDULUM 98 1.68 8 2 neutral
SERVIETTE 97 1.76 9 1 neutral
DEPUTY 97 1.83 6 5 neutral
CATALOGUE 97 1.63 9 16 neutral
REPRINT 96 1.78 6 3 neutral
kA RAINCOAT 96 1.47 8 2 neutral
RECIPE 96 1.49 6 9 neutral
INTERNAL 95 2.32 8 62 neutral
r-l PEDESTRIAN 94 1.88 10 3 neutral
Mean 97.0 1.7 7.4 13.3
SD 1.7 0.3 1.6 17.4t SUFFERING 100 6.03 9 30 negative
WORTHLESS 100 5.56 9 3 negative
LONELY 100 5.75 6 25 negative
DEPRESSED 100 6.06 9 10 negative
SAD 100 5.58 3 35 negative
T - USELESS 99 5.24 7 17 negativeINFERIOR 99 4.93 8 8 negative
UNWANTED 99 5.51 8 6 negative
■ ». DISLIKED 98 5.2 8 11 negative
DREARY 98 4.38 6 6 negative
INADEQUATE 98 5.26 10 32 negative
- BORING 97 4.42 6 4 negative
Mean 99.0 5.3 7.4 15.6
SD 1.0 0.5 1.9 11.8
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APPENDIX V
Analysis of the characteristics of the two sets of words utilised in the 
study reported in chapter 3
The characteristics of the two sets of words were analysed using a MANOVA with percentage 
subjective agreement, emotionality ratings, word length and word frequency as the dependent 
variables and word valence (positive, neutral & negative) and word set (target words & 
distracters) as the independent variables. This analysis revealed a significant effect of word 
valence in terms of percentage agreement; F(2, 66)=11.6, P<0.001. Further analysis revealed that 
overall there was significantly lower subjective agreement concerning the valence of the 
categorised neutral words (p,=97.0%, SD=1.7) than for either the positive (p.=98.5%, SD=1.5) or 
negative words (|l i =99.1, SD=1.0); both tests p<0.001. There was no significant difference 
between positive and negative words in terms of percentage subjective agreement. The main 
analysis also revealed a significant effect of word valence on the emotionality ratings, F(2, 
66)=569.9, p<0.0001. As expected neutral words were rated as significantly less emotional 
(p=1.7, SD=0.3) than were the positive (p=5.1, SD=0.5) or negative words (ju=5.3, SD=1.5); both 
tests p<0.0001. There was no significant difference between the positive and negative words in 
terms of their perceived emotional strength (emotionality). The main analysis also revealed that 
there was no significant differences overall between the two sets of words and no significant 
valence x word set interaction, both tests F<1.
Conclusion
Although there was a significant difference between the neutral and emotional words in terms of 
percentage of subjective agreement it would seem unlikely that this difference (1.5 -  2%) would 
exert an marked influence on the participants’ performance of the tasks included in chapter 3. 
Importantly the characteristics of the two word lists did not differ significantly.
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APPENDIX VI
Set A of FaceAVord pairs presented during the selective attention phase
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APPENDIX VII
Set B of FaceAVord pairs presented during the selective attention phase
y
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APPENDIX VIII
Practice and buffer stimuli presented during the selective attention 
phase
Practice Stimuli
Buffer Stimuli
m
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APPENDIX IX 
Statistical control for co-morbid anxiety (chapter 3)
Valence identification (VI) times
Difference in VI times for words paired with happy and neutral faces 
Correlational analysis revealed that both BDI and HADS D were significantly 
negatively correlated with the difference in participants’ valence identification times 
for words paired with happy and neutral faces; r(64)=-0.25, p<0.05 and r(64)=-0.28, 
p<0.05 respectively. A stepwise regression was conducted in order to establish if the 
difference in valence identification times could be predicted from the participants’ 
scores on these mood measures. This analysis provided a significant model that 
accounted for around 10% of the variance, R^=0.08, adjusted R^=0.06; F(l, 62)=5.2, 
p<0.05. HAD D score emerged as the strongest predictor; Beta -0.28, p<0.05.
Difference in VI times for words paired with happv and sad faces 
Correlational analysis revealed that both HADS D and HADS_A were significantly 
negatively correlated with the difference in participants’ valence identification times 
for words paired with happy and sad faces; r(64)=-0.30, p<0.05 and r(64)=-0.29, 
p<0.05 respectively. A stepwise regression was conducted in order to establish if the 
difference in valence identification times could be predicted from the participants’ 
scores on these mood measures. This analysis provided a significant model that 
accounted for around 10% of the variance, R^=0.09, adjusted R^=0.07; F(l, 62)=5.9, 
p<0.05. HADS D score emerged as the strongest predictor; Beta -0.30, p<0.05.
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Differences in VI times for congruent and incongment faces/word pairs 
Correlational analysis revealed a moderate relationship between participants’ BDI 
score and the difference in VI times for congruent and incongment face/word pairs; 
r(64)=0.19, p=0.06. HADS anxiety and depression scores were not significantly 
correlated with the difference in VI times, p>0.05.
Percentage of positive words correctly recognised during memory testing
Correlational analysis revealed that both BDI and HADS_D scores were significantly 
negatively correlated with the percentage of positive words correctly recognised by 
the participants during the memory phase; r(64)=-0.30, p<0.05 and r(64)=-0.37, 
p<0.01 respectively. A stepwise regression was conducted in order to establish if the 
percentage of positive words correctly recognised during the memory phase could be 
predicted from the participants’ scores on these mood measures. This analysis 
provided a significant model that accounted for around 13% of the variance, R^=0.13, 
adjusted R^=0.12; F(l, 62)=9.6, p<0.01. HADS D score emerged as the strongest 
predictor; Beta -0,37, p<0.01.
Conclusion
The results of these analyses suggest that it is depression, and not anxiety, that 
contributes most strongly to the explanation of the differences in attention and 
memory performance identified in chapter 3.
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Appendix X
Words used to cue autobiographical memories during the 
study reported in chapter 4
PRACTICE POSITIVE NEGATIVE
CUE WORDS CUE WORDS CUE WORDS
BUS HAPPY LONELY
TABLE INTERESTED CLUMSY
SAFE SORRY
SUCCESSFUL ANGRY
SURPRISED HURT
(EMOTIONALLY)
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APPENDIX XI
Positive and neutral images used to cue ABMs during the study
reported in chapter 4
Practice Images
m
Positive Images
*
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APPENDIX XII 
Negative images used to cue ABMs during the study reported in
chapter 4
Negative Images
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APPENDIX XIII 
Faces used to cue ABMs during the study reported in chapter 4
Practice Faces
Positive Faces
Negative Faces
mm
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APPENDIX XIV 
Inter-rater reliability for coding of ABMs
Correlational analysis revealed that there were significant correlations between the 
number of memories that were coded by the principle researcher (NR) and the 
independent ‘blind’ rater (BD) as specific; r(20)=0.97, P<0.001, extended; r(20)=0,6, 
P<0.01 or categorical; r(20)=0.98, P<0.001. These findings demonstrate a mean 
inter-rater agreement of 85%.
Mean number of memories coded by the two raters as specific, extended or 
categorical (standard errors are presented in parentheses)
Type of ABM Rater: NR Rater: BD
Specific 5.9 (0.7) 5.7 (0.7)
Extended 0.5 (0.2) 0.7 (0.2)
Categorical 3.2 (0.7) 3.1 (0.7)
Analysis of the data presented in the table revealed that the two raters did not differ 
significantly in terms of the number of memories they coded as specific; t(38)=0.2, 
P>0.05, extended; t(38)=1.0, P>0.05 or categorical; t(38)=0.1, P>0.05.
These analyses demonstrate a high level of inter-rater agreement in terms of coding 
the different types of memories.
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APPENDIX XV 
Statistical Control for Co-morbid Anxiety (chapter 4)
ABM Retrieval Times 
Positive ABMs
Correlational analysis revealed that both BDI and HADS_A were significantly 
correlated with positive ABM retrieval time; r(50)=0.4, p<0.01 and r(50)=0.3, p<0.05 
respectively. A stepwise regression was conducted in order to establish if the retrieval 
times of positive ABMs could be predicted from depression (BDI) and anxiety 
(HADS_A) scores. This analysis provided a significant model that predicted 16% of 
the variance, R^=0.16, adjusted R^=0.15; F(l, 48)=9.3, p<0.01. BDI score emerged as 
the strongest predictor; Beta 0.4, p<0.01.
Number o f ABMs retrieved
Positive
Correlational analysis revealed that BDI was significantly negatively correlated with 
the number of positive ABMs retrieved by the participants, r(50)=-0.3, p<0.05. 
However, HADS_A was not significantly correlated with the number of positive 
ABMs, p>0.05. A stepwise regression was conducted in order to establish if the 
number of positive memories produced by the participants could be predicted firom 
the depression (BDI) and anxiety (HADS_A) scores. The analysis produced a 
significant model that accounted for 9% of the variance; R^=0.09, adjusted R^=0.07; 
F(l, 48)=4.6, p<0.05. BDI score emerged as the strongest predictor; Beta -0.3, 
p<0.05.
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Percentage o f Specific ABMs
Words
Correlational analysis revealed that both BDI and HADS A scores were significantly 
negatively correlated with the number of specific ABMs retrieved by the participants 
when cued with words, r(50)=-0.41, p<0.01 and r(50)=-0.39, p<0.01 respectively. A 
stepwise regression analysis was conducted to establish if the percentage of specific 
ABMs retrieved in response to word cues could be predicted from the participants’ 
depression (BDI) and anxiety (HADS A) scores. This analysis revealed a significant 
model that explained 17% of the variance; R^=0.17, adjusted R^=0.15, F(l, 48)=9.6, 
p<0.01. Furthermore, BDI score emerged as the strongest predictor; Beta=-0.41,
p<0.01.
Images
Correlational analysis revealed that both BDI and HADS_A scores were significantly 
negatively correlated with the number of specific ABMs retrieved by the participants 
when cued with images, r(50)=-0.61, p<0.001 and r(50)=-0.56, p<0.001 respectively. 
A stepwise regression analysis was conducted to establish if the percentage of specific 
ABMs retrieved in response to image cues could be predicted from the participants’ 
depression (BDI) and anxiety (HADS A) scores. This analysis revealed a significant 
model that explained 37% of the variance; R^=0.37, adjusted R^=0.36, F(l, 48)=28.0, 
p<0.001. Furthermore, BDI score emerged as the strongest predictor; Beta=-0.61,
p<0.001.
Faces
Correlational analysis revealed that both BDI and HADS A scores were significantly 
negatively correlated with the number of specific ABMs retrieved by the participants
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when cued with faces, r(50)=-0.57, p<0.001 and r(50)=-0.52, p<0.001 respectively. A 
stepwise regression analysis was conducted to establish if the percentage of specific 
ABMs retrieved in response to face cues could be predicted from the participants’ 
depression (BDI) and anxiety (HADS A) scores. This analysis revealed a significant 
model that explained 33% of the variance; R^=0.33, adjusted R^=0.31, F(l, 48)=23.1, 
p<0.001. Furthermore, BDI score emerged as the strongest predictor; Beta=-0.57,
p<0.001.
Number o f Categorical ABMs
Correlational analysis revealed that both BDI and HADS A scores were significantly 
associated with the number of categorical retrieval errors produced by the 
participants; r(50)=0.57, p<0.001 and r(50)=0.56, p<0.001 respectively. A stepwise 
regression was conducted in order to establish if the number of categorical memories 
retrieved by the participants could be predicted from depression (BDI) and anxiety 
(HADS A) scores. This analysis revealed a significant model that explained 33% of 
the variance; R^=0.33, adjusted R^=0.32; F(l, 48)=24.5, P<0.001. Furthermore, BDI 
emerged as the strongest predictor; Beta=0.57, p<0.001.
Conclusion
The results of all of these analyses suggest that it is depression, and not anxiety, that 
consistently contributes most strongly to the explanation of the differences in ABM 
retrieval reported through out this chapter.
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APPENDIX XVI
Faces (Set A) presented to the participants during the encoding phase of
the study reported in chapter 5
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APPENDIX XVII 
Faces (Set B) presented to the participants during the encoding phase 
of the study reported in chapter 5
IP
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APPENDIX XVIII 
Distracters (Set A) presented during the recognition memory phase of
the study reported in chapter 5
mm
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APPENDIX XIX
Distracters (Set B) presented to the participants during the recognition 
memory phase of the study reported in chapter 5
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APPENDIX XX 
Statistical control for co-morbid anxiety (chapter 5)
Percentage o f  correctly recognised sad faces
Correlational analysis revealed that BDI, HADS D and HADS A were all 
significantly correlated with the percentage of sad faces correctly recognised during 
the memory phase of this study; r(34)=-0.58, p<0.001; r(34)=-0.62, p<0.001 and 
r(34)=0.56, p<0.01 respectively. A stepwise regression was conducted in order to 
establish if the percentage of sad faces correctly recognised during the memory phase 
could be predicted from depression (BDI & HADS D) and anxiety (HADS_A) 
scores. This analysis provided a significant model that accounted for around 40% of 
the variance, R^=0.39, adjusted R^=0.37; F(l, 32)=20.3, P<0.001. HADS_D score 
emerged as the strongest predictor; Beta -0.62, P<0.001. These findings suggest that 
the observed differences in percentage of sad faces correctly recognised during the 
memory phase are more strongly related to differences in depression, rather than 
anxiety.
293
APPENDIX XXI 
SCORING GUIDE FOR TASIT 
Emotion Evaluation Phase
The Emotion Evaluation phase of TASIT consists of 28 video clips (four clips 
featuring each of the seven basic emotions; happiness, sadness, anxiety, anger, 
surprise, disgust & neutral expression). The participants’ responses are compared to 
expected emotion label for each clip (indicated on the TASIT score sheet). Therefore, 
for each emotion there is a maximum score of four. The authors of TASIT grouped 
happiness, surprise and neutral expressions together under the umbrella term of 
positive emotion. Sadness, anxiety, anger & disgust were grouped together as 
negative emotion. Therefore, the maximum scores for positive and negative emotions 
are 12 and 16 respectively. In order to investigate relative differences in the 
recognition of the different classes of expressions (positive & negative valence) the 
maximum scores were translated into percentage correct recognitions.
Social Inference Minimal (SIM)
The SIM phase involves presenting fifteen videotaped social interactions. In five of 
the clips both protagonists are being sincere. However, in the other ten clips one of 
the characters is being sarcastic. Following each video clip the participants are asked 
four questions concerning the social interaction they have just viewed. The 
participants are only required to make a ‘YES’, ‘NO’ or ‘DON’T KNOW’ response 
(they are encouraged to give a yes or no response wherever possible). The 
participants’ responses to each question are recorded on the TASIT score sheet and 
compared to the designated correct (or expected) response (indicated on the TASIT 
score sheet).
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Examples of the type of questions are as follows:
A. Is Ruth trying to make Michael feel appreciated?
B. Is she trying to say he has been a big help?
C. Does she think he has worked hard?
D. Is she annoyed with him?
In the above example, in the sincere condition the correct responses would be 
A=YES, B=YES, C=YES and D=NO
However, in the sarcastic condition the correct responses would have been A=NO, 
B=NO, C=NO, D=YES
The participants receive one point for each of their responses that match the correct 
(expected) interpretation (indicated on the TASIT score sheet). Participants receive a 
score of zero for incorrect & don’t know responses. Thus, the maximum scores for 
sincere and sarcastic interactions are 20 and 40 respectively. In order to allow 
comparison of relative differences in the accuracy of interpretation of the two types of 
interaction (sincere & sarcastic) the total scores of the participants were converted to 
percentage correct interpretations.
Social Inference Enriched (SIE)
The SIE phase of TASIT involves presenting participants with sixteen videotaped 
social interactions. In half of the interactions one of the protagonists is telling a ‘white 
lie’ to play down the truth, in the remaining interactions one of the protagonists is 
being sarcastic in order to make clear their feelings to the other person. As with SIM 
phase, following each clip the participants are asked four questions concerning the
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meaning of the social interaction they have just viewed. The participants are again 
only asked to provide YES, NO or DON’T KNOW responses. The participants’ 
responses to each question are recorded on the TASIT score sheet and are compared 
to the designated correct (or expected) response.
An example of the type of questions that are asked during the SIE phase are as 
follows:
When Ruth is talking to Gary in the changing room
A. Is she trying to make him put on weight?
B. Is she trying to say that he has put on weight?
C. Does she think he has put on weight?
D. Does he seem happy with her?
In the above example, in the ‘white lie’ condition the correct responses would be 
A=NO, B=NO, C=YES and D=YES
However, in the sarcastic condition the correct responses would have been A=YES, 
B=YES, C=YES, D=NO
As in the SIM phase, the participants receive one point for each of their responses that 
match the correct (expected) interpretation (indicated on the TASIT score sheet) and 
zero for incorrect & don’t know responses. Thus, the maximum score for both the 
‘white lie’ and sarcastic interactions is 32. In order to allow the performance of the 
participants on the SIM and SIE phases to be compared the total scores of the 
participants were converted to percentage correct interpretations.
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APPENDIX XXII 
Statistical control for co-morbid anxiety (chapter 6)
Emotion recognition phase
Positive and negative expressions
Correlational analysis revealed that there were no significant relationships between 
the participants’ scores on the mood measures and the percentage of positive and 
negative emotional expressions correctly interpreted, all tests p>0.05.
Happv expressions
Correlational analysis revealed that BDI and HADS D scores were both significantly 
negatively correlated with the percentage of happy emotional expressions correctly 
interpreted during the emotion recognition phase; r(28)~0.34, p<0.05 (one-tailed); 
and r(28)=-0.28, p<0.05 (one-tailed). However, participants’ scores on the HADS 
anxiety scale were not significantly correlated with the percentage of happy 
expression correctly interpreted, p>0.05.
Social Inference -minimal (SIM) phase 
Sarcastic social interactions
Correlational analysis revealed that BDI, HADS D and HADS A scores were all 
significantly negatively correlated with the percentage of sarcastic social interactions 
that were correctly interpreted during the social inference (minimal) phase; r(28)=- 
0.63, p<0.001; r(28)=-0.57, p<0.001 and r(28)=-0.42, p<0.05 respectively. A stepwise 
regression was conducted in order to establish if the percentage of sarcastic 
interactions correctly interpreted during the SIM phase could be predicted from the 
participants’ scores on the mood measures. This analysis produced a significant model
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that accounted for around 40% of the variance; F(l, 26)=16.95, p<0.001; R^=0.40, 
adjusted R^=0.37; F(l, 48)=4.6, p<0.05. BDI score emerged as the strongest predictor; 
Beta -0.63, p<0.001.
Social inference-enriched (SIE) phase 
Sarcastic interactions
Correlational analysis revealed that BDI and HADS_D scores were both significantly 
negatively correlated with the percentage of sarcastic social interactions that were 
correctly interpreted during the SIE phase; r(28)=-0.56, p<0.01 and r(28)=-0.55, 
p<0.01 respectively. A stepwise regression was conducted in order to establish if the 
percentage of sarcastic interactions correctly interpreted during the SIE phase could 
be predicted from the participants’ scores on these mood measures. This analysis 
produced a significant model that accounted for around 30% of the variance; F(l, 
26)=11.57, p<0.01; R^=0.31, R  ^ adjusted=0.28. BDI emerged as the strongest 
predictor Beta=-0.56, p<0.01.
Social interactions involving lies
Correlational analysis revealed that BDI, HADS D and HADS A scores were all 
significantly negatively correlated with the percentage of social interactions involving 
lies that were correctly interpreted by the participants during the SIE phase; r(28)=- 
0.58, p<0.01, r(28)=-0.55, p<0.01 and r(28)=-0.38, p<0.05 respectively. A stepwise 
regression was conducted in order to establish if the percentage of social interactions 
involving lies that were correctly interpreted by the participants during the SIE phase 
could be predicted from the participants’ scores on the mood measures. This analysis 
produced a significant model that accounted for around 30% of the variance; F(l,
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26)= 13.0, p<0.01; R^=0.33, R  ^adjusted=0.31. BDI emerged as the strongest predictor 
Beta=-0.58, p<0.01.
Conclusion
The results of these analyses suggest that it is depression, and not anxiety, that 
consistently contributes most strongly to the explanation of the differences in emotion 
recognition and social perception outlined in chapter 6.
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